

The Role of the European Union in the Integration of the Mediterranean Region

A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in European Studies at the American University in Central Asia

by

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May, 2010

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Jana Duemler for supervising my research and for her assistance in structuring the paper. I would like to thank Dr. Markus Kaiser for providing helpful suggestions for improving essence of the research. I would also like to thank Serik Beimenbetov for approving feasibility of the topic and for his assistance in narrowing the research.

ABSTRACT

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by Aygul Hanova

A Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in European Studies at the American University of Central Asia, 2010.

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This paper studies the role of the European Union in the integration of the Mediterranean Region. It emphasizes the necessity of integration to achieve development and mutual benefit in the Mediterranean. With the increasing migration from North Africa through the Mediterranean and the instabilities in the East, i.e. the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Southern neighborhood has become an area of strategic importance to EU's security. Barcelona Declaration of 1995 set the objectives for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The recent Union for the Mediterranean, proposed by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy, became an impetus for the integration of the countries of the former Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Taking into consideration the impediments to integration, the study examines the EU's influence in the regional integration and identifies the priority benefits of this process within the framework of the Union for the Mediterranean. It also highlights the importance of this integration for the EU in constructing of a powerful image on the international arena.

List of Abbreviations


ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BD	Barcelona Declaration 1995
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EU	European Union
Maghreb	North Africa: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania
Mashreq	Arabic-speaking Eastern Mediterranean: Lebanon, Israel, Syria, Jordan, and occasionally Cyprus, Sinai, and part of Iraq
MPC	Mediterranean Partnership Countries
UFM	Union for Mediterranean

Introduction

“a ring of well governed countries to the East of the EU and on the borders of the Mediterranean, with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations”¹

Regionbuilding has become a pattern of the ongoing globalization. In practice, regionbuilding is the process that requires integration of various countries. The European Union is considered to be one of the successful models of integration. Moreover, it fosters regional cooperation and integration with its neighbors, e.g. the Black Sea Union, the Union for the Mediterranean. The purpose of the given research is to study the regional cooperation of the Mediterranean region and show whether the EU’s role in this integration is successful and how the members, especially the EU benefits from its influence in the Mediterranean.

Map of the countries of the European Union and the Union for Mediterranean



Source: www.barcelona.com/barcelon_news/the_union_for_mediterranean

¹ European Security Strategy, (June 2003), A Secure Europe in a Better World, presented by Javier Solana at the Thessaloniki European Council

The Mediterranean region is comprised of the EU-27, the Balkan states that have access to sea, North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Mauritania, and Libya not a full member) and countries of the Arabian Peninsula which have access to the Mediterranean Sea (Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Turkey). As it is commonly used by scholars, in the framework of the Mediterranean region one would refer to the EU as a Northern member and the non-EU (Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries) as South. The South is known for the political instability, e.g. Arab-Israeli conflict, division of North and South Sahara, and other similar ethnic and territorial conflicts. On the North it is the unstable environment caused by the previous conflicts in the Balkans and the unresolved territorial dispute over the division of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey. The Barcelona Declaration of the 1995 (BD) was the milestone of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, embracing political, economic and cultural dimensions of cooperation. The Declaration facilitates solving of the existing issues and promotes development of the region as a whole. Signing of this document by the political leaders of the Mediterranean states illustrates the commitment to cooperation. The proposal of the French president Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007 to create the Union for the Mediterranean (UFM) enhanced the Barcelona Process by putting its objectives into projects. Hence, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership advanced step further showing integration as its tool consequently fostering regional integration.

The current Union for the Mediterranean could be looked at as an updated version of the Barcelona Process. While the Barcelona Declaration focused predominantly on putting the objectives, the UFM embraces those objectives and enforces implementation of each area mentioned in the BD. It had brought out a number of specific issues that can be solved within the UFM. The following research concentrates on the areas that foster the regional cooperation and implement the initiative of the UFM.

The mere existence of the UFM suggests questions relating to the purpose of creating such an entity. Until the establishment of the UFM previous historical records suggest that there was an ongoing cooperation between various states of the Mediterranean.

North Africa was an arena for power competition of the European states, i.e. British, German and Dutch colonies provided the possessors with the resources that North African states had and hence strengthened their power on the international arena. Nowadays, ex-colonies still have the European influence in their cultures: language, lifestyle to a certain degree; however less developed than their European neighbor. As such, in the Mediterranean region the EU is so far the strongest economic entity. Signing of the BD opened equal opportunities for the whole Mediterranean to boost their development and acquire opportunities to improve their performance on the global arena.

Creations like UFM present extensive material for research especially since they are modern in a way that they are encouraged not by states in their traditional realist extension of the national interest, but by supranational actors like the EU. UFM provides much room for scholarly analysis, involving realist, liberal and constructivist analysis. Such analysis is especially important since in the contemporary world with shifting power relations with a single hegemony it is still necessary to define the role of states within regions and the role of regions within the modern system. Thus the research on UFM contributes to the academic literature on regionalization by providing newer examples of the phenomenon of region-building.

Research Questions:

Taking into account the purpose of the present study the following research questions are formed to define the role of the EU in the Mediterranean region:

1. How does the role of EU influence the dynamic of regional co-operation/integration in the Mediterranean region?
2. What are incentives for EU's expanded role in the Mediterranean?
3. What security perceptions drive the EU to foster regional co-operation/integration in the Mediterranean region?

Theoretical Framework

The analytical and theoretical framework of this paper employs a range of theories of international relations in order to explain the involvement of the supranational EU in the creation of a regional UFM. More specifically, the study uses neo-realist, liberalist and constructivist approaches to understand the reasons behind creation of the UFM and its possible future role in the region and in the world system at large.

Neo-realist approach helps to explain the regional co-operation dynamics in the Mediterranean area by highlighting an argument about the regionalization being an extension of national interests of parties involved. That is, the countries within EU are interested in creating the UFM to serve their national interests. For instance, very often in the literature the UFM is mentioned in the context of Sarkozy's new policies in the region, i.e. an extension of France's interests to pursue a specific policy.

Liberalist approach argues that it is the values that drive any form of co-operation between the states. Though this approach has been ignored and less utilized due to the reliance on the neorealist explanation driven by the more practical and state-related concerns, liberalist analysis is still important. For instance, one of the branches of this approach, the liberal institutionalism is often used to explain the creation of EU. In fact, this approach can be complimentary to the overall analytical framework as it brings additional tools that are values, beliefs, ideas that drive certain processes and regional co-operation in general. In the end, the EU is often referred to as the 'community of values' which aims to translate those values to the neighboring regions.

Finally, the constructivist approach helps us to look at the EU's role in the UFM through the constructs, i.e. certain perceptions and discourses that various actors involved produce. There are many branches within the constructivist/critical theory, however, all including "conventional, consistent, and critical constructivists share the observation of the construction of identity and interest that makes behaviour in global politics relational

rather than rational”.² This approach helps us to understand that both EU and UFM could be seen as social constructs, a result of certain discourses and perceptions. This approach expands the analysis by bringing an argument that UFM is a product of a newer narrative on behalf of European states, and France in particular, about the non-EU Mediterranean partners.

Finally, it is important to note that no theory alone is able to explain all processes involving Mediterranean states. That is why elements of different theoretical schools are used in the study. Ultimately, while theories provide us with holistic view, they are not always suitable to provide further justification when it comes to future events, they are nevertheless important in terms of tools with which to analyze and explain.

Literature Review

The French Presidency term in EU fulfilled by Nicolas Sarkozy stimulated the issue of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership on the EU’s agenda. Thus the topic has been researched by multiple scholars and experts of the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern affairs. There have been as well a number of scholarly articles edifying on the current Euro-Mediterranean integration and emphasizing on the specific issues within it.

Studying the European incentive to implement the Neighborhood Policy towards the Mediterranean one usually refers to the instability in the Southern and Eastern region and Europe’s determination to facilitate peace-keeping in the region. First of all, Mediterranean is not only one of the regions of the European interest. Likewise, as Dr.Eberhard Rhein, Former Director at the European Commission in charge of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, brought out that Mediterranean is Europe’s backyard; therefore the two are tightly bound by political, economic, historical, geographical aspects.³ Consequently, this clarifies the milestones of the cooperation.

²A.Wiener, “Constructivist Approaches in International Relations Theory: Puzzles and Promises”, *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica / Review of Italian Political Science* 2007, p. 13.

³ Eberhard Rhein, “Peace Making in the Middle-East: Mission Impossible,” *Zurcher Beitrage* (n.61): 83-100, 10 Sept. 2009

<<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=484&lng=en>>

Further, the reinforcement of the European interests in its neighborhoods was explained by Moschella as following:

“[...] the European Union, as traditional Empires did, appears to be engaged in a pacification and stabilization process of its frontiers, through which the Union exports its norms and rules in a radial manner”⁴

Roberto Aliboni has emphasized the possible effects of the southern Mediterranean migration as spreading of such threats as crime, conflicts and terrorism on the EU's territory.⁵ Similar to Moschella's statement, Spencer underlines the “unwillingness of southern Mediterranean states and governments to co-operate with each other over regional security issues”, then adding that EU, as the closest neighbor takes the lead in order to respond to the problems of security in the region.⁶

The economic prospects of the partnership, intended to liberalize the southern markets, also implies that the member states will “use the UMed to boost their trade and energy relations with both France and Europe”.⁷ Supporting the economic benefits it is worth mentioning the successful implementation of the project to establish the free trade zone between the MPC's and EU by the 2013. Fabrice Gras analyzed the economic perspectives and achievements, stating that already “manufactured goods from the MPCs enter the European market free of all duties, and the Mediterranean countries have dismantled their own import barriers”.⁸

⁴ Manuela Moschella, “European Union's approach towards its neighbors: the European Neighborhood Policy vis-à-vis Euro-Mediterranean Partnership,” Jean Monnet Center (): 14-15, 19 Sept. 2009

<www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/moschella.pdf>

⁵ Roberto Aliboni, “European Union Security Perceptions and Policies towards the Mediterranean,” Instituto Affari Internazionali (1998), 10 Sept. 2009

<<http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/air03/index.html>>

⁶ Claire Spencer, “The EU as a security actor in the Mediterranean: Problems and Prospects,” Zurcher Beitrage (n.61): 9-31, 10 Sept. 2009.

