

**AFGHANISTAN & PAKISTAN RELATION: POTENTIAL OF
COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION**

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Abstract

This thesis explores the complex relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It will try to basically find the certain factors which negatively impact on maintenance of good relation between these two countries. It will go deeper into studying policy objectives of Pakistan in Afghanistan for the last twenty years. More specifically, it will discuss the issue of Taliban, insurgent groups, terrorism Pashtun, and Durand line which are considered as the top threats to the instability of Afghanistan. Afghan Government claims that Pakistan has given Taliban and Al-Qaeda safe places in its territory and as well as they are being supported by Pakistan's military intelligence (ISI) but Pakistan denies any connections with them. These arguments have paved a mistrust and suspicion relation between these two countries. Therefore, the aim of this study is to identify the major challenges, which caused that these two countries to never succeed in establishing a smooth bilateral relation free of tensions.

Introduction

Afghanistan and Pakistan relation has always been complex despite of sharing several things in common: geography, history, religion, and ethnic groups like Pashtuns. These two countries have never succeeded in establishing a smooth bilateral relation free of tensions. Rather, their relations have been problematic due to mistrust and passive antagonism. Political changes in Afghanistan have always affected region in general and Pakistan in particular because the form of hostility has been varied under different regimes in Afghanistan and Pakistan's alleged links first to Mujahedeen during the soviet occupations then to the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan have been a major source of tension between the two states. Besides, it should be mentioned stability of these two countries is not only mandatory for peace and security for themselves but also for its bordering states (China, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) because these countries view stability in Afghanistan as important for their own security since the Western withdrawal from military operations in Afghanistan has been finished; therefore, the role and influence of regional powers and neighboring states in Afghanistan will again return to the top of agenda. In response to this situation, a lot of literatures have been produced on security and political stability in Afghanistan by considering the role and impact of regional and neighboring states; however, they has largely ignored the role of Pakistan, which is seen as the main source of threatening existing local regimes, security and political stability in the country. This research, therefore, focused to evaluate the conduct of Pakistan and Afghanistan relation with a view to identify the challenges which caused the mistrust, claim and blame games between these two countries.

Research Question

Why Afghanistan and Pakistan have never succeeded in maintenance of good relations between each other?

Hypothesis

Two Hypothesis is being preformed by this research and they are as following:

Frist, Pakistan has failed to be regionally cooperative by Afghanistan because of its security dilemma in the context of India in the region. It thus views a friendly regime in Kabul as key to 'strategic depth' in the region.

Second, The combustible ethnic politics of the two countries, especially the Pashtun question, has led to state weakness that undermines relations between the two countries.

Methodology

This paper is essentially more analytical than statistical as it analyzes the main challenges, claims and blames which caused Afghanistan and Pakistan not to have a smooth and friendly relationship for decades. Therefore, in this work qualitative research method and discourse analysis are employed to analyze both secondary sources. Secondary sources are Books on Afghanistan- Pakistan relation, journals, articles and scholarly publication, reports, and news, and in primary resource is the date which has been collected by conducting in-depth interview with political experts from Afghanistan in form of semi-structured because, however the questions were designed prior to the interview, more questions were made on the spot in accordance with the recent responses of the interviewees. The political experts, who were interviewed, were mostly impartial and neutral to the politics of Afghanistan; however, they were much involved in analyzing issues and challenges going between the two states. The primary date in collaboration with the secondary sources gives this research depth and originality.

Theoretical Framework

Before considering whether Pakistan's policy, strategic depth, and objectives meet the principle of Security Dilemma, it would be good to outline the different tests that the security dilemma theory offers in understanding a state's dilemma towards another state. Security Dilemma is a term used in IR and refers to a situation wherein two or more states are drawn into conflict, possibly even war, over security concerns, even though none of the states actually desire conflict.

Essentially the security dilemma occurs when two or more states each feel insecure in relation to other states. None of the states involved want relations to deteriorate, let alone for war to be declared, but as each state acts militarily or diplomatically. An ironic cycle of unintended provocations emerges, resulting in an escalation of the conflict which may eventually lead to open warfare.¹ The term security Dilemma was introduced by John H. Herz, he introduced six propositions of the security dilemma, First, the ultimate source of the security dilemma is anarchy—the lack of “a higher unity”; second, an immediate cause of the security dilemma is states' uncertainty and fears about each other's intentions to do harm under anarchy; third, states' means of self-helping by trying to escape from the security dilemma and accumulate more and more power; fourth, states' attempt to escape from the security dilemma by accumulating more and more power may not increase their security at all, becoming self-defeating and even tragic; fifth, the security dilemma can cause war, but is not the cause of all wars; and sixth, the dynamic of the security dilemma is a self-reinforcing “vicious cycle”.² Thus, if we observe Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan's internal affairs in the context of security dilemma, then it becomes clear that Pakistan's security dilemma arises with the state's uncertainty and fears about India's

¹ Kanje. O, “ Security in Burgess,” *Conflict Research Consortium*, University of Colorado, 2003, <http://www.irtheory.com/know.htm>.

² Tang. Shiping, “ The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” *Security Studies*, School of International and Public Affairs, Pg. 591, July 1, 2009, <http://www.sirpa.fudan.edu.cn/upload/article/0f/45/7264b2b54ee0bb429e1577179fda/9f36698a-e8fb-4b06-82c8-a66c17d80ff1.pdf>.

engagement in Afghanistan that is why Pakistan views Afghanistan primarily as an environment in which to peruse its rivalry with India.

Moreover, in spite of the fact that Pakistan faces security threats from inside of its government by the religious extremist and other militant groups but still it sees the main threats to its security from Afghanistan's complex situation. Pakistan believes that when the Soviet occupied Afghanistan, it dramatically complicated the security situation in Pakistan because the invasion has posed fears and uncertainty among many Pakistanis that their country would be the next target. Therefore, in order to perceived threats to its national security, Pakistan helped the resistance group of Mujahedeen in fight against the Soviets with the support of international actors, the United States and Saudi Arabia.³ However, Mujahedeen succeeded in war against the Soviet Union with the help of Pakistan and this victory left Pakistan to deal with major problems like the country hosted around 3 million refugees. According to Ahmad Rashid, "The Taliban were born in Pakistan refugee camps, educated in Pakistani Madrassas and learnt their fighting skills from Mujahedeen parties based in Pakistan."⁴ Pakistan provided all the financial and military support to Taliban till they established their government in Kabul in 1996. Despite of these efforts to help and control Taliban, Pakistan's security planners found their relation problematic with Taliban as the Pakistan's deep connections to Pakistani states institutions, political parties, Islamic groups helped them to extend their influence in Pakistan. Pakistan scared of the situation as a high percentage of the Taliban were ethnic Pashtuns and public support for the Taliban run very high in the Pashtun region, North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), which would help them to defy the federal government by gaining support from that region. Ahamd Rashid stated "As the Taliban movement expanded it became increasingly unclear as to who was

³ Parvez Iqbal. Cheema, "Afghanistan's Crisis & Pakistan's Security Dilemma," *Asian Survey*, Vol 23, No.3. Pg 227-243, <http://www.khyber.org/publications/016-020/securitydilemma.shtml>.

⁴ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban, Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, (New York 2000)

driving whom. Pakistan, rather than being the master of Taliban, was instead becoming its victim.”⁵ As Pakistan had good relation with western and mainly US; thus, its relation with Taliban destroyed its image in whole world such a country that provided the Shelter to terrorists. To deal with its unpleasant image to the world, Pakistan joint the United States in fight against terrorism in order to show that the country is not supporting or giving shelter to terrorist groups.

Scope of the Study

This study will consider cooperation and confrontation in Afghanistan-Pakistan relation. The thesis has divided into three chapters and each of the chapters of this study discusses incidents of cooperation and confrontation and further examines contributing factors that bind states to mutual agreement and collaboration or to clashes of interests and confrontation. Specific consideration will be given on policy areas of confrontation.

After the chapter of the introduction, Chapter 1 will provide a historical overview of Afghanistan- Pakistan relations, giving and general information about the rise of Mujahedeen, the Taliban and also the 9/11 and their influences on these two countries relation. Chapter 2 will consider the issue of internal politics and external threats both in Afghanistan and Pakistan and how they influence on relationship of these two countries. Later, Chapter 3 presents the issue of claims and blames by these two countries towards each other in accordance with the analysis of primary data, which was collected by taking in-depth interview from both Afghanistan’s political analysts who delivered their opinion on the issues of conflict, cooperation, security, terrorism, and Taliban. Finally each chapter presented in this work will discuss the broad objectives of the study and tries to find reasonable answers to the research questions.

⁵ Ibid.

Limitation

Although this research was undertaken as planned, there were limitations what were unavoidable. Firstly, due to time constraints, interviews were limited to five participants representing a very small percentage of overall the number of participants, which was scheduled in Kabul. Therefore, it would necessary to expand the number of participants in order to generalize the result from a larger population. Secondly, it was scheduled to take interview from Pakistani political experts too but due to the some security problems and time limit, it failed to meet them. Thus, with a longer amount of time to conduct this research, I could have conducted multiple interviews with participants both from Afghanistan and Pakistan that delved deeper into the topic and could have given more originality to the research. For future studies, researchers with more time could employ this technique.

Literature Review

There is a considerable amount of academic literature on Afghanistan and Pakistan's complex relationship. Frederic Grare in his article *Pakistan-Afghanistan Relation in the Post-9/11 Era* states that the relations between the two countries have never been easy. Despite of the fact that Pakistan has supported Afghanistan during the jihad against the Soviet Union, Afghanistan was the only country who voted against Pakistan's accession to the United Nations after its independence because of Kabul's claim on the Pashtun territories located on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. This claim of Kabul immediately created a quasi-alliance between Kabul and New Delhi. In order to reverse this situation, Islamabad supported parties of Afghan resistance and late Taliban expecting to create a friendly government in Kabul but the attempt failed.⁶

⁶ Frederic Grare, "Pakistan-Afghanistan Relation in the Post-9/11 Era," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, South Asia Project, October 2006, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cp72_grare_final.pdf.

Similarly to Frederic Grare statements, Nasreen Akhtar in her research titled *Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Taliban* argues that Afghanistan has never been a peaceful country. It has for centuries been a conflicted state with warrior groups because of its geopolitical locations, trans-ethnic populations, and rivalry between its neighbors. Among Afghanistan's neighbors, Pakistan has been an important and permanent neighbor of Afghanistan, sharing a common border and since 9/11, a common enemy.⁷ In order to understand Pakistan's relation with Afghanistan, she purposed three main factors that examining each of them is very important. First, the Afghan fighter groups that were involved in the civil war depended on external economic trading partners and alliance with various states with different geo-political goal for the region. Second, the establishment of independent networks of Afghan groups with the support of religious fundamentalist, ideological and ethnic groups which Afghanistan itself and neighboring states found it hard to challenge the influence of non-state actors that threaten the traditional order and stability of the nation-state. Third, Afghanistan's neighbors, especially Pakistan, have followed predatory policies toward Afghanistan, exploited many of its vulnerabilities as a weak state to their advantage.⁸ Thus, compare with the other neighbors of Afghanistan, Pakistan has a vital role in the country and its involvement in the in internal affairs of Afghanistan has been considered very critical by many researchers and writers.

Sripathi Narayanan in his research about *Understanding Islamabad's Policies and Strategies* argues that Pakistan has always been involved in Afghan war crises. The war of Mujahedeen against the Soviet Union's occupation in Afghanistan was strongly supported by Pakistan with the assistances from Saudi Arabia and the United States, which paved the way

⁷ Nasreen. Akhtar, "Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Taliban," *International Journal on World Peace*, December 2008, <http://edvardas.home.mruni.eu/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Pakistan-Afghanistan-and-the-Taliban.pdf>.

⁸ Ibid, 50.

for Pakistan to gain a predominant role in Afghanistan. Further, he added that the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan creates a civil war among the different Afghan resistance groups and warlords in their interests for power. The period from 1992 till 1996 is considered a very violent period in the history of Afghanistan which finally ended in 1996 when the Taliban took control of almost 33 of the 35 provinces of Afghanistan with the help of Pakistan.⁹ When Taliban became the sole holder of power in Afghanistan, their government was very friendly towards Pakistan. Therefore, for the first time in its history, Pakistan enjoyed a comfortable and calm relationship with Afghanistan during the Taliban period. According to Sripathi Narayanan, “ In the post Afghan War, Pakistan gained advantage during Taliban rule as the Indian influence was diluted to a great extents and New Delhi had no say in the affairs of Afghanistan.”¹⁰

Moreover, when Pakistan just started to experience a friendly relationship with the government of Afghanistan during the Taliban Period, the event of 9/11 happened and all changed as the United States took the mission of “war on terror” in order to destabilize the regime Of Taliban from Afghanistan. Since that the situation of Afghanistan is far away from being stable with Pakistan because the country is being accused by the Afghan government due to its supporting terrorist bombings in Afghanistan and providing protection to Taliban leaders and allowing them to operate freely from Pakistan territory while Pakistan always denies this connection.¹¹ Zahid Hussian in his article *Source of Tension between Afghanistan & Pakistan: A Regional Perspective* states, “Pakistan’s military intelligence agency’s link to the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and the whole terrorist groups has been a major source

⁹ Sirpathi. Narayanan, “Pakistan & Afghanistan: Understanding Islamabad’s Policies and Strategies,” *IPCS Special Report*, New Delhi July 2010, http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR94.pdf.

¹⁰ Ibid, 3.

¹¹ Ibid.

of tension between the two countries ever since 2001.”¹² A number of the US officials have also accused of the ISI for supporting terrorist groups as the US Defense Secretary Robert Gates in his interview with CBS’s 60 Minutes in 2009 said, “The ISI maintains links with groups like the Afghan Taliban as “strategic hedge” to help Islamabad gain influence in Kabul once US troops exit the region.”¹³

Ahmed Rashid in his book *Decent into Chaos: The U.S and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* states that when the USA initiated the “war on terror” mission in the aftermath of 9/11, immediately after that General Mahmood Ahmed, Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) chief, announced Pakistan’s assistance in the “war on terror” but when Ahmed Karzai become the president of Afghanistan, the Pakistan army believed that Karzai’s interim government was an anti-Pakistan that was dominated by pro-Indian NA leaders at the expense of Pashtuns. However, there were more Pashtuns in the cabinet of Karzai’s government. In this situation, to maintain its influence among both the Taliban and Afghan Pashtuns, Pakistan’s military agency (ISI) created a two-track policy of protecting the Taliban and meanwhile promising to the US that they will be a faithful ally with them on the mission of “war on terror”.¹⁴ Soon after, the CIA became extremely suspicious of the ISI and they started investigation by asking the profile of all ISI personnel and as well as requesting the removal of officers whom they didn’t trust. Over time the CIA and NATO intelligence officers confirmed a report with evidence that the ISI was running training camps for Taliban in North of Quetta and Karachi as well as the report showed that Pakistan artillery gave

¹² Zahid. Hussian, “Source of Tension between Afghanistan & Pakistan: A Regional Perspective,” *Norwegian Peace Building Research Center*, December 2011, http://www.observatori.org/paises/pais_87/documentos/ZAHID_HUSSAIN%5B1%5D.pdf

¹³ Bajoria. Jayshree, and Kaplan. Eben, “ The ISI and Terrorism: Behind the Accusation,” Council on Foreign Relation, May 4, 2011, <http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/isi-terrorism-behind-accusations/p11644>.

¹⁴ Ahmed. Rashid, *Decent into Chaos: The U.S. and Disaster in Pakistan. Afghanistan, and Central Asia*, New York Times, Pp. 221-223.

covering fire to Taliban infiltrators crossing into Afghanistan and also medical facilities were set up close to the border by the army for wounded Taliban.¹⁵

Besides, Carlotta Gall in her book *The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan 2001-2014* also claimed that Pakistan have been always involved in internal affairs of Afghanistan and she stated that Pakistan is training militants. They are indoctrinating suicide bombers to go in and cause mayhem. All those who are bombing Afghanistan are coming from Pakistan. And there is no doubt that they are trained in Pakistan because there's a lot of training camps and indoctrinating that recruitment of young Afghans and Pakistanis then send them to Afghanistan.¹⁶ Thus, there are many training camps in different parts of Pakistan, mainly in Baluchistan and Waziristan, where radicals and Taliban are trained and then exporting to Afghanistan. If Pakistan does not export them to Afghanistan, then I will cause Pakistan a huge problem, as the government itself is weak and its control over on those are is sporadic. Thus, this is the weakness of Pakistan that undermines its bilateral relationship with Afghanistan.

¹⁵ Ibid. p 223.