<<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=484&lng=en>>

⁷ Rosa Balfour and Dorothee Schmid, “Union for the Mediterranean: disunity for the EU?” European Policy Center (Feb 2008), 10 Oct, 2009

<<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=48430&lng=en>>

⁸ Fabrice Gras, “European Union – Mediterranean countries: growing trade in services and investment” EUROSTAT (106/2008), 5 Oct. 2009

Having its essential role as a regional actor the EU benefits from the integration process in the Mediterranean. According to Emerson it enables the transparency “to rationalize and revitalize the EU’s present set of policies towards the Mediterranean”.⁹

<<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>>

⁹ Michael Emerson, “Making sense of Sarkozy’s Union for the Mediterranean” Center for European Policy Studies (No.155, March 2008), Feb 20, 2010

<<http://www.ceps.eu>>

Chapter I: Reasons for Integration

1. Mediterranean Integration: the case of region-building

Being the meeting point of diverse cultures, throughout the history the Mediterranean Sea itself has been of a great advantage for the states having access to it. Promoting development of trade this sea route gathered diverse nations for more than just material exchange; likewise it endorsed the exchange of ideas as such the region developed. However, there was more than economic benefit, for certain states it helped to increase its influence, and consequently gain political power. Possessed by the Romans the eastern and southern parts of the Mediterranean equally as its northern and western parts became the point of exercise of the Empire's rule and power.¹⁰ With the Arab conquests the southern entities were bound by Islam which for the later periods impacted on their political structure and lifestyle. Later, again the Northern states implemented their political strength through colonization, e.g. possession of Northern African countries by France. Based on historical facts each part of the Mediterranean contributed to a certain alteration thus changing the course of events in the whole region. Rather, only the widening scope of the globalization in the twentieth century and certain geopolitical aspects contributed to the process of region building consequently merging Mediterranean states.

Nowadays, the integration is forwarded at specific targets that in the whole bring together the Mediterranean states to one stage where they can exchange their views and find solution to common issues. In recent years the partnership of Mediterranean countries became greater than just cooperation moreover it put forward the process of region-building.

In case of the Mediterranean the region-building is the natural result of globalization. As Stephen Calleya states in his research on this subject, with globalization different states inevitably become interdependent due to economic factors, thus in a region like

¹⁰ The Roman Empire. April 1, 2010.< <http://www.roman-empire.net/maps/map-empire.html>>

Mediterranean there is a need for more intensified cooperation.¹¹ In fact, having an actor as the European Union which has been successful in its own integration the Mediterranean integration is likely to take the similar pattern. At any rate, the European Union is indispensable for the Mediterranean similarly as the latter is for the EU itself. The roots of such interdependence lie in the history of development of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

Having sufficient experience in influencing the fate of the Mediterranean region, France has always played the role of the initiator and founder of the cooperation with the Mediterranean countries. Perhaps, due to its experience as the colonial power France sees certain objectives for which persistence of the cooperation with southern Mediterranean countries is inevitable. Essentially, the Mediterranean countries always cooperated with each other. Nevertheless, their partnership became rather structured with the launch of schemes invented in collaboration of southern Mediterranean countries and France in early 1990s. Namely, those are the Western Mediterranean Forum launched in 1990, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership respectively. According to those schemes there were launched discussions between north-south and east-west Mediterranean states. Mainly focusing on common aspects such as security and economic cooperation those platforms brought together the leaders and representatives of Mediterranean states allowing them to bring out common issues and discuss upon them. However, such free flow of ideas was not fruitful firstly due to divergence of opinions and secondly there was lack of institutionalization.¹² In this respect, initiated in 1995 the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership appeared as more productive since it was based on the Barcelona Declaration that clearly defined the objectives which needed to be targeted in mutually beneficial dialogue of the Mediterranean countries. Barcelona Declaration became a valuable

¹¹ Stephen C. Calleya, "The Euro-Med Partnership and Sub Regionalism: A Case of Region Building?" Institute of European Studies (Berkeley, California, 2004), 5 Sept 2009 <<http://repositories.cdlib.org/ies/040424>>

¹² Ibid

element for the Mediterranean since through this regional cooperation the countries could step into creation of a common space where they would be committed to transnational changes in political, economic, social and cultural domains.¹³ Nevertheless this ideal plan lacked common activities and projects that would put the objectives into force. Accordingly, in the 90's the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was rather theoretical slowly contributing to achievement of its goals. Indeed, constructing a region consistent of already existent sub-regions, i.e. Southern Europe, Balkans, Maghreb and Mashreq, is a long-term project that requires commitment and ability to compromise in order to achieve a synergy. Hence, firstly it appears essential to consign to the abolishment of cultural and other barriers. According to the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation, launched by the Euro-Mediterranean Ministers in 2003, enhancing dialogue and common understanding between cultures and civilizations was accented.¹⁴ Consequently, the Euro-Med Partnership has targeted to resolve the conflicts taking place in the Arab countries and settle down the peace in the Arab region.

Stability of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries is vital for the European Union since the former have a number of conflicts, territorial or ethnic, which were already mentioned earlier in the research. The EU endorses stability of the region through exercise of its soft power. Europe cannot be secure as long as the Mediterranean is insecure.¹⁵ In fact, such protective approach from the European partners has grounds for existence and this aspect might be one of the prevailing ideas for construction of the effective Euro-Med Partnership. First of all, in European vision the instability of the southern countries imperils the economic steadiness, i.e. interdependent global economies. However, in such case it is rather the southern countries' dependence and geographic links to Europe that underline their reliance to the EU. Compared to any other partners the EU is significantly large, thus the Mediterranean countries have no

¹³ Ibid, p.15

¹⁴ Manuela Moschella, "European Union's approach towards its neighbors: the European Neighborhood Policy vis-à-vis Euro-Mediterranean Partnership," Jean Monnet Center (): 14-15, 19 Sept. 2009

<www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/moschella.pdf>

¹⁵ Calleya, 12

other choice than accepting the EU's prospect.¹⁶ Secondly, the economic interdependence itself implies closer cooperation and endorsement of security. The conflicts in the Arab countries directly result on the global economy particularly affecting the increase of oil prices. Thus, the EU has realized its role in promoting peace in the region since it envisages its positive effect on the stable economy.¹⁷ Further, the security of Southern Mediterranean countries assures the decrease of the migration. If the EU achieves its objective of maintaining stability in the region then those states would achieve certain level of development that would contribute to creation of better standards of living. In other words, the number of people abandoning their home countries in search of better life in Europe should decrease. Consequently, the EU tries to tackle possible spillover effects of migration: ethnic and religious conflicts, drug-trafficking, spread of terrorism, etc.¹⁸ Therefore, the regional cooperation in case of Euro-Med Partnership can be interpreted as the EU's approach to security. As it is stated in the European Security Strategy of 2003 the European Union as a global player "[...] should be ready to share in the responsibility for the global security and in building better world."¹⁹ The same document has explained that the accession of the new member states to the European Union brings closer the borders of the conflicting regions further stating the need to encourage well-governance in the Mediterranean and Eastern countries in order to achieve productive cooperation.²⁰ Essentially, the European Security Strategy brings out the issues of the trouble regions and the significant role of the EU in dealing with those issues, particularly in one of the paragraphs emphasizing the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration to solve the undergoing conflicts in the southern and eastern Mediterranean. Euro-Med Partnership manufactured by Barcelona Declaration is a product of the EU's aspiration to settle down the stability in the world. Accordingly, the

¹⁶ Moschella

¹⁷ Joffe, George. "European Multilateralism and Soft Power Projection in the Mediterranean." *Zurcher Beitrage* (n.61): 31-57. 10 Sept, 2009
< <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=484&lng=en> >

¹⁸ Moschella

¹⁹ "A secure Europe in a better world" European Security Strategy (Brussels, Dec 2003) p.3
< www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf >

²⁰ Ibid, p.9

rest of the Mediterranean countries in the framework of the Euro-Med Partnership are the receivers of the EU's strategy. As a result, engaged in the establishment of the secure Mediterranean region, the countries involved in this process are being Europeanized.²¹ The nature of such European effect would be discussed through investigation in the following chapters.

The mutual interest in each other has contributed to the regional integration in the Mediterranean, merging together diverse countries bound to each other primarily in geographical terms. The reason why such partnership is not just cooperation yet it claims itself to be a region is that the nature of this integration is eminently wide ranging. In fact, from the very commencement of the Euro-Med partnership, the Barcelona declaration laid out variety of areas that envisaged the solution of common issues and mutual benefit impelling development. Founding the main goals of the Euro-Med Partnership in mid 90's only with the turn of the 21st century this partnership has productively commenced regional integration. During the first years of cooperation the objectives were rather theoretical and lacked practical tasks; even with the Barcelona Declaration the Mediterranean states continued cooperating on one-by-one basis, i.e. cooperation only among those countries that have similar interests prevailing over collaboration of multiple countries driven by common interests. As such, the process required time to become more dynamic. Situation with the current cooperation in the Mediterranean compared to its earlier stance can be claimed to be more productive since the process is focused not only in integration but the expansion as well.

2. Southern and Eastern urge for response

With the current interlinks between the markets and the global economy practically all parts of the world are affected to varying degrees by processes that take place locally. The

²¹ Robert Aliboni, "The Role of International Organizations in the Mediterranean" Instituto Affari Internazionali (2001), 8 Oct. 2009

<<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=23104&lng=en>>

economic crisis as one of nuisances of the present time has imposed the financially viable challenges for each country and has weakened certain regions in particular. The Mediterranean region was not an exception. Moreover, its was not only affected by crisis since it's a common challenge of the whole world, further previous political and economic preconditions in some of these states jeopardized the ability to face the issue and invent sound solutions on their own. Importantly, instability of the oil and gas rich countries has relentlessly motivated the drawbacks in the economic history. Since many of the current political, economic and socio-cultural processes are interlinked there is a need to recognize certain issues from a global perspective. Hence, the Mediterranean region experiencing various development related challenges ought not to become the Achilles' heel of the global economy.²² The external aid in these countries is vital for their development of all countries involved in general. Besides, having a powerful neighbor as the EU which supports equal competition on the international arena, the Mediterranean countries cannot be disregarded from development perceptions and strategies.

²² C.Calleja

Chapter II: EU's Involvement in the Mediterranean Region

1. Implementing EU's vision in partnership

"[...] will build peace in the Mediterranean together, like yesterday we built peace in Europe"

- Nicolas Sarkozy²³

Placing common goals on the spotlight, the Mediterranean countries years later stimulated the integration of the partnership in a renewed structure under the common project of establishing the Union for the Mediterranean. However, in recent years this initiative is claimed to be once again the invention inspired by French. In fact, the ongoing Euro-Mediterranean partnership that lacked development was invigorated by the French president Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007 with the proposal to establish the Union for the Mediterranean (UFM). As it was reported in the media the launch of the UFM was aimed at the regional unrest, i.e. Arab-Israeli conflict, terrorism and massive migration, and as the French president emphasized it would reduce the tensions fueling conflict and assist in establishing cooperation between the countries involved.²⁴ A new start could not have been left without awareness of all the Southern Mediterranean countries which were expected to join the UFM and it also brought the attention of the EU itself. While some criticized the new project, by many it was an anticipated development that could bring benefits to them.

The attractiveness of the UFM was the determined objectives that would solve the issues arising in the Mediterranean and change the future of the region. The new initiative distinct from other unions by its wide ranging scope included political, economic, social and cultural improvement. In particular these dimensions of integration of Mediterranean states were seen as advantageous for all its parties. Supporting Sarkozy the French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier brought out that integration should be first of all based on economic aspect since in his idea it would promote greater interest in development

²³ "Mediterranean Union is launched" [BBC News](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/1/hi/world/europe/7504214.stm) (13 July 2008), 20 Oct. 2008

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/europe/7504214.stm>

²⁴ Ibid

consequently helping to avoid conflicts.²⁵ As such, the UFM runs several economic projects, for instance, construction of maritime and land highways that would abridge transportation of goods and people within the region.²⁶ The EU's interest in promoting development in Mediterranean, especially in its southern countries appears immense and the reasons are similar to those that put into force the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Yet, under the framework of the UFM the partnership is rather structured than it was in the beginning having noticeable impact on expansion of the region. Both, non-European and Arab entities perceive this integration as the fundamental source for transformation and implementation of certain goals.

The perspectives and intentions of north and south upon the regional integration differ. The EU has a composite approach, trying to enhance all spheres. The EU perceives its efficiency by affecting domestic structure of the southern states and as such making positive transformation as a whole. Hence, in this case the EU's stance seems to be more detailed and rather preventive since it can influence all aspects instantly at once. On contrast, the prospect of the Southern partners is considerably different. They regard this partnership in traditional way where the process requires mainly political cooperation particularly in their case soft-security issues.²⁷ Nevertheless, the slight differences in perceptions on regional cooperation do not intervene in successful implementation of EU's venture present in most dimensions of their southern partners. In order to make the cooperation and integration more efficient the partnership is organized in three-dimensional approach: multilateral, bilateral and unilateral. Therefore, both sides remain feasible in terms of their prospects and expectations. Regardless of the fact that on the

²⁵ Katrin Benhold, "Sarkozy's proposal for Mediterranean bloc makes waves" New York Times (10 May, 2007), 4 Sept, 2009

<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/world/europe/10iht-france.4.5656114.html?_r=1>

²⁶ Mahjoob Zweiri and Nicola Pantaleo, "Will the Union for the Mediterranean learn from the Barcelona Process?" Research Institute for European and American Studies (no.124, Sept. 2008), 7 Oct, 2009

<<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?dom=1&groupot593>>

²⁷ Bechir Chourou, "The (Ir)relevance of Security issues in the Mediterranean" Mediterranean, "Zurcher Beitrage" (n.61): 57-75, 10 Sept. 2009

<<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=484&lng=en>>

surface it seems that the EU is more active and enforces its vision on southern members, one has to note that without accord of others EU's proposals would not function. To be precise, the projects in order to reach agreement should represent interests of both parties, and every further step needs to be negotiated and requires active participation of all members.²⁸ Only such harmony can guarantee fruitful fulfillment of cooperation objectives. Furthermore when issues come at stake, the members should be open to the flow of ideas coming from third parties, i.e. non UFM members.²⁹ Hence, solidarity of all members can be perceived as the main supplier that put into force regional cooperation and integration in the Mediterranean. Similarly, Jean Monnet had inspired the European integration. As such, persistence to solidarity is a product of European example. In fact, the model of "union of projects" functioning on solidarity can be applicable to the UFM as well since already once it has proven to achieve success. As a result, the EU does not impose its decisions on the Southern members, rather they co-decide.

Worthwhile mentioning the alternatives created by UFM. By some EU's role is seen as dominant in all matters concerning the new union. For instance, some argue that by creating UFM as alternative, the EU controls accession of new member states rather suggesting membership in UFM, e.g. Turkish accession. The argument has reasonable grounds, yet provision of alternate solutions might have positive impact. One significant point is that for instance Turkey by becoming a member of the UFM can avoid possible conflicts. Even in case of accession to EU, Turkey would not be able to abandon its longstanding historical and cultural values that frequently conflict with those of most of EU member states. Thus, put into the UFM, Turkey can maintain its cultural heritage and achieve aspired development yet in this union. On the other hand, it would help Turkey to prepare for the membership in the EU or estimate whether it actually needs it. Similar procedure can be applied to other countries which aspire the EU model but cannot become its members. In other words, with the establishment of the UFM the European part has drawn clear borders of EU, at the same time maintaining its cooperation with

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ Ibid

those who seek for EU's involvement. As a consequence, the EU sustains its role as an inevitable international actor.

In fact, north and south of the Mediterranean are correlated in a complex way that they are vital in each others' existence. Through fruitful cooperation, the Arab states can, for instance, resolve conflicts and importing the EU's model they would be able to liberalize their markets and apparently move further on the international arena. Evidently, this can be supported with the encouragement of inter-Arab trade that with Agadir Declaration in 2001 motivated the commitment of several Arab states to liberalize trade among them.³⁰ As with regards to the EU the Mediterranean stability is one of the apparent goals. However, far from the surface there are a number of reasons that trigger the partnership. First of all, the partnership provides balanced relationship with those states which either export or lie on the pathway via which the natural gas is supplied to the EU.³¹ Thus, EU's intervention in keeping stability in the region has apparent *raison d'être*. Secondly, the UFM is a sufficient platform to employ the seemingly non-existent Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU. Namely, it enables functioning of the EU's Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and its Security Strategy as well.³² Perhaps, through this experience in future the EU would be able to reach a common view or a new vision of its CFSP.

³⁰ Eberhard Rhein, "Peace Making in the Middle-East: Mission Impossible," Zurcher Beitrage (n.61): 83-100, 10 Sept. 2009

<<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=484&lng=en>>

³¹ George Joffe, "European Multilateralism and Soft Power Projection in the Mediterranean," Zurcher Beitrage (n.61): 31-57, 10 Sept. 2009

<<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=484&lng=en>>

³² Rory Miller and Ashraf Mishrif, "The Barcelona Process and the Euro-Arab Economic Relations, 1995-2005" Middle East Review of International Affairs (vol.9, no.2, June 2005), 14 Sept, 2009

<meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue2/Miller%20Rory%20pdf.pdf>

As a result, expansion of the Mediterranean region with respect to UFM and its integration has allowed alternative sources for solution of the issues on the interior level. Subsequently, such course of events appears to contribute to the overall progress.

2. Enhanced Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the significance of the EU's involvement

Emerging from the French initiative and taking into account all the implications that execute regional cooperation, the examination brought out the role of diverse interests in the Mediterranean. Considering the real reasons that enforced the regional cooperation in the first part, now we are shifting to the integration process itself and EU's fundamentality in regards to the establishment of strategies and projects within this cooperative plan of focusing on '*mare nostrum*' (Latin "our sea"). The latter is the core element upon which the whole geopolitical interests are constructed. Further study will show the institutional framework and how the various sectors integrate the states and fulfill the expectations from the Union for the Mediterranean.

Founded as a joint project which principally deals with issues in the non-European part of the Mediterranean, currently the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has acquired a greater credibility by proposing various projects that put into force the Union for the Mediterranean. One has to notice that the project is chiefly based on the EU's aid in the development of the other Mediterranean countries. The ministerial meetings are held twice a year, with the heads of states of the Mediterranean countries represented as ministers and the EU through the European Commission. Even the goals of the UFM are initiated on the EU's expectations from the region. In fact, the Mediterranean partnership is one of the implementations of the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) which enhances the European Neighborhood Policy.³³ Thus, such policies allow the regional cooperation within the Mediterranean by funding the projects based on the strategic points laid in the Barcelona Declaration. Subsequently, this plan brings the

³³ "European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument. Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Program for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership," EUROMED (2007), Dec 14, 2009 <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_euromed_rsp_en.pdf>

main goal of the UFM to improve cooperation in the whole region in multiple spheres by emphasizing on sharing the vision and having a mutual approach to each aspect. EU encourages active participation of the rest of the Mediterranean countries in the decision-making and supports unanimity. As such, the point 10 of the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean (2008) highlighted the significance of consensus.³⁴ Furthering this principle recently the EU Council concluded:

*“The European Council underlines the importance of the enhanced partnership between the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries and welcomes the process of reinforcing relations as well as efforts to further strengthen cooperation and dialogue and establishing the structures of the Union for the Mediterranean”*³⁵

Embarking on these standards the Union for the Mediterranean is now set into force.

Now, having a prospective on what the UFM is it is time to look at why the EU wants to be present in the region besides the reasons brought out in the previous chapters. The question is whether the rest of the Mediterranean needs the EU's intervention and in what regards. Moreover, the analysis of the EU's role in these affairs can be examined through the tasks for the sake of which the UFM functions and exists. Thus primarily in the next part one would deem that the internal affairs of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries are not flawless and they advocate for assistance of greater powers, the one as the EU. Further, the study will examine common issues that fall into the framework of the Union for the Mediterranean, the areas which maintain mutual response and the recent achievements that serve as the fundamental evidence of the regional integration. The analysis would go further and beyond the facts that have been previously identified as the dynamics of the EU's initiative to integrate the region. As a result of this study one would be able to once again evaluate the role of the EU for the region.