¹⁶ Carlotta. Gall, *The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001-2014*, (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Bostan, New York 2014)

Chapter 1: Historical Overview of Afghanistan and Pakistan Relation

1.1 The rise of Mujahedeen and role of Pakistan

Afghanistan is a country that has faced long-term wars and conflicts for decades. Looking through the history, we find out that this country was under the invasion of super and great powers such as Britain and Soviet Union for a long time because of its good geographical and economical location in the Asia that could pave the way for them to achieve their goals and interests. However, all of these invaders always faced confrontation of people which finally ended up with their withdrawal from the country. When on 12 December 1979 the Soviet Union entered into Afghanistan with an attempt to impose its direct rule in order to get the country under its influence, they faced into conflict with the resistance Afghan group named Mujahedeen. Mujahedeen with the heavily support by a wide variety of international actors, including the United States of America, Iran, Pakistan, China, and Saudi Arabia started fighting known as Jihad (Holy war) against the Soviets that caused the failure of their strategies in the country and eventually they withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989.¹⁷ Unfortunately their withdrawal was not the end to conflict and war, but a new phase of war which marked the most harsh and unforgettable pages of memory in the history of Afghanistan.¹⁸

In 1986, Dr. Najibullah took control of the power in Afghanistan. His regime was against the will of Mujahedeen because even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow continued to supply and arms the communist regime of Dr. Najibullah. Therefore, the resistance group of Mujahedeen again with the help of international actors such as the US, Iran and mainly Pakistan started fighting against Dr. Najibullah's communist regime in order

¹⁷ Amin. Saikal and Maley. William, "The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan," *Cambridge University Press* 1989, New York

¹⁸ Maley. William, "The Afghanistan Wars," *Palgrave Macmillan* , August 2009, Pp. 126-251.

to establish a government based on religious principles. Mujahedeen succeeded to take out the communist regime of Dr. Najibullah and take control of power in 1992. After Dr. Najibullah's government collapsed, the different Mujahedeen factions could not agree on how to share power and started to fight each other for control of the country.¹⁹ Each ethnic group who were included in Mujahedeen factions wanted to have more power and take high positions in the government. Inter-ethnic war for power led the state to take a phase of anarchy.²⁰ According to Rasul Bakhsh Rais, "The civil war symbolize the two opposite struggles in Afghanistan, one by the Pashtuns to re-establish their dominance, and the second by the Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek minorities to seek adequate representation in political power at the center and autonomy of their respective areas."²¹ Thus, the Afghan leaders were unable to form a consensus due to the conflict interest of Mujahedeen factions for power.

Besides Mujahedeen, another essential factor that increased the level of anarchy and chaos in the country was the interference of neighboring countries, mainly Pakistan. According to Ahmed Rashid, "CIA and Saudi Funding had given Pakistan the power to dominate the course of the jihad."²² Thus, Pakistan, compare to other neighboring countries, has been involved in Afghanistan's internal conflicts for many years as it shares several things in common: geography, history, religion, and ethnic groups like Pashtuns with Afghanistan. The continues civil war which followed the collapse of Kabul regime became worse by constant Pakistan's interference on behalf of extremist Afghan Mujahedeen factions. Pakistan's military intelligence (ISI) continuously helped Mujahedeen and warlords factions by giving arms, weapons and as well as financial supports in order to keep rival India out of

¹⁹ Omar. Sharifi, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan from 1947-2008," Afghanistan.ru 2006, <http://en.afghanistan.ru/doc/130.html>.

²⁰ Zalmay. Khalilzad, "Anarchy in Afghanistan," *Journal of International Affairs* 1997, <https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1-54117808/anarchy-in-afghanistan>.

²¹ Rasul Bakhsh. Rais, "Conflict in Afghanistan: Ethnicity, Religion and Neighbours," *Ethnic Studies Report*, Vol. XVII, January1, 1999.

²² Ahmed. Rashid, *Taliban, Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, New York 2000.

Afghanistan. Despite of all these help that Mujahedeen got from Pakistan, they failed to make a Pro-Pakistani government in Kabul.²³

1.2 The Taliban's Rise to Power and Role of Pakistan

In 1994, the Taliban, who were consisted of frustrated Afghan religious students, Pakistan volunteers, Arab and other international Islamists, rose in Pakistan's Baluchistan Province with the direct financial and logistic support of Pakistan and several Arab countries. According to Ahmed Rashid, "The Taliban were born in Pakistani refugee camps, educated in Pakistani Madrassas and learnt their fighting skill from Mujahedeen parties based in Pakistan. Their families carried Pakistani identity cards."²⁴ They later on arrived to southern Afghanistan and almost took control of that region by the end the year. Their primary goals were to give an end to the chaos in Afghanistan which was ongoing in since the withdrawal of Soviet Union and restore peace, disarm the population, enforce a government with strict Sharia law and defend the integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan.²⁵ According to Omar Sharifi, director of American Institute of Afghanistan Studies, "Pakistan support for Taliban is based on several well developed ideas. Establishing a friendly government in Afghanistan has been long-held desire because control over Afghanistan provides Pakistan with safe bases for training militants who later will be sent to Indian controlled Kashmir to fuel uprising against India. On the other hand, Pakistan supports them because they considered Taliban to be a perfect tool in opening up trade routes in into Central Asia and a safe haven for pro Pakistani militants in Kashmir."²⁶

²³ Omar. Sharifi, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan from 1947-2008." Afghanistan.ru 2006, <http://en.afghanistan.ru/doc/130.html>.

²⁴ Ahmed. Rashid, "Taliban, Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia." New York 2000, Pg. 185

²⁵ Ahmed. Rashid, "Taliban, Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia." (New York 2000), 22-23.

²⁶ Ahmad. Rashid, Pakistan and the Taliban, The Nation, Lahore-Pakistan, April 11, 1998, <http://www.rawa.org/arashid.htm>.

Ahmad Rashid supports the same idea and he adds, “The Pakistani military considered its support to the Taliban as part of the country’s strategic national interest. Since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the ISI had tried to bring its various Afghan proxies to power in Kabul in the search of a friendly Afghan government that would keep rival India out of Afghanistan because the Pakistani military determined that a friendly government in Afghanistan would provide Pakistan with “strategic depth” in any future conflict with India.”²⁷ Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan’s internal issues and mainly its military intelligence (ISI)’s leading role in helping Taliban to capture Afghanistan show that Pakistan was always in favor an insecure Afghanistan in order to achieve its own strategic national interest as well as an insecure Afghanistan would be a great a tool for Pakistan’s security dilemma in the context of India’s influence in the region.

Furthermore, another important fact that increased the level of conflict in Afghanistan by Pakistan is that this country by recognizing the Taliban gave preference to the Pashtuns ethnic groups, which changed the phase of civil war into semi ethnic conflict in Afghanistan. This conflict caused that the Pakistani government itself start to lose its role over controlling and managing the Taliban and soon after the Taliban changed themselves from being subservient political client into a regime closely connected to International terrorist networks that possibly could destabilize Pakistan itself. The Taliban tried to reduce their dependency to Pakistan’s government, and in the meantime they tried to keep their relation very strong with Pakistan’s military intelligence (ISI). In order to become more self-dependent, they made very close ties with Osama Bin Laden. He not only supported the Taliban financially but also he sent thousands of Arabs and other international terrorists to fight Taliban enemies in the northern Afghanistan and Indians in Kashmir. Despite of the fact that the Taliban was making the security situation of Afghanistan instable, the Pakistan’s government along with help of ISI increased their military financial to support the Taliban in order to have a role of dominance on Afghanistan’s policy.²⁸ According to Ahmad Rashid, “Throughout Afghan history no outsider has been able to manipulate the Afghans, something the British and the Soviets learnt to their cost.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Omar. Sharifi, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan from 1947-2008,” Afghanistan.ru 2006, <http://en.afghanistan.ru/doc/130.html>.

Pakistan, it appeared, had learnt no lessons from history while it still lived in the past and help the Taliban.”²⁹

1.3 Afghanistan and Pakistan’s relation after 9/11

The attack of 9/11 on the World Trade Center of the United States committed by terroristic network started a new political page about the relation of Afghanistan and Pakistan in the history of Afghanistan. The United states decided to military overthrow the Taliban regime make free Afghan people from authoritarian regime of Taliban.³⁰ Taliban and al Qaeda leaders were pursued by the US into Pashtun regions in southern Afghanistan. However, majority of the Taliban fighters laid down their arms to the US forces, most observe and researchers believe that the Taliban and Al Qaeda’s senior leaders crossed out the border into Pakistan, mainly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP).³¹ According to James Lee, after the event of September 11 terrorist attacks, Pakistan left with two very difficult choice. Whether to support the U.S mission on war against Taliban and other terror networks, or had to continue its strong support for pro- Taliban Afghan Policy. Pakistan’s president, General Parvez Musharraf, changed quickly its foreign policy and announced to be an ally in the “War on Terror” with the US. After couples of meetings, promises of economic assistance, Musharraf began to send larger number of troops into the tribal areas where Taliban leader were considered to be there. However, Pakistan suffered significantly by losing Pakistani forces,

²⁹ Ahmed. Rashid, Taliban, Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia, (New York 2000),185.

³⁰ Kenneth. Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post- Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” *Congressional Research Service*, January 20, 2015, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf>.