³⁴ *Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean* Paris, July 13, 2008. Dec 14, 2009 <http://www.ue2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/07/0713_declaration_de_paris/Joint_declaration_of_the_Paris_summit_for_the_Mediterranean-EN.pdf>

³⁵ “Councils conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process ,” 2985th FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting (Brussels, Dec 9, 2009), Dec 14, 2009 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/111829.pdf

3. Security perceptions

Seemingly, the Western world is concerned about the lack of democracy in the Arab world. Causing instability on the international arena the non-EU states in the region urge for changes. The EU is committed to improve development in this conflicting region and promote reforms. The whole Mediterranean region encounters different conflicts with various extents. The EU, being tries to avoid the threat coming from the neighboring region. As such, it accounts responsibility to share its democratic vision with its neighbors.

The process of democratization of the region requires time since this type of transformation is a long term process for the states that have never experienced it. Moreover, the Arab states are suspicious about real intentions of the EU's promotion of transformation. EU aims to achieve secure neighborhood and borders. For accomplishment of this goal it is essential to settle democracy and change the perceptions of the Mediterranean states. As such, democratization of Mediterranean is an instrument that can assure stability and security of EU's borders. The EU's role in the Mediterranean is vital as a promoter of peace. As Malmvig has pointed out the relations in the Mediterranean are similar to the family ties:

*“The shared Mediterranean past becomes a type of “mother-figure”, which has given birth to equally grand and civilized children. Now as adults, the “siblings” have to remember their common roots. They are to be brought closer together and learn from one another, yet to respect each other’s autonomy and difference.”*³⁶

However the lack of a common identity is replaced by coherent actions moving towards the integration. In this process the mutual interest in secure region fosters the integration

³⁶ Helle Malmvig, “Cooperation or Democratization? The EU's Conflicting Mediterranean Security Discourses” Danish Institute of International Studies (Copenhagen, 2004), Nov 20, 2009 <<http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/mah02/mah02.pdf>>

and enables productive cooperation of both parts of the region. Nevertheless, reforms proposed by the European ‘sibling’ are not always effective. It was once criticized that the EU is not capable of controlling the security issues in the Mediterranean:

“On most issues of the day, middle-eastern states take no heed of what Europe says: the Israelis build their wall and settlements; the Palestinians vote for Hamas; the Iranians pursue their nuclear program; the Turks repress the Kurds; the Saudis, Egyptians and Tunisians crack down on even the mildest of liberal critics.”³⁷

This statement shows the weakness of the European soft power projection. In fact, it might not be completely weak but less effective compared to other powerful players acting in the Mediterranean and its results concerning security can be perceived as long-term achievable. However, such criticism is irrelevant because the partnership has only recently enhanced integration and the results cannot be immediate. For now, the EU maintains financial support which stimulates projects for political liberalization.³⁸ However, it is the responsibility of each receiving state to allocate the funds for formation of strategies and projects that would facilitate the transformation. Unfortunately, the governments do not always use the financial support for projects involved with democracy, rather they employ it for different priorities.³⁹ Thus in many Mediterranean states the authoritative regime is still persistent. Consequently, EU’s effort to transform the region to democracy seems to be cosmetic; on the surface the EU fulfills its task by its support, yet in reality the receivers consistently refuse coherence in common actions. Nevertheless, the EU’s expectations are fulfilled in number of areas such as women empowerment or rights for education. Such facts give optimistic prospect that eventually the transformation would be achieved. In order to increase efficiency of this process, the EU should rather be more demanding. As in any group there is a leader, and since in EU’s case its security is still dependent on the neighbors, the fruitfulness of the

³⁷ Fred Halliday, “Mediterranean mirage: Europe’s sunken politics” *Open Democracy* (July 30, 2008), Mar 15, 2010

<<http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/the-mediterranean-union-or-europe-s-bad-examples>>

³⁸ Martin Baldwin-Edwards, “Crime and migrants: some myths and realities”

³⁹ Ibid

Mediterranean dialogue relies on the EU. On the other hand, by adopting reforms proposed by the EU, the rest of the Mediterranean becomes an object of its influence rather than an equal partner. However, this is due to the lack of a coherent approach of the non-European countries that is slowing down the implementation of common objectives. Besides, it is the presence of another international actor as the US that contradicts the success of EU projects in the region. Hence, another reason to promote Mediterranean integration and region building is fostered by the European desire to ballast the American projects in the Mediterranean and not to diminish its role on the international arena.

Chapter III: Impediments to Implementation

1. Implementation: cultural barriers

Euro-Mediterranean integration is complex. Given that the Mediterranean countries have different ethnic, religious, historical backgrounds, moreover the conflicts on Cyprus, Arab-Israeli confrontation and the Western Sahara tensions between Algeria and Morocco overwhelm the idea of integration. How can such differences and confrontations bring the Mediterranean states together in addition make them partners? For such a phenomenon one again has to bring to mind the impact of the European Union in this regional integration process.

By its fundamental nature being a peaceful agreement between France and Germany and making these countries allies in the aftermath of both World Wars, the EU in the Mediterranean inspires similar ideas. Euro-Mediterranean partnership by its nature bears a resemblance to the EU. Similar economic objectives are laid at core which further shall become the push factors for transition of the developing states. Yet, if in case of the EU the integration went among solely European countries with a more or less similar background, then the Union for the Mediterranean is a more complex case. Would the EU, as the sole successful model of integration in the world, handle sustaining steady integration in the Union for the Mediterranean? In order to answer it is rather necessary to refer to the impediments that this integration might face. This complex process has to be negotiated between the agriculture based economy of the South and post-industrial Europe, divergent religious values of the North and South, still unresolved conflicts among the Southern countries. Besides, having the EU as a promoter of democracy, the Southern countries could use it as a potential model to build their own democracy. Cooperation in democracy would be more efficient in terms that the countries could become more competitive and open for innovations. For this reason, the southern shore has to undergo a long process of transition. Another factor that can slow down the integration is that it expects to establish a Free Trade Area so that the economies would cooperate on daily basis. However, such goal on the agenda can be regarded as a long-term project because first of all it is necessary to liberalize the economy of the South to raise the industrial sector, to diversify the production and attain accordance to the

expected standards.⁴⁰ Such goals are feasible because again the EU supports the Mediterranean not only in economic terms but as well it assists its political transition. The objectives of the Euro-Med have to be regarded as a long-term process because the south needs to strictly dedicate itself to transition and be able to compromise its interests. Such cannot be done without outside assistance and again one has to consider the significance of the EU with the aid to speed this process. Moreover, the economic goals of shared benefit of free market inspires the southern states to strive for self-improvement since even if in the short-run they cannot yet compete with the European market, perhaps in a long-run their advancement would make such competition possible.

This intricate route put forward by Sarkozy laid the Euro-Mediterranean integration on the EU agenda as one of the primary issues of the external policy. With the task of assisting the Mediterranean in implementation of objectives laid in Barcelona Declaration, the EU does not in fact load itself with foreign policy tasks. On the contrary, such challenge in face of the UFM makes the Euro-Mediterranean partnership less sophisticated because the UFM allows gathering previous initiatives that were conducted on bilateral level and tackle them on an enlarged scale involving all the Mediterranean counterparts in joint discussions. Moreover its democratic structure that incorporates all the EU member states gives everyone a chance to have their own say, thus the effect on a theoretical level one may claim that the flow of ideas would enforce the positive effect from synergy. Yet, in practice according to the institutional framework of the UFM and due to varying interests of the European counterparts the discussions do not require participation of each member state on every occasion. Rather for now, the institutionalization is focused on the southern shore and on the European members who perceive assistance to transition of the developing countries as a one of the main issues of their foreign policies. Thus, at present it is a partnership that is mainly focused on the participation of the Southern Mediterranean countries and their geographically close European neighbors, yet one should not undermine assistance of the rest of EU.

⁴⁰ Gonzalo Escribano, "Euro-Mediterranean versus Arab Integration: Are They Compatible?"

Arab Planning Institute (2000), Feb 4, 2010

<www.uned.es/deahe/doctorado/gescribano/apiart.pdf>

The model of integration in the Mediterranean can be regarded as fitting the both functionalist and neo-functionalist theories. On the one hand, the EU has promoted economic integration which by means of increasing of development should reduce conflicts. In other words, this process will foster stability meanwhile the EU will be able to secure its borders remaining its soft power. On the other hand, so far the UFM is handled on the upper level among the political leaders and since only recently the objectives are specified into projects. According to the neo-functional theory the political actors cooperate on the sub-national level in order to cultivate political integration which can later on have a spillover effect. Hence, on the theoretical level both theories can be applied in the case of the UFM. However, only through the study of projects and activities taken in order to implement the Euro-Med partnership, one is able to determine the applicability of this project to either theory.

2. Migration impediment to Integration

The migration distress in the EU has endorsed the regional cooperation in the Mediterranean. Being one of the primary targets on the European agenda, the goals to prevent the negative outcomes of migration, e.g. ethnic conflicts, have directly reflected on the integration process within the Mediterranean. One of the achievements that the EU is attempting to accomplish is to stop the increasing migration flow from North African states by providing development aid to sending countries. Through this measure the EU endeavors to boost the development in those countries which should replicate on increasing the standards of living, especially by endowing with opportunities for employment. Hence, the citizens of the countries contributing to migration would in fact be able to acquire employment in their home countries. The mission that EU is promoting within the Mediterranean contributes to the integration process and emphasizes the role of the EU in this framework. Nevertheless, one should regard the consequences of decreasing migration to the EU territory and consider its possible outcomes.