³¹ James. Lee, “Afghanistan: The challenge of relations with Pakistan,” Library of Parliament, *Parliamentary Information and Research Service*, January 7, 2007, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/researchpublications/prb0733-e.pdf>.

still many observers and researchers have begun to question the depth of its commitment in the fight against terrorism.³²

Chapter 2: Structure Problems between Afghanistan and Pakistan

1.2 Pakistan: Internal Politics and External Threats

The modern state of Pakistan got its independence in 1947 from the British, who ruled the Indian subcontinent for nearly 200 years, in order to be a separate homeland for the Muslims. Pakistan since its birth has been facing both internal and external threats. As Pakistan is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-culture states; so, most of the threats and tensions are made within the country. Pakistan has four main provinces, Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, Kyber Pakhtunkhwa (NWFP).³³ Each of these provinces has its own culture, language, and history and they have been fighting for their identifications and rights for a long time. As a consequence, the country has experienced varieties of internal conflict; civil war, tribal insurgencies, ethnic and sectarian struggles, and border conflicts.³⁴ In support to this, Nasreen Akhtar states, “The fairly devolution of power, regional autonomy by recognition of multiple linguistic culture and ethnic identities will pave the way for the development of a strong state but unfortunately Pakistan is luck of them and as a consequence of this, the country is facing a variety of internal obstacles such as security, ethnic, and religious extremist threats.”³⁵

³² Ibid. p.3.

³³ Parvaiz Iqbal. Cheema, “ Security Threats Confronting Pakistan,” http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series9/pdf/10.pdf.

³⁴ Rafeh A. Malik, “ Threats to Pakistan’s Internal Security,” *Defense Journal*, August 2003, <http://www.defencejournal.com/2003-08/opi-e.htm>.

³⁵ Nasreen. Akhtar, “ Polarized Politics: The Challenge of Democracy in Pakistan,” *International Journal on World Peace*, Vol. 26, No. 2, June 2009, Pp. 3163, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20752885>.

Furthermore, some scholars and political leaders also consider ethnicity to be the most serious threats to Pakistan. For instance, in the past, provincial imbalance, political failure and ethnic conflict had caused that the country lost its eastern wing, Bangladesh. According to Dr. Fatah Mohammed, “Pakistan was a multi-culture sociality and the lack of justice both on the economic and legal fronts was main factor behind the lack of harmony and lawlessness in the country.”³⁶ When power ruled by that one province, then it creates the inter-state conflict because the smaller province will be deprived from having equal access to all the resources and decision of the government. In Pakistan, Punjab is the most populated and largest province and all the state institutions; parliament, armed forces, civil bureaucracy and federal agencies and corporations are being ruled by the elites of this province. This created a conflict between Punjab and smaller provinces.³⁷ For instance, Sindh is the largest oil producing province of Pakistan, followed by Punjab, and as well as it is the largest gas producing province of Pakistan, followed by Baluchistan. According to Pakistan Energy Year Book 2007 (published by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources), Sindh and Baluchistan contribute almost 94 % of the country’s national gas production; therefore, these two provinces are being considered as the energy basket of Pakistan by some researchers. But the problem is that there is an inequality in natural resources exploitation and royalty distribution as Sindh and Baluchistan consumes only a small portion of their production and much of the gas produced in those two provinces is consumed in Punjab province.³⁸ Thus, unequal distribution of resources and mismanagement of energy have become an important threats to

³⁶ News, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=48184&Cat=4>

³⁷ Jami. Chandio, “ The Crisis of Federalism in Pakistan: Issues and Challenges,” SOP Discussion Paper Series, October 2013, Pp. 5.

³⁸ Naseer. Memon, “Oil & Gas Resources and Rights of Provinces: A case study of Sindh,” *Center for Peace & Civil Society*, Hyderabad, Sindh , Pakistan, June 2010, Pg. 9-10, <http://www.cpcs.org.pk/docs/bookshelf/oil-and-gas-resources-andr-rights-of-provinces.pdf>.

the internal situation of Pakistan and recognizing this threat as an important one, President Musharraf regarded inter provincial harmony as one key for focus because he believed that these kinds of threats not only destabilized a country but also present a bad image of Pakistan in front of the world.³⁹

Besides, the threats of ethnicity, inter-provincial functions and unequal distribution of resources, there is one more important threat, Islamic/ Religious insurgency. This threat is being considered the most crucial dynamic in Pakistani politics that lead to external players to interfere in internal affairs of the country. According to some political experts, Islamists are defined as individual or groups that use Islam as a platform and inspiration for their political ideology and goals. In Pakistan, the Islamists activities have a significant role in the Pakistani politics as many, but not all, of them use political parties to further their agenda. The history of Islamists groups started ever since Pakistan emerged as the most populous Muslim state in 1947. When General Zia took the power in Pakistan, the Islamization of state took a new phase as General Zia mostly relied on the support on the idea of Ulemas and used Sunni discourse in his speeches because he belonged to the Sunni sect of Islam that is why he supported Sunni Ulemas and Madrassahs. This policy of General Zia opposed the Shia sect who forms 20% of the population of Pakistan. According to one survey, the number of Madrassahs in Punjab was 808 in 1979 and from this year onward the number of Sunni madrassahs increased up to 2,463.⁴⁰ Most of them have been involved in Islamists activities and their activities have been marked as a serious threat for the internal security of Pakistan. As a consequence of supporting Sunnis and madrassahs by General Zia, some militant and extremist organizations were created through Sunnis and Shias sect. The General Zia's government used these extreme groups for its purpose and as a result of that, Pakistan became

³⁹ Umer. Farooq, "The Politics of Anti-Politics," September 15, 2014, <http://herald.dawn.com/tag/nawaz-sharif>.

⁴⁰ Rafeh A. Malik, "Threats to Pakistan's Internal Security," *Defense Journal*, August 2003, <http://www.defencejournal.com/2003-08/opi-e.htm>.

a playground for the extremist organizations. With the military intervention of the Soviet Unions in Afghanistan increased the tension of Pakistan about these extremist organizations and Madrassahs as they became the recruitment center of the Mujahedeen who were fighting in Afghanistan.⁴¹

During the decades of Soviet-Afghan war, Pakistan has played an important role. According to Ahmed Rashid, “the United States and Saudi Arabia had given fund to Pakistan to support the course of Jihad in Afghanistan.”⁴² Despite of the fact that the internal situation of Pakistan was in crisis during the Soviet-Afghan war, it helped Mujahedeen activities in collaboration with the United State in order to have influence in Afghanistan. Moreover, the government which took power after General Zia did not do much to come down the problems and activities of extremists groups; thus, the religious extremism’s activities had increased gradually till General Musharraf took power over the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the situation has changed somehow. In his first address, President Musharraf mentioned that the issue of religious extremism is a very important threat to the national security of his country as it has created a negative image of Pakistan in the eyes of its neighboring countries and the rest of the world. He also stated that the government needs time to fix and control all the activities that are alleged to extremist groups. While the government of Pakistan was trying to solves many of its internal problems and cope with what was going on within its neighboring countries that the event of September 9/2001 happened which changed the situation and left Pakistan with two choices, whether to support Taliban or join the United States in war against terrorism.⁴³

⁴¹ Ibid

⁴² Ahmed.Rashid, “Taliban, Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia.”(NewYork 2000), 22-23

⁴³ Ibid.

After the event of 9/11, Bush announced, “the United States would punish not just the perpetrators of the attack but also any states that harbored terrorist.”⁴⁴ When President Musharraf heard about this, he immediately ordered a meeting with his generals and a few key civilian cabinet ministers. President Musharraf stated, “The U.S. will react like a wounded bear and it will attack Afghanistan; so, Pakistan could not oppose American demands and could no longer support the Taliban, but it would not take part in any U.S. attack on Afghanistan.”⁴⁵ So, Musharraf told to his Generals commanded that Pakistan has no choice but to accept the United States demands and fight along with them in the mission of “war on terror” or being considered as a terrorist state by the United states. Finally, Musharraf announced that it would be an ally with the United States in fight against terrorism. This decision of him raised objections by many Pakistani generals and as well as by most of the Pakistani people but he told to his generals that if Pakistan did not accept the United States’ demands, India would immediately take the opportunity and offer bases and support to the United States as India had tried to encourage the Americans to declare Pakistan a terrorist state due to its support to Kashmiri militants; thus, Pakistan could face with a hostile India allied to the United States military while being allied with the U.S. forces in Afghanistan could pave the way for Pakistan to prevent its nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of Islamic extremists and meantime it would perceived its national security in case if India become ally with the U.S .⁴⁶

Pakistan has been facing multiple and complex challenges both internally and externally. Its internal challenges could be weakened institutions, bad governance, extremism

⁴⁴ Ahmed. Rashid, Decent into Chaos: The U.S. and Disaster in Pakistan. Afghanistan and Central Asia,(New York Times), 28.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p.29.

activities and meanwhile the global war on terror which continues to make its internal situation more unstable. Besides, Pakistan faces serious external challenges by the two important countries', the United States and India, activities inside of Afghanistan. Hence, the main concern of Pakistan is its national security; therefore, it has always tried to have interference in internal affairs of Afghanistan in order to secure its interests and to be safe from the external threats and as well as to prevent a Pro-Indian regime in Kabul.⁴⁷

2.2 Afghanistan: Internal Politics & External Threats

The history of Afghanistan has been with conflict, conquests, foreign interventions, and civil wars. The past 40 years, the internal politics of Afghanistan has been in chaos that is why the country has experienced a problematic process of state formation and nation building. There were many factors which posed challenges and threats to the internal situation of Afghanistan. As all multi-ethnic society has experienced problems and conflicts which raised due to different ethnic groups in their community, Afghanistan is also divided in many ethnic groups and linguistic line and similar to Pakistan, most of the various conflicts and civil wars have been proved as a result of ethnic discrimination in Afghanistan as there are many ethnic groups who fight for power in order to take the control of the country.⁴⁸ According to Abubakar Siddique, "Afghanistan's national anthem recognizes 14 ethnic groups among the country's 27 million people: Pashtuns, tajiks, hazaras, Uzbeks, Balochis, turkmens, nooristanis, Pamiris, arabs, gujars, Brahuis, Qizilbash, aimaq and Pashai. Governing a viable state with these demographics has always been a core challenge confronting Afghanistan today."⁴⁹ The largest group is the Pashtuns who has dominated the society since the

⁴⁷ Nitin. Pari, "Why Pakistan Interferes in Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs & Security*, May 25, 2012. <http://acorn.nationalinterest.in/2012/05/25/why-pakistan-interferes-in-afghanistan/>.

⁴⁸ Samee Ozair. Khan, Naheed S. Goraya, "Ethnic Factor in Afghanistan," *Journal of Political Studies*, Vol. 19, Issue- 2, 2012, <http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/pdf-files/Naheed-winter2012.pdf>.

⁴⁹ Abubakar. Siddique, "Afghanistan's Ethnic Divides," *Norwegian Peace Building Resource Center*, January 2012, http://www.observatori.org/paises/pais_87/documentos/ABUBAKAR_SIDDIQUE.pdf.

eighteenth century. The other ethnic groups (Tajiks, Hazars, and Uzbeks) believe that Pashtun group has held a large amount of functions of national and local authorities as a consequence of this there is always an ongoing conflict between these ethnic groups over the power. Hence, one can argue that ethnicity plays a dominant role in the politics of Afghanistan as the internal politics of Afghanistan is involved around contentions due to inter-ethnic conflicts between the Pashtuns in the South and Tajik and Uzbek in the North.⁵⁰ Therefore, the maintaining of harmony and peace among different ethnic groups in Afghanistan is being considered one of the biggest problems that pose serious threats to the internal situation of the country.

Besides the threats of ethnic groups, the internal situation of Afghanistan has been threatening by the politics of warlords. Warlords and their militias have a long story in the history of Afghanistan. During the Soviet occupation, the warlords were the key allies to the U.S. in fighting against the Soviet Union and later Taliban and Al- Qaeda. There were more than 200 warlords and each of them had their own militias. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989, the warlords with their personal militia came to the ground and started fighting with each other over taking the power in order to achieve their own self-interests and have influence first in their respective provinces then in the whole country. For instance, Ahmad Sha Massoud was a very famous and prominent Tajik warlord in Afghanistan, who led the resistance groups against Soviet occupation, and he was also known the “Lion of the Panjshir.”⁵¹ Massoud formed the United Front, also known as the Northern Alliance, in order to counter the advance of the Taliban. Later, he became the minister of defense in 1992 but he

⁵⁰ Rhea. Abraham, “ Politics of Ethnicity in Afghanistan: Understanding the Pashtuns and the Minor Ethnic Groups,” *Defence and Diplomacy Journal* Vol. 2 NO.2, January- March, 2013, http://www.academia.edu/4234112/The_Politics_of_Ethnicity_in_Afghanistan.

⁵¹ Anup. Kaphe, “ The Warlords of Afghanistan,” *The Washington post, Asia & Pacific*, April 1, 2015, <http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/the-warlords-of-afghanistan/967/>.

got assassinated two days before the 9/11 event. Beside Ahmad Sha Massoud, Abdul Rashid Dostum was considered the second famous warlords and he was in command of an Uzbek militia that fought against Mujahedeen fighters and as well as the Taliban. He also operated some of the largest contractor security forces in the North part of the country during the fall of Taliban.⁵² Now, he serves as vice president of Afghanistan under President Ghani's government. As each of these warlords belongs to an ethnic group with having a huge number of militias and they all try to have their influence in the country and that is why they are being considered as a threat to the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

In addition, in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, al-Qaida attacks on the United States, the United States invaded Afghanistan and aimed to remove the Taliban from power. For this mission, the U.S. asked cooperation from warlords who belonged to different ethnic militias allied under the Northern Alliance. They helped American forces and CIA operatives to defeat the Taliban and they also take benefit from this opportunity to strengthen their position and to return to the regional and local levels of power in the country.⁵³ According to Sedra, "Power and politics in Afghanistan is localized, warlord authority often exceeded that of central government in the provincial areas and in the absence of alternative source of authority; thus, the international community decided to deliberately integrate several powerful warlords into the central state system."⁵⁴ Based on a report in 2005 by the U.S. Army's Strategic Studies Institute, Karzai proclaimed, "Warlords militias as the greatest threat to Afghanistan, a threat even greater than the Taliban insurgents."⁵⁵ Thus, Karzai and the United

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ CANWEST News Service, May 10, 2007, <http://www.canada.com/topics/news/world/story.html?id=1acb5330-dfe8-4f0e-8a1b-4f581478244f&k=44800&p=1>

⁵⁴ Mark. Sedra, "Afghanistan: Between War and Reconstruction," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, March 1, 2003, http://fpif.org/afghanistan_between_war_and_reconstruction_where_do_we_go_from_here/.

⁵⁵ Joshua. Philipp, "Afghan Warlords: A larger stability threat than Taliban," Rawa News, October 12, 2010, <http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2010/10/12/afghan-warlords-a-larger-stability-threat-than-taliban.html>.

Nations decided to place the warlords in the government in hope that including them would make them to support the establishment of a strong central government but their plan became ineffective. Experts say, “Instead, the warlords have largely used their official positions to cement their own authority in the regions they control and have resisted attempts to disarm their personal militias or meld them into the national army.”⁵⁶ Hence, this complicated relation of government with inter-state warlords not only has posed security dilemma and internal threats to the country but it also paved the way for regional players to take advantage from this situation by helping these warlords.

Afghanistan has always been a playground for regional players due its geo-strategic importance. The inter-conflict between the government and warlords after the collapse of the Taliban created a good opportunity for neighboring states to interfere and achieved their desire interest from the region. According to Sedra, “Russia pledge U.S. \$100 million in military aid to the powerful warlords and Defense Minister, General Mohammad Fahim; Iran continues to give case and military support to Ismail Khan, a powerful warlord who controlled most of western Afghanistan; and Uzbekistan provided Uzbek strongman Abdul Rashid Dostum with aid and close protection unit.”⁵⁷ Besides, these abovementioned countries’ interference, India and Pakistan appeared to take more advantage by using Afghanistan’s situation for their own conflict over Kashmir. India provided Afghanistan with military, economic, and political support and has opened consulates in several cities that were near to the Pakistani border in order to have spread its influence in Afghanistan. This policy of India

⁵⁶ Esther. Pan, “ Afghanistan: Karzai Vs. the Warlords.” *Council on Foreign Relations*, September 15, 2004, <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/afghanistan-karzai-vs-warlords/p7791>.

⁵⁷ Mark. Sedra, “ Afghanistan: Between War and Reconstruction,” *Foreign Policy in Focus*, March 1, 2003, http://fpif.org/afghanistan_between_war_and_reconstruction_where_do_we_go_from_here/.

has posed a strong threat to the security Pakistan's Security Dilemma as because of its national security, they always afraid of India's presence in Afghanistan.

Therefore, Many Pakistani analysts believed that India is trying to open up a new front in its conflict with Pakistan that is why Pakistan's Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) started to provide sanctuary and arms to the Taliban and Al Qaeda in order to keep the situation in Afghanistan insecure because of the India's influence in the region.⁵⁸ Lawrence Wright stated that, however, Pakistan received billions of dollars from the United States to combat against Taliban and terrorism, yet most of the attack on U.S. forces on the side of Afghanistan's border was from Pakistan's side. It widely proved that Pakistan was playing double game with the U.S. and used most of the fund to make strong its military forces against its rivalry India in the region.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Lawrence. Wright, "The Double Game: The unintended Consequence of American Funding in Pakistan," *Annals of Diplomacy*, May 16, 2011, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/16/the-double-game>.