According to statistics the crime rate in the EU increases with boosting migration; there are more migrant criminals than citizens in European prisons.⁴¹ Consequently, the issue has become one of the primary concerns of the EU which it attempts to tackle through various means. The EU has set up a program for monitoring incoming migrants FRONTEX. The program has received a lot of criticism by anti-racists who have pointed out:

“FRONTEX represents a militarized security regime in which police, border control, migration authorities, army and secret services are forming a more and more integrated complex of repression, dividing the world along hierarchies between rich and poor, between [western] Europe and ‘the others,’ between those who have rights, those who have less rights and those who have no rights at all.”⁴²

Assessing such authoritative measure it is important to note that the EU always tries to use peaceful measures. However, according to the opinion stated above one has to note that in some urgent instances the EU is able to implement more stringent tools that enable its police and military forces. Such views affect the EU’s decision towards the migration issue. Consequently, many consider the Union for the Mediterranean as one of the platforms for fighting migration.⁴³

Regarded by a general perspective on one side the migration seems to bring a lot of negative consequences. However on the other hand the same migrants boost the European economic growth. In fact, migrants fulfill the employment gaps that Europeans themselves are not able to. At the same time they contribute to the economies of their home states by financial support of their families. Thus immigrants become bridges between sending and receiving state at the same time serving for both states in economic

⁴¹ Martin Baldwin-Edwards, “Crime and migrants: some myths and realities” Mediterranean Migration Observatory (May 2001), Nov 29, 2009
<http://www.mmo.gr/publications_mmo_staff.htm>

⁴² Ajay Prakash and Antoine Lerougetel, “The EU strengthens the “Fortress Europe” against migration due to climate change” World Socialist Web Site (May 7, 2008), Dec 12, 2009
<<http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/may2008/clim-m07.shtml>>

⁴³ Martin Baldwin-Edwards, “Crime and migrants: some myths and realities”

terms. Thus by constructing the “Iron Wall” against migrants EU’s economy and its demographics experience contrasting influences. The issue is quite similar to that of EU’s transatlantic neighbor: the US likewise is experiencing the futile process of struggling with southern migration. If the EU applies the same model then its efforts might possibly lead to similar less effective consequences. Therefore, it is often important to emphasize the role of the integration of the Mediterranean countries unlike the calls leaning towards right-wing tendencies that often surface in the political landscape of the EU’s 27 countries. Such approach allows the EU to be more flexible in the migration dilemma. Moreover, the integration in its cultural sense might promote tolerance and understanding among Mediterranean cultures. Thus, the regional integration would allow prevention of ethnic conflicts.

3. Integration: what holds it down?

The process of Mediterranean integration is comparatively deliberate. Due to the fact that the process itself is objected by potential members and also the member states of the European Union in fact supplies into deliberateness. On early stages of formation of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership integration was slow because members were reluctant to cooperate in groups. Whereas now, this very integration is a matter of indisposition of Mediterranean states to contribute to the rapidity of this process.

Initially, the first step that put forward the idea of formation of the Union for the Mediterranean was condemned. The idea of French colonialism revived causing objection of some North African countries. In fact, president of Libya explained his absence at the Paris meeting stating that the Union would be a new form of colonialism.⁴⁴ Furthermore, president of Senegal mentioned that the new platform of cooperation in face of the Union for the Mediterranean including European, Arab and African states would in fact divide already unstable African continent into two. Particularly his opposition to this idea was expressed in the following terms:

⁴⁴ “Mediterranean Union is launched” BBC News (13 July 2008), 20 Oct. 2008

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/europe/7504214.stm>

“With North Africa turned toward Europe, the Sahara will become – and this is exactly what we have been trying to prevent – a political wall splitting our continent in two parts”⁴⁵

In other words he implied that North Africa would undergo certain Europeanization which would affect the inter-African states relations, splitting them into two groups Sahara being here a sort of an Iron Curtain. His statement shows that Europe would play a dominant role in the integration and functioning of the project. From the one point, concerns of the Senegalese leader are comprehensive. The role of the EU as aforementioned is foremost in this project because coming from the French president the further development of the objective would be managed from the same side. It has to be mentioned that still African countries are less developed consequently even the common projects of the UFM would be mostly influenced by more developed Europe. In this context truly North Africa would experience advancement in the way Europe perceives it. As a matter of fact, the European goal to integrate Mediterranean by assisting in solution of internal issues of its member states, spilling over into achievement of long-term goals of the UFM demonstrates European penetration into the Mediterranean affairs. On the other hand, development of North African countries should actually promote spread of this example further in African continent. Perhaps, in contrast to Senegalese leader’s idea, this would even lead to achievement of anticipated unification of diverse African countries promoting better standards for living and aspired progress. As Tunisian foreign minister Muhammad Selim al-Sayed looks ahead, the UFM would facilitate comprehensive strategy for development in this area.⁴⁶ Therefore, having grounds for existence in North African thought, the outcome of the Mediterranean is unpredicted consequently such criticism should not prevent from accomplishment of goals in the Union. Rather the criticism should invoke cautiousness in handling the project. Holding up to this idea, it was already clarified that

⁴⁵ “Impact of New Mediterranean Union on Africa” Middle East Times (18 July, 2008), 17 Aug, 2009

<http://www.metimes.com/Editorial/2008/07/18/impact_of_new_mediterranean_union_o>

⁴⁶ Rory Miller and Ashraf Mishrif

the EU within the framework of the UFM in close cooperation with the Arab League and African Union shall assure that the Union's gain would not result on African loss.⁴⁷

The vision of the EU upon the UFM rather involves discontent with France being as much engaged in this process. In fact, not informing the EU about its future plans, France left out the rest of the EU's possible active presence in the project. This unquestionably shows the weakness of the EU's approach in its CFSP, seemingly still each country has individual approach in its foreign policy. On the other hand, the French leader by acting independently contributed to the slowdown of achieving a common approach in EU's foreign policy. Yet, this is still a subject for internal analysis of EU.

In fact, by some analysts it was brought out that the French plan would enable the expansion of the EU south and east wards.⁴⁸ Leaving the EU unaware, France could become a moderator between the two, EU and non-EU countries of the UFM. Germans observed France as attempting to become both European and Mediterranean power.⁴⁹ Most likely this was not a common idea of the French nation; rather the idea was inspired by Sarkozy's activity during French Presidency in the EU. According to the Czech Prime Minister Topolánek, French president was trying to gain a name for himself by actually working by focusing on his economic interest and national goals, in other words he was concerned of France's image.⁵⁰ The media also emphasized Sarkozy's actions as independent from the rest of the EU, stressing on the fact that it disregarded participation of the European Parliament.⁵¹ Nevertheless, further the UFM recognized participation of the EU countries vital. The new project required a budget; the new organizational structure was structured as such that it became in charge of management of the financial

⁴⁷ "Impact of New Mediterranean Union on Africa" Middle East Times (18 July, 2008), 17 Aug, 2009

<http://www.metimes.com/Editorial/2008/07/18/impact_of_new_mediterranean_union_o>

⁴⁸ George Friedman, "A new French Strategy" STRATFOR (25 March, 2008), 20 Oct. 2008

<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/new_french_strategy>

⁴⁹ Ibid

⁵⁰ Elitsa Vucheva, "EU leaders agree to weakened Mediterranean Union plan" EUOBSERVER (14 Mar. 2008), 6 Sept. 2009

<<http://euobserver.com/9/25835>>

⁵¹ Ibid

package being a significant contributor to its funding. Thus, all 27 members of EU became involved in the UFM by gaining its membership. Worthwhile mentioning that a new Union comprising for a great part of EU states is rather Europeanized and again this shows the EU's dominant role in Mediterranean Partnership. Nevertheless, the interest of EU in terms of its agricultural demand from the Mediterranean shifted away with the Eastern European supply in this sphere.⁵² Furthermore, it should be noticed that the interest of the EU member states cannot be equal since for instance the Eastern member states are more interested in dealing with their neighbors such as Ukraine and Russia. Consequently, France used its presidency to commence a partnership that could be beneficial for itself and in future for the EU as well because as a result of its membership in UFM, the EU actually is on a stage where it can improve its cooperation with the Mediterranean and exercise its neighborhood policy. The latter became the major point for EU to support the partnership.⁵³

⁵² Eberhard Rhein, "Peace Making in the Middle-East: Mission Impossible," Zurcher Beitrage (n.61): 83-100, 10 Sept. 2009

<<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=484&lng=en>>

⁵³ George Joffe, "European Multilateralism and Soft Power Projection in the Mediterranean," Zurcher Beitrage (n.61): 31-57, 10 Sept. 2009

<<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=484&lng=en>>

Chapter IV: Prospects of Integration

1. Economic Cooperation

In one of the previous instances it was highlighted that the Mediterranean is an area where interests of two important global players meet, those of US and the EU. Consequently, one was brought to the idea that both are equally necessary for the development of the Mediterranean region. However, performance of the US as more of a military and security concerned player already means that the EU would have to compete with the US interests in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, to avoid such conflicts one would prescribe EU the role of an important economic partner. Further account would clarify the degree of economic importance of the EU.

The Mediterranean is the backyard of Europe; it constitutes its whole Southern part. Hence, even from a geographic perspective it is evident that Europe, Maghreb and Mashreq are manifestly close and an economic bridge between the two shorelines can improve the relations between the partners. As such, the north and south would be not only geographically close but also the mental and cultural barriers can be removed subsequently allowing productive multilateral cooperation of the Mediterranean states. In fact, the economic interest, being always a motivation for collaboration, in case of the Mediterranean can be regarded as a primary step to launch in integration. Hence, in its integration it employs the functionalist theory. The planned and ongoing economic development patterns among the Mediterranean countries seemingly resemble the first construction steps of the EU when it united for coal and steel and further aimed at removal of economic barriers, yet this instance is wide ranging since it implies exchange of various goods, i.e. natural resources, agricultural products and etc.

Taking the example of the neighboring Europe for Maghreb states launched creation of the Free Trade Area. In 2004 Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt signed the Agadir Agreement establishing a basis for further enlargement of the Free Trade Area which further lead to the creation of Greater Arab Free Trade Area. As laid in the Agadir Agreement, the members shaped a new objective of productive economic cooperation where they can enjoy shared benefits. This initiative was based on Barcelona

Declaration. Further, it was emphasized that this objective would be bound by the EU creating further the EU-MEFTA (Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area).⁵⁴ The initial step was the foundation of GAFTA that allowed productive economic cooperation among Arab and Maghreb states. Perceiving the benefit of GAFTA the member states anticipate adherence of the Gulf countries, Syria, Iraq, Mauritania and Libya in the nearest future. Supporting the constructive initiative of its neighbors the EU has proposed to create a common area where the Southern Mediterranean States would enjoy the benefits of a non-tariff area.⁵⁵ Hence, along with the GAFTA the Mediterranean countries are involved in EU-MEFTA. The latter, being a successful product of the Barcelona Declaration, upholds negotiations to allow joining of more non-Mediterranean partners as well. Consequently, expanding the market northwards and eastwards, the Free Trade Area would promote exchange a wider range of goods. On the other hand, economic cooperation that fosters regional integration in this case, would contribute to improvement of internal affairs of member countries alongside with an improved performance externally.

In fact, the regional integration in case of the Mediterranean can be claimed to be economically based, i.e. validating the functionalist integration theory. To the point, the integration of Mediterranean countries is dynamic due to the economic goals rather than in political or security issues. It has to be mentioned that the Euro-Med partnership is primarily based on the trade agreements between the countries.⁵⁶ Taking this into account the focus is towards further realization of an expanded free trade area also backed by diverse economic projects. Thus, for instance in the economic agenda it is outlined to increase the trade agreements with Turkey and to sign agreements between EU and


⁵⁴ Agadir Agreement, Bilaterals.org: an open-publishing website (Aug 17, 2005), Jan 25, 2010
< http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=2513&lang=en>

⁵⁵ Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, Wikipedia: Online Encyclopedia Jan 24, 2010
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro-Mediterranean_free_trade_area>

⁵⁶ System of Pan-Euro-Mediterranean cumulation, European Commission: Taxation and Customs Union Nov 18, 2009, Jan 25, 2010
<http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/preferential/article_783_en.htm>

Syria.⁵⁷ The following map demonstrates the already established trade agreements among the Mediterranean states.

Map of countries of the EU and Mediterranean region illustrating trade agreements schemes



Trade agreements among Med partners (the lines indicate bilateral agreements, the red in the middle are the countries of the Agadir agreement)

Source: Luc De Wulf⁵⁸

According to the map there is apparently an economic net functioning among the Mediterranean partners, mostly connected with France. With the economic integration

⁵⁷ Sophie Petitjean, “EuroMed trade ministers assess crisis impact” EUROPOLITICS: European affairs daily (Dec 10, 2009), Jan 25, 2009

<<http://www.europolitics.info/externa-policies/euromed-trade-ministers-assess-crisis-impact-art257384-42.html>>

⁵⁸ Luc De Wulf et al, “Economic Integration in the Euro-Mediterranean region”, CASE Network Reports (no.89/2009), Feb 3, 2010

<<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=110896>>

the states would be able to match the higher standards and there would be a more favorable climate for investment. However on the other hand the states would become more dependent on each other which can have negative consequences in times of economic crisis because all would be affected. Nonetheless, similar to the EU the idea of this integration is to work in synergy, hence finding solutions for any potential threat can become easier if the states cooperate. Factually the economic integration is successful. Since 1995 the economic growth increased to 3.9%.⁵⁹ Hence, as put in the EU's Regional Strategy paper the first steps of the 5 year for Euro-Med cooperation and development demonstrate potential realization of integration objectives.

Economically well integrated EU plays an important role as an experienced partner and the promoter of the functionalist theory. Moreover, promoting mutual economic benefit with Mediterranean counterparts, the EU ensures a steady image of an economically powerful global player. Further, coming back to the competition between the EU and the US in the region, it is clearer now that their roles are in fact divided. While the US in its actions is solely focused on military and security prospects, the EU's vision stretches to the economic activities. The EU not only encourages functionalism for integration, moreover its activities in the region prove that the economic prosperity would prevent or reduce various conflicts in the region and improve internal structures.

The Southern markets already benefit from tariff-free access to the European market. This is the initial step towards liberalization. Nevertheless, for now there is no visible evidence of increase in trade among the Mediterranean countries.⁶⁰ This could be due to the low production or the economic crisis ongoing in the world. Otherwise, one could see the solution to increase trade and liberalize the markets. For instance, increase of bilateral

⁵⁹ European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Program for The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (2007) Dec 14, 2009
<www.developpementdurable.gouv.fr/.../Liste_projets_UpM_eau_cle622b16.pdf>

⁶⁰ Luc De Wulf et al, "Economic Integration in the Euro-Mediterranean region", CASE Network Reports (no.89/2009), Feb 3, 2010
<<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=110896>>

agreements among partners, e.g. Morocco-Turkey, etc. Such cooperation can progress into a larger network of partners hence the integration would be not fostered only by EU but also it would create more prospects for cooperation besides the objectives that the EU envisions to accomplish. For now it is only the EU as a soft power player and the most democratic in the Mediterranean can assist enhancing of the cooperation among the countries. In this regards the European investment will also be helpful. Initially, investment in long run would support dynamic integration.⁶¹ Investment is able to provide support for private sector for instance as well as it can have the same effect on other sectors. Thus, it brings a positive climate to boost economic progress. As a result, the country develops and is able to cooperate and compete. This principle is feasible for the economic integration of the Mediterranean. In accordance through further study one will learn weather truly the economy is the center of the region-building.

2. Integration in Process

“Only those states that learn how to achieve and maintain a "we-feeling" develop into security communities become institutionalized and, thus, have practical effects”⁶²

The initiatives to establish new communities require agreement and commitment of the members. For instance, when one family merges into other through marriage, the marrying couple often unites based on their common interests, values and a common vision of the future achievements that they can accomplish in synergy. Similar effect can be observed in any other entities that come together to deliver a common project. When the European Community was launched there was a commitment to work towards common economic goals which on later stages spilled over to other areas. Prior to the initiative or in the process itself integration requires the sense of a common identity. In fact, nowadays one might claim that a common identity is not a compulsory fruit of

⁶¹ Ibid. p. 177

⁶² Emanuel Adler and Crawford Beverly, “Constructing a Mediterranean Region: A Cultural Approach” Fundacao Oriente Lisboa (May, 2002), Feb 3, 2010
<<http://ies.berkeley.edu/research/MeditAdlerCrawford.pdf>>

integration by bringing up the example of the EU. On the one hand, the common identity is a goal on the European agenda which in fact is not the greatest obstacle in the overall performance of the EU. On the other hand, who can argue that the EU had never had a common identity? The European Union nowadays consists solely of the European states. Hence, to a certain extent the member states share a common sense of being European. Most of the members have a similar background, they mostly share the same values and have a very similar lifestyle, and moreover they often speak common languages. Therefore, on a certain level there is a common European identity, even though many might not agree the European community is so far the one that has more grounds to create a common identity than any other union or community.

Arguably, common identity is not always essential for the success. However, when certain questions come at stake it is the common identity that can offer a solution through additional dynamics. A well-constructed regional identity simplifies the relations among the political leaders and the peoples. On a higher level it can help to ease multilateral negotiations and point out possible compromises for common solutions. The people inside the community that have a sense of a common identity are able to exchange their views easily and hence there are fewer grounds for ethnic conflicts or tensions. With a common regional identity the regionbuilding process becomes more productive and more secure.

The Mediterranean Sea is seemingly the sole common valued and binding object for the people and states surrounding it. *Mare nostrum* or Our Sea is the main tangible source for cooperation and since there are in fact more aspects to negotiate upon in this region this cooperation has imposed the process of regional integration. Hundred years ago it was a common space connected by the trade routes and spread of Christianity and Islam, and later possessions of European powers. Today, the Mediterranean as it can be extracted from previous findings remains the center for economic and political cooperation between two parts that hold different views. The Mediterranean cultures are unlike each other: varying in religion, traditions, languages, interests, lifestyles, etc. Even if bringing the two distinct parts, the developed north and developing south, to the

common table is possible it is challenging to have them speak a common language. It is not the matter of understanding each other's languages, but rather understanding each others views might be confronting. On some political issues the two have slightly different views because one is democratized whereas the other still has the autocratic regimes, as one might argue. If the initiative of the Euro-Med partnership is expected to be more productive then one need to launch the long-term process of building a regional identity which according to this theory would promote efficiency of integration and objectives laid at the core. Consequently, in order to make the views similar the EU should assist the South in democratization. As an outcome the newly constructed Mediterranean community would be able to freely express their ideas and mutually fruitful exchange between the south and north will be feasible. On the one hand democratization of the Muslim community is a long-term mission since the countries have never experienced it. That is why democratization might not work for them.⁶³ On the other hand, while in the process of integration, the sense of a common community which is valued among Muslims and other North African tribes may assist and foster regional integration. Taking into view the former idea, the envisioned projects regarding the economic prosperity and environmental security would be moved to the background while the projects constructing the common cultural identity would be at the forefront. Consequently, it can become a long term process. From one perspective, this scenario could have in fact eliminated the regional instability and helped the EU to achieve prospected goals of its Neighborhood Policy. Yet, perhaps concerned of being too friendly to the South, which in turn can have two effects: either the South becomes Europeanized and lays solid grounds for future conflicts in Sahara or the South attracted by the European friendliness will increase migration flows to the EU. On the other hand, perhaps those are the main reasons why the EU has applied a different theory of integration in the Mediterranean. In this vision the regional identity is not the core element. Such can be achieved along the process. Therefore, the "we-feeling" is laid in each project within the Mediterranean; eventually there will be a common sense of not belonging but of relativity to each other in various matters. It is the institutional design of the Mediterranean which does not focus on the difference of blood and culture, but rather

⁶³ Ibid

gives preference to the integration of the common interests of the leaders and their societies that in fact not to a lesser degree assist regionbuilding.⁶⁴ At least one should regard the following factor as the foundation of integration: developing countries that are willing to access and be a part of the global markets utilize regional integration as an instrument.⁶⁵ In this case the not yet economically successful South through Euro-Med partnership integrates into the well-performing economy of the EU and consequently improves its own performance and sustainability.