Chapter 3: Bone of Contention (Claims & Blames)

Afghanistan and Pakistan's relationship history is full with fighting, negative impact of foreign interventions and perpetual instability. These two countries have never succeeded in maintenance of good relation due to the below mentioned factors and challenges which are considered as the main bones of contention by some political experts and researchers between the two states:

3.1 Legacy of Mistrust

The interplay of mistrust between these two states started since the early ages when Pakistan got its independence in 1947 and Afghanistan was the only country to oppose Pakistan's entry to the UN. There were several ambiguities that why Afghanistan opposed Pakistan's UN membership.⁶⁰ Kabul saw the Pashtun and Baluch ethnicities in the North Western Frontier Province of Pakistan; therefore, it should not be recognized as a part of Pakistan until Pashtuns of that area had been given the opportunity to opt for independence and make an independent state name Pashtunistan. An Afghan representative at UN said, "This unhappy circumstance is due to the fact that we do not recognize the old North Western Frontier Province as part of Pakistan as long as the people of that NWFP have not been given an opportunity free from any kind of influence to determine whether they wish to be independent or become a part of Pakistan."⁶¹

By claiming for independent of Pashtunistan, Pakistan assumed that the royal government of Afghanistan never wants Pakistan to be as an independent state. This demand of Pashtunistan turned the relation of these two states into some serious strains as in 1949 Pakistan decided to merge the NWFP into newly formed province of West Pakistan. This

⁶⁰ Farooq. Sulehria. "Pakistan's Afghan Misadventure: Durand Line to Strategic Depth," July 17, 2014, <http://www.viewpointonline.net/2014/07/vp210/pakistan-s-afghan-misadventure-durand-line-to-strategic-depth/3869-pakistan-s-afghan-misadventure-durand-line-to-strategic-depth>.

⁶¹ Surendra. Chopra, "Afghan Pakistan Relation: The Paktoonian an Issue." *The Indian Journal of Political Science* Vol. 35, No. 4, October 1947, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41852102?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

provoked to a strong Afghan reaction which led to mark a number of border clashes between the two states.⁶² Ahmad Saeedi also claimed that the legacy of mistrust and hostility which caused the relation of these two states to be in conflict even by today goes back to the history when Pakistan in 1949 decided to merge the tribal area of NWFP to West Pakistan. (Ahmad Saeedi, an Afghan Political Analyst, in-depth interview, 1 January 2015, Kabul Afghanistan)

3.2 The Durand Line & the Question of Pashtuns

According to Faruque Hasan, “The Durand Line refers to the poorly marked international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which is approximately 2,640 kilometers long. The line was established through an agreement signed in 1893 between the Government of the British-India and Afghan ruler, Abdul Rahman Khan. The Durand Line established Afghanistan as a buffer zone between British-India and Russia which they were engaged in the ‘Great Game’ in this region. This border cut through the areas where the Pashtuns as well as Baloch tribes live.”⁶³ From the time Pakistan got its independence in 1947, the Durand Line has become the bone of contention regarding to the division of Pashtun tribal areas as Pakistan has inherited the border from the British-India at its independence.⁶⁴ Sarajulhaq Saraj states that Pashtuns are divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan in both side of this line. The Pakistan side of the Durand Line border includes the provinces of Baluchistan, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and the seven tribal agencies of the FATA, Federally Administered Tribal Areas. On the Afghan side, the line includes Nuristan province in the northeast and Nimruz in the southwest but Afghanistan has claimed all Pashtun land as its lost territory while British ruled the country. When Afghanistan claimed to take control over the Durand line, Pakistan denied as this area is considered a great economic

⁶² Khurshid. Hasan, “Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 2, No. 7, September 1962, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3023688.pdf>.

⁶³ Faruque. Hasan, *The Realities and the Myths of the Clash of Civilizations*, First Published (2013), 102.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

and military significant to its government. (Sarajulhaq Saraj, Deputy Spokesman of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in-depth interview, 3 January 2015, Kabul Afghanistan)

People, mainly Pashtuns, residing on the both sides of the Durand Line have been ignored to move freely from one side to the other at their will and even permitted to keep the nationalities of both Pakistan and Afghanistan that is why many Pashtuns on both side of the border have demand an independent state of Pashtunistan.⁶⁵ Based on the history, Afghanistan has also demanded that Pashtuns living on the Pakistani side of the Durand line should be given the right to self-determination but Pakistan refused. In response, the Afghanistan government had ignored to recognize the Durand Line as an International border. As a consequence, the relation between these two states has been tense so far over this territory. (Sayed Farhad Hashimi, a young Afghan Political expert, in-depth interview, 10 January 2015, Kabul, Afghanistan)

On other hand, Pakistan claimed that the 30 million Pakistani Pashtuns appeared to have little motivation to join the 15 million Afghan Pashtuns as they have played significant roles in civilian and military life in Pakistan then why they leave that for a barely functioning Afghanistan; therefore, they asked from the new Afghan president, Dr Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzia, to review Afghanistan's foreign policy and accept the legality of the border.⁶⁶ Shamim Shahid states, "Dr Ghani has not made any formal statement regarding the controversy over the border with Pakistan but his stance on the actual Durand line is unlikely to be different from his predecessors."⁶⁷ This debate on the issue of Durand Line and the question of Pashtuns on both side of the border have been the tension and mistrust between

⁶⁵ Frederic Grare, "Pakistan-Afghanistan Relation in the Post-9/11 Era," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, South Asia Project, October 2006, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cp72_grare_final.pdf.

⁶⁶ Arwin. Rahi, "Why the Durand Line Matters," *The Diplomat*, February 21, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/why-the-durand-line-matters/>.

⁶⁷ Shamim. Shahid, "Living with border tension: Durand Line's Fencing is no Easy Task," *The Express Tribune with International*, New York Times, November 10, 2014, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/788462/living-with-border-tension-durand-lines-fencing-is-no-easy-task/>.

these two states which caused many other problems such as armed clashes, suicide bombs, and street fighting between police; thus, the government of these two states should come to conclusion and solve this problem otherwise the tension will continue as it has been for many years. (Engineer Kamal, Member of Afghanistan Parliament, in-depth interview, 10 January 2015, Kabul, Afghanistan)

1.3.3 The Taliban as a Strategic Asset

In spite of the fact that Pakistan joined the U.S. as an ally to fight against terrorism and Taliban in Afghanistan, many analysts claimed that Pakistan is playing a double game; aiding the Taliban to kill NATO forces and keep Afghanistan insecure in order to advance its core foreign policy interests, mainly in connection with the influence of India in the region.⁶⁸ “Pakistan is the biggest threat to Afghanistan, Pakistan’s foundation is based on making problems in the region as Pakistan always tried to interfere in Afghanistan’s matter and has always been hostile to Afghanistan. Pakistan uses its British ancestral policy of ‘Divide & Rule’ and has involved in trying to divide the Afghans by having connections with different regional leaders and as well as with formal Afghan government. Pakistan is the founding place of Taliban and it is clear for the Afghan government too that the Afghan-Taliban is being aided by Pakistan’s security and intelligence services (ISI).” (Anonymous, in-depth interview, 17 January 2015, Kabul, Afghanistan)

However, Pakistan has always denied this and claimed that while Afghanistan points the finger at Pakistan for fanning the flames of its domestic wars and Afghan-Taliban’s activities, such blames do not necessarily mean that the ISI can be responsible behind that but it could be also as the result of poor governance which led their efforts to be failed in controlling of the Taliban and cross-border issues. Pakistan has also stated that the terrorism inside Pakistan is linked to Afghanistan that promoting the mission of ‘anti-Pakistan

⁶⁸ Zachary. Laub, “Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, November 18, 2013, <http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-new-generation-terrorists/p15422>.

elements' with the help of India in Pakistan's territory.⁶⁹ Carlotta Gall rejects this attempt that Afghanistan has linked with terrorism inside Pakistan and questioned Pakistan's alleged support of terrorisms. She states, "We may be fighting the wrong enemy in the wrong country."⁷⁰ She suggests that American's real opponent was the ISI and the Pakistan Army and the United States never faced up to the fact that its most powerful ally in the region was also its most powerful enemy. As a consequence, it fought a war that it could never win. Gall states that in the war approximately 50,000 and 70,000 Afghans have died, as well as 3,400 foreign soldiers, including 2,300 Americans. Between 2001 and 2013 Pakistan received more than \$20 billion in aid from Washington, most of which went to strength its military.⁷¹

In a report titled "Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan", which was issued by the Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs to The US department of Defense, Mr. Sartaj Aziz, the prime minister and national security foreign affairs of Pakistan, states that Pakistan's cooperation with the U.S. is from an area of mutual interests and the government of Pakistan has launched comprehensive operations against militant in North Waziristan. The military operations "Zarb-e- Azb" has been internationally welcomed in order to eliminate the existence of terrorist sanctuaries or any kind of proxy forces who are operating from here against Afghanistan and India. Therefore, we hope that the issue will have been seen fairly to the U.S. and Afghan government that the Pakistan is no more serve for Taliban or any kinds of terrorist groups.⁷² Some Afghan analysts argues that this report quietly ignores the fact that

⁶⁹ Qandeel. Siddique, "Pakistan's Future Policy towards Afghanistan: A Look at Strategic Depth, Militant Movements and the Role of India and the us," *Danish Institute for International Studies Report*, August 2011, http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2011/RP2011-08-Pakistans-future-policy_web.pdf.