As such, in case of the Mediterranean integration one should rather speak about common interests and expectations rather than a common identity related by blood and culture. There are a number of areas that draw attention of the states belonging to the Mediterranean; accordingly there is cooperation for now on bilateral level among the EU and different countries to the South. Perhaps, in this case the already-mentioned value of a community among the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean nations will advance integration.

⁶⁴ Ibid, Adley and Crawford, p.16

⁶⁵ Gonzalo Escibano

Chapter V: Additional Factors

1. Demand related membership: the Turkish gate

Security perceptions within the Mediterranean dialogue stretch overlap on the economic concerns of the EU. For the EU's demand in natural resources coming from Central Asia, Turkish membership plays a vital role. Turkey's candidacy for EU membership is still a debated issue on the EU's agenda. However, cooperation with Turkey is inevitable since it is a potential gateway for gas pipelines. The Russian transit with recent concerns of Ukrainian involvement restricted European access to gas for a certain period. Thus looking for optional decisions the EU anticipates Turkey to become the transporter and the go-between in its negotiations for gas and oil. By providing UFM membership for Turkey initially the EU tried to compromise its accession as a member state. Thus, enabling fruitful cooperation with Turkey in the Mediterranean dialogue and integrating it with the rest of the Mediterranean states, the EU in fact made Turkey one of the key members. Similar to the previous cases where the EU tries to achieve security, in case with Turkey the EU intends to achieve economic goals.

With the increasing demand of gas and oil in the European market along with such suppliers as Russia, North Sea and North Africa, the EU needs another channel that would ensure its access to these resources to meet the future demands.⁶⁶ Having Turkey as its ally the EU would be able to consider possible proposals to import gas from various locations. Recent negotiations upon the construction of the Nabucco pipeline emphasize the role of Turkey in economic stability and sustainability of the European Union.

As a result, the UFM is the ultimate platform for a fruitful dialogue with Turkey. In such way, Turkey can closely cooperate with EU not necessarily having its membership. Furthermore, it is not only one way benefit where it is only the EU who profits among all. Definitely, becoming a close partner of EU and being a transit gate for oil and gas pipelines, Turkey enters the international arena as an important actor. Thus, such

⁶⁶ John Roberts, "The Turkish Gate: Energy Transit and Security issues" *Turkish Policy Quarterly* (Vol.3, no.4), Nov 28, 2009 <http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_13.pdf>

experience reflects on its internal development enabling boosting growth of its economy and corresponding to European standards. Perhaps, in future with such course of events the Turkish membership debate would reach its end either with accession or with consent to continue its development with the same pattern as it is following now. The intricate instruments that EU invents to cope with its objectives, in fact are beneficial for those who are involved in the process. Hence, the EU can be claimed as a partner who upholds mutual benefit.

2. Mediterranean platform: EU vs. US

Regardless of the geographical closeness of the Mediterranean countries, there is a certain difference in their perceptions and preferences. Physical neighborliness of the EU and its increasing role as a globally important player implies its growing responsibility over the future of the region. Its active presence can be witnessed in fostering regional cooperation in the Mediterranean. Operating as the leading initiator of integration the EU asserts its influence over the southern and eastern neighbors. More to the point, the actions related to the Mediterranean have become a platform for competition with its transatlantic neighbor and another influential performer in this region as the US. Accordingly, the Mediterranean states receive reforms proposed by both players and in this case their performance affects the state of affairs in the Mediterranean countries. Therefore, one needs to analyze the implementation of objectives by both players and compare their success in order to define whether the role of the EU is not diminished by US's presence.

In EU's case regional cooperation is driven by security perceptions and certain economic interests, while the US similarly perceives stability in the region as a promise of self and global security. In reality, in addition to the security insights of the US, the Mediterranean serves as a gateway to the Middle Eastern and Central Asian natural resources. As a result, the Mediterranean has become a nucleus and mediator attracting global players hammered by their pursuits.

Since the terrorist attacks of the 9/11, the US perceives the Mediterranean, in particular the Middle Eastern region as a strategic point related to its security. Hence, the US has a solid existence in security affairs within the Mediterranean. Unlike the EU which advances its soft power to accomplish its objectives in the Mediterranean, the US is sending abroad its military power to settle peace in the region. However, it is not only the terrorist attack events that motivated US interest in the region. From a historical perspective the US being a significant member of the NATO acknowledged its presence to control the perilous aftermath of the Post Cold war period in the Mediterranean.⁶⁷ Particularly through NATO it envisaged its Transatlantic and European security by supplying into conflicts in the Balkans. Moreover, the ongoing NATO-Mediterranean dialogue allows the US presence in the region as a security concerned player. Thus, either directly as in the agenda of US's foreign policy or through the military and political dimensions of NATO, US legally by military and civil means secures itself from terrorism and proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. In fact its strategy is efficient for transition; particular instance is its involvement in political and economic reforms of Serbia and Bosnia, where EU's role is as well important through the OSCE.⁶⁸

On the other hand, similar to the EU the US is driven not only by security concerns. Definitely, security is a merely a part of a greater interest in the Mediterranean as a secure gateway and a stable bridge towards energy security path enhancing the Persian Gulf and further Middle East and Central Asia. Bearing in mind such resource demanding concerns, the US is expanding its military actions over the security in Iran and Afghanistan. As any other vast international actor the US geopolitical concerns under the surface of activities related to stability and development in the region, are in reality motivated by economic interests. As such, in order for US to fulfill its stipulations of

⁶⁷ Helene Prestat, "NATO and the European Union and their offers of cooperation in the Mediterranean" NATO Defense College (Rome, no.28, Sept 2006), 10 Oct, 2009
<<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=25554&lng=en>>

⁶⁸ Fabrizio Tassinari, "Security and Integration in the EU Neighborhood" Center for European Policy Studies (No.226/July2005) 10 Oct, 2009
<ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/background_material.pdf>

natural resources the Mediterranean region plays a vital role in its future as a prospect to control the resource market.

Another prospect on the transatlantic agenda is the growing interest of Washington in Turkish membership in the EU. In this viewpoint it is essential to have Turkey as a NATO ally. The US has recognized the continuous conflict upon division of Cyprus as one of the impediments delaying its accession to the EU. Furthermore in order to support Turkey in its *Europeanization*, in 2005 the US and Ankara launched negotiations to modernize and democratize this Muslim country to demonstrate its secular potential and inclination towards western style democracy.⁶⁹ Consequently, the US is a great supporter of Turkish convergence and willingness to become a part of the EU's enlarging capacity. The idea behind such support implies that Turkey as a close ally of US and a member of the European community would become a mediator between EU-NATO promoting improved cooperation.⁷⁰ For the EU Turkey is a gate to energy security path to the East, and for the US, Turkey is a gate for enhanced cooperation with the EU on its path to cooperation in NATO. As a result, both the EU and US play a significant role on the transformation of the Mediterranean region. As a consequence one should distinguish each player's role in order to have a prospect on efficiency of either actor's influence on the Mediterranean states.

The southern countries themselves notice the divergence of European and American approaches; however they intervene in certain areas. Aforementioned facts illustrate significance of security as a chief point on the EU and US cooperation agenda with the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, the two have quite different approaches in dealing with security. European security concerns are primarily related to the migration and similar issues bound to the stability. Subsequently, the Europeans adherent to soft power approach involve a number of activities enhancing number of spheres – political,

⁶⁹ Ibid

⁷⁰ Ian O.Lesser, "The US, the Mediterranean and Transatlantic Strategies (ARI)" Real Instituto Elcano (no.141/2009), 15 Oct. 2009
<http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTE XT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/usa-transatlantic+dialogue/ari141-2009>

economic, cultural – to establish a profound ground to further the path to the stability of each state and a the Mediterranean as a whole. In this regard responsive recognition of the European strategies of transformation tailored for the Southern Mediterranean is backed up by the colonial heritage ties.⁷¹ As inevitable economic partners and what is more dependence of the Southern import on the European market are the reasons to share and accept the European vision of shaping stability in the Southern Mediterranean. Consequently, Europe has become influential in the region and as it was emphasized the EU's multilayered and diversified strategy is capable to make reforms in the Southern Neighborhood.⁷² Significantly, Europe is a major actor for trade and economic development in the region.

Along with the European strategies the region receives the American version of the ideological transformation plan, i.e. transformation to liberal democracy of autocratic states. US policies are short-term in comparison to those of the EU. Moreover, through NATO the US enacts clear military policies through package of activities targeted at the Southern and Middle Eastern parts of the Mediterranean.⁷³ However, such a dominant existence of the US activities in the region stimulates competition with EU, besides it blocks the credibility of the European attempts to reconstruct the region. The study of the soft power projection on the Mediterranean by G. Joffe brought out the following discouraging fact:

“Indeed, one of the great ironies of Europe’s policy towards the South Mediterranean is that it cannot achieve its objectives before American initiatives in the Middle East have succeeded – although the United States has no role within the Barcelona Process!”⁷⁴

⁷¹ Fabrizio Tassinari

⁷² Ibid

⁷³ Helene Prestat

⁷⁴ George Joffe, “European Multilateralism and Soft Power Projection in the Mediterranean,” *Zurcher Beitrage* (n.61): 31-57, 10 Sept. 2009

< <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=484&lng=en> >

The former statement suggests the necessity of collaboration of European activities along with the US ones. Perhaps, one of the ideas behind US's actions is to trigger improved cooperation with EU through such intricate strategy.

In fact, the European influence diminishes because the restrictive immigration policies affect the trustworthiness of the Southern countries.⁷⁵ Furthermore, the argument for US's significance is dependent on the future choices made in its foreign policy. The American role would overshadow the European if the current administration adopts a more soft power oriented approach which would foster productive economic reconstruction along with its military activities.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, such is not yet the case and US is still considering merely its hard power to build peace and stability in the region. Besides, the experts explain that Washington would less likely cultivate competition with EU, rather it would not mind EU's intervention in issues related to Balkans and Maghreb.⁷⁷ The result could be a development of transatlantic relations, where the Mediterranean would serve as a ground for cooperation of both powers. In exchange the EU could stimulate creation of common tactics and plans towards security of the Mediterranean together with the US. For now such synergy is only in born in minds of the architects of the cooperation initiatives in the EU.