⁷⁰ Carlotta. Gall, *The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001-2014*, (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Bostan, New York 2014)

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Bill. Roggio, "Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," Report from Department of Defense United States of America, October 2014, Pg. 93-95, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Oct2014_Report_Final.pdf.

the Afghan Taliban have a massive safe haven, such as training camps and recruiting centers, in Quetta, the capital of the Pakistani province of Baluchistan.

The senior members of Afghan Taliban are said to operate from Quetta from where they manage military operations in the South-Central Afghan provinces, Helmand, Kandahar, Oruzgan and Zabol.⁷³ Gall visited Quetta in order to investigate from the families of Taliban suicide bombers whether they have link with ISI or not. She said when I asked the brother of a Pakistani bomber if he blamed the Taliban or the ISI for bombings in Afghanistan on U.S. forces, he said, “All Taliban is ISI Taliban. It is not possible to go to Afghanistan without the help of the ISI.”⁷⁴ A former Taliban commander, who fled to Pakistan after being arrested in Afghanistan, also said that ISI agents had threatened to send him to prison unless he returned to fight Americans in Afghanistan.⁷⁵ These examples widely proved Pakistan’s complicity in supporting terrorist groups and using them as a key of strategic assets in order to have influence in the region.

In February 2006, President Karzai gave to President Musharraf a list of top Taliban leaders, including Mullah Omar and Bin Laden, who were living openly in Pakistan. Musharraf denied any Taliban leaders are in Pakistan. The U.S. also declined that list. Ahmed Rashid states “The Americans were already deeply involved in Iraq and wanted no distractions such as a cat fight between the presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The U.S. was unwilling to push the Pakistanis, and the Afghans were angry that the Americans had allowed Karzai’s credibility to suffer.”⁷⁶ “The world’s most wanted man, Osama Bin Laden, must be inside Pakistan, Abbottabad area, rather than the semi-autonomous tribal areas.”

⁷³Robert D. Kaplan, “The Taliban’s Silent Partner.” The New York Times, July 20, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/20/opinion/20kaplan.html?pagewanted=all>.

⁷⁴ Carlotta Gall, *The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001-2014*, (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Boston, New York 2014)

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ahmed. Rashid, *Decent into Chaos: The U.S. and Disaster in Pakistan. Afghanistan, and Central Asia*,(New York Times), 246.

Amrullah Saleh, the head of National Directorate of Security, told the Guardian as early in 2004.⁷⁷ He also said that he had no doubts that Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban Movements, was hiding a safe house owned by the Inter-Service Intelligence of Pakistan (ISI) in the city of Karachi. As Amrullah Saleh has been a hate figure in Islamabad among officials who believed he was an anti-Pakistani; thus, the Pakistan government did not take into consideration his claims and President Musharraf refused to consider Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar were hiding in Pakistan.⁷⁸

Surprisingly, Bruce Riedel, a CIA analyst on Al- Qaeda and Taliban, confirmed that Mullah Omer had been spotted in Karachi recently. He claimed that the ISI decide to move him further from the battlefield to keep him safe from the U.S. drone attacks; therefore, Mr Riedel asked from the Obama's administrations to send more to fight there. Mr Nadeem Kiani, a spokesman for the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, said that we have no evidence of Mullah Omar or Osama Bin Laden's presence in Pakistan. He added that the ISI and Pakistani military have suffered a lot of losses fighting the terrorists and that people who are making these accusations have their own agendas.⁷⁹ As the U.S. got suspicious of Pakistan's ISI helping the Al-Qaeda and Taliban; thus, they made Special Forces in attacking the Al-Qaeda networks into Pakistan which resulted the death of Osama Bin Laden at the end of April 2011.⁸⁰ President Obama officially announced that the U.S. Special Forces killed

⁷⁷ Jon. Boone, "Osama Bin Laden Death: Afghanistan 'had Abbottabad lead four years ago'," The Guardian, May 5, 2011, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/05/osama-bin-laden-afghan-intelligence-abbottabad-lead>.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Exclusive: Taliban Chief Hides in Pakistan, the Washington times, 20 November 2009, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/nov/20/taliban-chief-takes-cover-in-pakistan-populace/?page=all>.

⁸⁰ Anthony H. Cordesman and Arleigh A. Burke, "Transition in the Afghanistan- Pakistan War: How does the War End?," *Center for Startegic & International Studies*, July 11, 2012, Pg.35, http://csis.org/files/publication/120111_Afghanistan_Aspen_Paper.pdf.

Osama Bin Laden in a raid on a residence in Abbottabad, Pakistan.⁸¹ Hence, one conclusion can be stated with Certainty that Pakistan has played double games with the U.S. on the mission of fight against Al-Qaeda as in spite of denials by Pakistani military and government, evidence proved that Osama Bin Laden was kept in the Abbottabad areas of Pakistan by the support of ISI as well as this also make it clear that the claimed which was made by Afghan intelligence about Osama Bin Laden hiding in an area close to Abbottabad four years before he killed there was true. Thus, Pakistan does not see Taliban as a threat in its internal security but as a strategic asset to keep the Afghan society always destabilized in order to prevent the India's influence in the region.

Chapter 4: The Current Stage of Afghanistan and Pakistan's Relation

Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been particularly tense ever since the Taliban were forced from power in 2001. Over the years, Afghan leaders accused Pakistan that it intends to destabilize their government and because of its regional policies, Pakistan wants to bring the Taliban back to power. Due to this blame, the Afghan government and some international community sees Pakistan as the key player in bringing the Taliban to negotiation table. Since coming into power in September 2014, Dr Ashraf Ghani sought to installed negotiations with the Taliban for peace and for that it asked helped from Pakistan. President Ghani states as Islamabad insists that both countries have shared goal in defeating terrorism; thus, Pakistan's support is crucial in persuading the Taliban to enter peace talks as well as denying them safe havens on Pakistani soil.⁸² But, many Afghan leaders showed their concern over the President Ghani's decision. The former Presided of Afghanistan, Ahmed Karzai, said that is the Afghan government cannot overturned the country's traditionally hostile relationships with Pakistan in the hope of enlisting its help in brokering a peace deal

⁸¹ Patrick.Martin, Alex.Lantier, "The Killing of Osama Bin Laden," World Socialist Website, May 2, 2011, <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2011/05/pers-m02.html>.

⁸² NDTV, Afghanistan's Ashraf Ghani Walks Tightrope Over US, Pakistan Ties, March 30, 2015, <http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/afghanistans-ashraf-ghani-walks-tightrope-over-us-pakistan-ties-750681>.

with Taliban. He added, “We want a friendly relationship but not to be under Pakistan’s thumb.”⁸³

Surpassingly, President Musharraf in an interview with the Guardian admitted that when he was in power, Pakistan sought to undermine the government of former Afghan president Hamid Karzai because Karzai had helped India which, indeed, was damaging Pakistan’s interests because if India got more influence in Afghanistan, then it would definitely attack Pakistan in the back. Thus, we were working against Karzai’s interests in order to protect our own interests.⁸⁴ He added that India is a country that has beaten Pakistan in three conflicts since independence and played a critical role in the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971 and when we found Karzai’s government was dominated by non-Pashtuns that were thought to be mostly in favor of India. Thus, because of being suspicious of India in the region, we were looking for some groups to counter this Indian action against Pakistan. “That is where the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) work comes in. they were being in contact with Taliban groups. Definitely they were in contact, and they should be.” said Musharraf.⁸⁵ When now President Ghani has come and he is trying to restore balance in Afghanistan, Musharraf emphasized that we must totally cooperate with him; hence, he called for an end to the backing of militant “Proxies” in Afghanistan in hope for peace in the region.⁸⁶

However, Afghan officials and analysts are apparently concerned about the unprecedented decision of President Ghani to improve relationship with Pakistan. They believe that trusting Pakistan, a very close neighbor who has been accused by Afghan leaders

⁸³ Jon. Boone, “Hamid Karzai: Afghanistan in Danger of Sliding ‘Under Thumb’ of Pakistan,” *The Guardian*, March 9, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/09/hamid-karzai-if-we-give-up-control-of-our-foreign-policy-pakistan-taliban-ashraf-ghani-india>.