Interestingly, bearing in mind the establishment of the European Community by the proposal of the American Marshal plan, the similar is used in the foundation of the UFM. Sarkozy, known for his friendliness to US, inherited the latter idea when proposing the Union for the Mediterranean. As such, integration is laid a as a primary aim in its structure.⁷⁸ Perhaps, Sarkozy's attitude towards the US will in future foster collaboration with US in the Mediterranean. Currently, each deals with the Mediterranean on its own.

⁷⁵ Helene Prestat

⁷⁶ Giancarlo Elia Valori, "Considerations on the Mediterranean, the United States and Europe" Zangani Investment Community (June 10, 2009), Nov 9, 2009 <<http://www.zangani.com/node/3781>>

⁷⁷ Ian O.Lesser

⁷⁸ John Laughland, "What is really behind the Mediterranean Union?" The Brussels Journal (12, 2008), Dec 1, 2009 <<http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/3083>>

Geopolitics shape the role of each actor in the Mediterranean. It is said that the North African states fall under the European, particularly the Franco-German influence; while the Americans manipulate over the Middle East.⁷⁹ Hence, they are both equally important authorities, each in its own area. However with the recent course of events the European interests shift eastwards; improving relations with Turkey and intervening in Middle East conflicts in areas where US is already present. Coming back to the idea of achieving power on the global scale, the EU expands its influence eastwards through sponsorship of the Mediterranean Union. As such if the EU's influence increases this might result in reduction of the US power in the region. The latter might negatively affect the US-EU relations; as a consequence both actors have to measure their steps in this sophisticated area. Regarding the current EU Council's conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process, it is important to note that EU proposes its soft power in this deal and confirms support of the US.⁸⁰ The supremacy of each authority would be equally balanced by their separate soft and hard power views. Recently in Marseille on the meeting upon the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership it was mentioned that:

“Union for the Mediterranean is not intended to replace the other initiatives undertaken in the interests of the peace, stability and development of the region, but that it will contribute to their success”⁸¹

⁷⁹ Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, “The Mediterranean Union: Dividing the Middle East and North Africa” Global Research (Feb 13, 2008), Oct 28, 2008 <http://www.bilaterals.org/article-print.php?id_article=11142>

⁸⁰ “Councils conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process ,” 2985th FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting (Brussels, Dec 9, 2009), Dec 14, 2009 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/111829.pdf>

⁸¹ Final Statement, Marseille Declaration (Marseille, Nov 3-4, 2008), Dec 14, 2009 <http://ue2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/1103_ministerielle_Euromed/Final_Statement_Mediterranean_Union_EN.pdf>

Conclusion

European Union is the essential partner of the Mediterranean, especially in the role of an economically powerful neighbor. Aforesaid instances illustrate not only interdependence between the two shores of the Mediterranean, moreover such interdependence sets in motion cooperation resulting in regional integration. As such the Mediterranean Sea, or the so called "*mare nostrum*", is the nucleus for the meeting and exchange among the people and states of the surrounding shores, stretching from EU member states on the north-west to the Middle Eastern countries on its south-east. In the milieu of existing and rising issues around the Sea one refers to his closest and powerful neighbor. In case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership the latter method has been the actual manner of cooperation. Yet, apparent differences in the development level of the two shores and the subsequent circumstances, e.g. migration, instability and etc, call for edifice of mechanisms that will in the short-run progress the level of development, while in the long-run is expected to avoid spreading of the negative outcomes to other regions. In principle, the rationale of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean respectively, is the European vision of the order in its southern and southeastern neighborhood. Consequently, the vision which is set in EU's Neighborhood Policy was reflected in the Barcelona Declaration and recently inspired foundation of the Union for the Mediterranean. Along with EU's expectations from the Mediterranean neighbors in terms of prosperity and stability, the partnership offers lucrative grounds for development of the non-European allies. The initiative to help the transformation of the region attaches to the EU the leading role. Indeed, the financial assistance of the EIB branch for the Mediterranean, FEMIP, and the promotion of various initiatives, projects and technical assistance shows EU's deep interest. Nevertheless, one may not claim that the partnership is controlled solely by the EU. On the contrary, EU encourages equal participation of all the partners. However for now, due to divergence of political views and relations among certain political leaders, e.g. Muammar Gaddafi's rejection to include Libya in the UFM, the EU has to take the role of the mediator while bringing together the members to discuss the projects. In the long run if such cooperation maintains and the projects are successfully implemented, democratization and liberalization of the South and East would become possible. Consequently, there would

be put less efforts in defining and sharing the competences among the partners. Besides, since the new union of the Mediterranean countries includes all the member states of the EU, even the ones that are less interested in Mediterranean affairs, the attitudes of the North vary. Hence, one can see a democratic approach in making of the common European stance. As such, “open troika”, that represents the EU, includes Presidency, the Commission accompanied with any EU member state that has a serious interest in the region, takes part in negotiations with Mediterranean allies.⁸² Another point is that the UFM for now is open to any interested member. It has expanded eastwards by accepting states that do not have access to the Mediterranean Sea. However, such approach is relevant since there are other common grounds such as the development level that all members can attain in the framework of the UFM or the common cultural and religious factors that they have in common. Moreover, certain areas of economic and geopolitical interests make accession of such states as Turkey to the UFM logical. Above all, the more members the union has the wider the market is. As such, one can learn from each other and one can exchange products among each other and use it further for diversification. In synergy the cooperation is more dynamic and the objectives that gave birth to the UFM can be accomplished. On the other hand, such expansion solves the issue on the EU’s enlargement; through the UFM it is able to offer the same democratic standards and similar economic benefits to the states to which the EU membership boundaries are not open.

Looking at the UFM nowadays, it is clear that there are diverse common issues and interests. The latter are reflected in projects which by successful implementation become evident features of existing integration. So far, the UFM is the community of joint projects. The time for the member states to initiate new prospects has not yet come. First, it is the lack of the conditions, i.e. the relevant political and economic standards, due to which the countries do not consider integration in the UFM as a primary goal on the agenda; rather they try to resolve the issues internally. On the other hand, it is the

⁸² Michael Emerson, “Making sense of Sarkozy’s Union for the Mediterranean” Center for European Policy Studies (No.155, March 2008), Feb 20, 2010
<<http://www.ceps.eu>>

interest of the political leaders that does not complement the democratic approach of the EU. The EU has noted such barriers and has taken measures to attract the members' attention to the economic benefits. Searching for common ties the Mediterranean Sea itself has become the core to put the Union into practice. The common environmental issues and the resources that the region has are the areas which link the two shores. The EU having a powerful stance in the region has assigned itself the role of the manufacturer of the framework for cooperation and the donor of ideas and funding. The responsibility of the rest of the member states of UFM is implementation and putting forward of possible projects that can be made on joint basis. Such projects demonstrate continuity of the actions in the framework of the UFM.

Regional integration or just a union working on common grounds, the idea of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation nowadays suits the vision put forward by the Barcelona Declaration. European expectations, which are rooted in the endeavors of its Neighborhood Policy, through efforts of Mediterranean integration, are now viable. Regardless of the impediments such as criticism and deficient commitment from all the members, the partnership is functioning with potential prospects of further integration. While implementing common projects the southern and southeastern states will slowly improve economic conditions and become more competitive. Consequently, the internal conditions of those countries would allow creation of better opportunities for the population to acquire employment and other advantages. As such, the migration northwards shall decrease. Moreover, since the projects are held on cooperative basis there would be better understanding and tolerance among the people of different religious and ethnic backgrounds, subsequently the conflicts would not spread to the neighboring countries. One important point is presence of the US in the region which influences largely the security architecture. It is has both positive and less positive viewpoints. In cases where the European soft power projection is ineffective for the peace-keeping it is US who can handle it through military means. However, such instances only provoke the Mediterranean states to arm themselves to resist the US actions. Consequently, the region becomes unstable again. As such, even if it is long-term, the EU's approach is more peaceful and more inspiring since it gives more freedom and focused on well-being

of the people rather than US's intervention. Nevertheless, for now the EU cannot resist US presence, it is left to only compete for influence over the region or compliment it. Moreover, EU's vision is broad, i.e. enhancing aspects other than stability. Thus, in the long-run if EU succeeds with its objectives of Mediterranean affairs, it might acquire a better stance on the international arena. The Mediterranean region is then also a place where the European geopolitical interests can be fulfilled.

Union for the Mediterranean is an already existing community, yet one can for now speak only of its future since it is newborn and needs to develop. It is now at the stage when it shapes internally, in terms of structure and responsibilities. Meanwhile, the common projects that gave start can be perceived as ice-breakers, i.e. they allow partners to learn each other capacities and define their own roles in the Union. The common identity as it was brought out is not necessary as long as there are common interests and eager to cooperate. The latter can foster integration. Whether it is the integration that becomes mechanism for implementation of objectives or whether it would be the other way around, the most important point is that the expectations are viable. It is the matter of time; interest and productivity which will guarantee EU reduce of migration, conflicts and other issues concerning the South, and ensure the South access to benefits from integration to the EU market, liberalization and democratization. Even in case the integration does not reach the expectations, the Free Trade Area linking markets of Maghreb, Mashreq and EU and the projects will produce the anticipated development of the region. The EU's role in these matters is enormous since it has enough strength and interest to motivate its southern neighbors for dynamic cooperation. Without EU's aid this process could have been long-term goal for each country because none of them were able to initiate such integration on their own. Besides, as an actor the EU does not only focus on its own interests, e.g. it promotes South-South cooperation, as such it is attractive for its Mediterranean partners. EU is an inspiration for the hopes of Mediterranean people for a better future, an inspiration that has to be further implemented in the framework of the UFM. As such, the EU is the core actor in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, ensuring feasibility of its Neighborhood Policy and spreading its vision which fosters progress in the Mediterranean region as a whole.

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MAPS

Map of the Union for the Mediterranean

<www.barcelona.com/barcelon_news/the_union_for_mediterranean>

Map of countries of the EU and Mediterranean region illustrating trade agreements schemes

<<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=110896>>