⁸⁴ Jon. Boone, “Musharraf: Pakistan and India’s Backing for Proxies in Afghanistan must stop,” February 15, 2015, *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/13/pervez-musharraf-pakistan-india-proxies-afghanistan-ghani-taliban>.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

of destabilizing the country, would be a risky shift in Afghan Policy because they have not taken any solid steps to prove their mutual commitment for peace as they still continue to support Taliban fighters and offer safe heavens to Taliban to operate freely from inside Pakistan towards Afghanistan, then how President Ghani believes that Pakistan is ready in building a relationship with Afghanistan based on mutual trust and confidence while it has always been proved untrustworthy.⁸⁷ On the other hand, these analysts hopes that shift of Afghan foreign policy towards Pakistan do not effect on Indo-Afghan ties because Pakistan has always attempted to destabilize Afghanistan while India did the opposite by contributing billion dollars to Afghanistan's reconstruction. According to the Tolo News, India got legitimate concerns over the sudden shift in President Ghani's foreign policy towards Pakistan. MP Sayed Abdul Qayom Sajjadi said, "I think Afghanistan's foreign policy needs a strong review. In respect to our current situation, our relations with regional countries should be balanced."⁸⁸ Thus, President Ghani scheduled to visit India next week to meet Prime Minister Narendra Modi and other Indian government officials in order to remove India's concerns that were raised over the close ties between Kabul and Islamabad.

⁸⁷ Hamid M. Saboory, " President Ghani: Stuck Between India and Pakistan.," *Foreign Policy*, March 12, 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/12/president-ghani-stuck-between-india-and-pakistan/>.

⁸⁸ Tariq. Majidi, Ghani To Visit India Next Week, 24 April 2015, Tolo News, <http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/19216-ghani-to-visit-india-next-week>.

Conclusion

The overall aim of this research was to illustrate and find out why Afghanistan and Pakistan have never succeeded in building of good relationship based on mutual trust and confidence. As it explained the story of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations is a long and complex. They are two countries with many things in common; religion, ethnic groups such as Pashtuns, and thousands of miles border. Why the relation of Paki- Afghan has never been smooth and stable goes back to the history of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan has always been a playground for foreign invaders such as the Great Britain and Soviet Union and later United States because of its good geographical and economic location in Asia. The political, economic and most importantly the form of hostility have been varied during period of each invasion in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan from December 1979 to February 1989, which affected the interest of different players in the region. Hence, the international actors, mainly the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, started to fund the resistance groups of Mujahedeen to fight against the Soviet presence through the help of Pakistan in Afghanistan. Pakistan provided the Mujahedeen with weapons, supplies, trainings, and bases from which to operate; and Pakistani units, disguised as mujahedeen, also participated directly in the fight against the Soviet till they lose the war and left Afghanistan. After the collapsed of the Soviet Unions, Afghanistan turned into a massive civil conflict between competing Mujahedeen and warlords over the power and none of them were capable of stabilizing the entire country that was the reason that Afghanistan went into a civil war.

Pakistan used this to its advantages and got decision to join the internal Afghan factions. During the 1990s, at the center of Pakistan's Afghan policy was the military's pursuit of "strategic depth" in Afghanistan that could be useful in the event of any military conflict with India. The Afghan factions with help of Pakistan fought between each other till

Taliban emerged in late 1994. The primary goals of the Taliban were to give an end to the chaos which was on going since the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and enforce a government with strict Sharia Law in order to defend the integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan. Pakistan continued to help Taliban regime because they thought the government of Taliban would be capable of not to raise the ethno-nationalists issues inside Pakistan as well as questions the Durand Line as the boundary between the two countries.

However, after the attacks of 11 September 2001, the Taliban's government was quickly collapsed by the U.S. led international coalition. After that, the United States announced the mission of "War on Terror" and warned that any country that supports terrorism will be considered under this mission too. This left Pakistan with two choices whether to still continue its support with the Taliban, who got regrouped in the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, or become an ally with the U.S. in fight against terrorism. Finally, President Musharraf changed Pakistani policy and reluctantly joint the U.S. because he feared from U.S's action towards Pakistan and the prospect of a U.S- Indian alliance. The government of Afghanistan got suspicious over the decision of Pakistan to be an ally with the U.S. in war against terrorism and Taliban and accused Pakistan that they are playing double game; instead of fighting against Taliban, Pakistan with its military intelligence (ISI) organize, recruit, and train militants who then cross the border to attack foreign forces as well as Afghan forces. Besides, after the death of Osama Bin Laden, the founder of al-Qaeda that claimed responsibility for the September 11 attacks on the United States, in a Pakistani military town very near to Islamabad made some of the U.S. officials to blame army and ISI of supporting terrorist groups. Surprisingly, in spite of all these evidences, Pakistan's government has denied such connections with terrorism.

Nevertheless, all the claims and blames became clear when former Pakistani president and army Chief Pervez Musharraf, in an interview with the Guardian, admitted ISI's

involvement in Taliban's creations. "ISI cultivate the Taliban to counter Indian's action against Pakistan." said former president Musharraf.⁸⁹ He added that Ahmed Karzai's government was a Pro-Indian which had an overwhelming number of non-Pashtuns and officials who were said to favor India. Since president Ghani wants to have a balanced relation with regional countries, we want to fully cooperate with him and join combat against terrorism in order to improve our relation based on mutual trust, respect and confidence. But, Afghan political and military experts asked from the Afghan government to take into consideration the national interest of the country and act very carefully with Pakistan's promises and should not believe this soon as such transformation of strong relationship will require years of trust-building to fix decade of suspicion. "Afghanistan should never believe in Pakistan's promises, instead they await their actions." Military expert Atiqullah Amarkhail said to Tolo New.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Jon. Boone, "Musharraf: Pakistan and India's Backing for Proxies in Afghanistan must stop," February 13, 2015, *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/13/pervez-musharraf-pakistan-india-proxies-afghanistan-ghani-taliban>.

⁹⁰ Ratib. Nori, "Pakistan Army and ISI Chiefs Arrive to Kabul," February 17, 2015, Tolo News, <http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/18259-pakistans-army-and-isi-chiefs-arrive-to-kabul>.

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Appendix

List of Interviewees:

1. Ahmad Saeedi, a former Afghan diplomat and political analyst.
2. Sayed Farhad Hashimi, a young Afghan Political expert.
3. Sarajulhaq Saraj, deputy spokesman of Ministry of Foreign affairs
4. Wahid Muzhda, a political analyst and a journalist.
5. Engineer Kamal, member of Afghan parliament.

List of Questions:

1. How do you see the state of relation between Afghanistan and Pakistan?
2. What political gain does Pakistan make from keeping Afghanistan destabilized?
3. What are the main factors which effecting the maintenance of good relation between these two states?
4. Do you believe that if Afghanistan recognizes the Durand line as an International borders, then the problem between these two states will get smooth?
5. What do you think about the question of Pashtun, whether it has any effect on the relation between these two states or not?
6. Why Pakistan is unwilling to fight against Taliban?
7. Despite of the fact Pakistan is an important ally of the U.S., what do you think that why they still have some links with Taliban, mainly their military intelligence (ISI)
8. How do you analyze the last 13 years of these two states compare to Taliban's period?
9. How do you observe the policy of former President Karzai and President Ghani towards Paksitan?
10. How do you view the current situation of these two states?

List of Glossary:

Mujahedeen	“Holy Warrior”- in Afghanistan, the term most often used to refer to the member of the Afghan resistance who fought against the Soviet Union, which took place from 1979 to 1989. ⁹¹
Taliban	Opposition, Radical Islamic group, Pro Al-Qaida and Osama Bin Laden.
Northern Alliance	Tajik Mujahedeen in cluding warlords and some high-ranked members of the parliament.
FATA:	Federally Administered Tribal Areas is a tribal region bordering Pakistan’s province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan to Afghanistan’s province of Kunar.
ISI	Inter-Service Intelligence
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
Zarb-e-Azb	The name of a joint military offensive being conducted by Pakistan armed forces against various militant groups
Shia	Religious Sect
Sunni	Religious Sect
Jihad	Holy War
Mullahs	A Muslim Religious leader often trained in Islamic Doctrine and Sharia Law. ⁹²
Madrasah	An Arabic word that is referred to an educational institution, particularly for Islamic religious instruction
Strategic Depth	In politico-diplomatic terms, strategic depth is the ability of a state to reduce threats by a combination of strategies, which include improving relations with neighbors, and brings the possibility of an armed conflict to zero. In case of Pakistan, a strategic depth is a function of the way that Pakistan approaches its national security dilemma. ⁹³

⁹¹ Sultan. Masuda ,” From Rhetoric to Reality,” *Afghan Women on the Agenda for Peace*, February 2005, http://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/18_from_rhetoric_to_reality_afghan_women_on_the_agenda_for_peace.pdf.

⁹² Ibid

⁹³ Khalid. Iqbal, “ Pakistan’s Dilemma about Strategic Depth,” February 12, 2012, <http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/pakistan’s-dilemma-about-strategic-depth/>