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**Third Party Intervention in the Conflict Resolution  
Process and its Impact on Post Conflict State Building: the  
Case of Civil War in Tajikistan**

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## **Glossary**

**IRP**- Islamic Renaissance Party

**UTO**- United Tajik Opposition

**WHO**-World Health Organization

**PDP**- People's Democratic Party

**OSCE**- Organization for Security and Cooperation in

**DPA**- UN Department of Political Affairs

**UNMOT**- the United Nations' Mission Observers

## **Introduction**

There are 24 ongoing intrastate conflicts in the world today, among which nine are internationalized.<sup>1</sup> End of the bipolar security system culminated in increased autonomy of regional and international organizations which have been playing important role in conflict resolutions.<sup>2</sup> Tajikistan was one of the first countries, to experience intrastate conflict after the collapse of the Soviet Union and diverse international involvement to manage conflict.

In 1993 after a year of armed conflict Tajikistan had left 100 000 killed and around 600 000 thousand of internally displaced people.<sup>3</sup> The Civil War in Tajikistan started in 1992 after the collapse of the Soviet Union and culminated with the General Agreement in 1997. It was the case where intrastate conflict became internationalized. Diversity of interregional and international actors were involved to manage peace process in Tajikistan. Mediators' multi-dimensional approach applied in the Civil War to achieve reconciliation was successful. Civil War hindered the development of the country, but the positive outcome achieved by multidimensional approach did not influenced on the post conflict state building positively. Tajikistan today an authoritarian country and neo-patrimonialism is prevailing in the politics and economy.

Conflict resolution process in Tajikistan is accepted as a successful operation of international and regional parties which ended in peace. In the civil war of Tajikistan conflict resolution was facilitated by international organizations United Nations, OSCE,

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<sup>1</sup> Uppsala Data Program, "Ongoing Armed Conflicts", Uppsala University, Sweden, n.d. Wed.26 Apr.2015 [www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/)

<sup>2</sup> Bercowitch, "*Conflict Resolution in the Twenty First Century: principles, methods, and approaches*", (The University of Michigan Press, 2009) 122

<sup>3</sup> International Crisis Group Report, Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace, (Osh/Brussels, 2001)# 30,2.

and regional actors as Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Tajikistan ethnically diverse country which inherited regionalism and ethnic nationalism from times of Soviet Union rule. At the break of Soviets in 1990s Tajikistan was left on the crossroads of Civil War. Different political factions from four regions, Sogd, Khatlon, Kulyab and Gorno-Badakhshan, composed of different nationalities and ethnicities had fight with each other to gain power in the new government. Conflict in Tajikistan started from peaceful demonstrations of parties against the establishment of communist government after independence.

## **Literature Review**

“Conflict resolution is a range of formal and informal activities undertaken by parties to a conflict, or outsiders, designed to limit and reduce the level of violence in conflict.

It is a popular term used to address concerns of conflicting parties without controlling or forcing the conflict, to bring parties to a peaceful agreement.

From plenty of conflict resolution approaches nowadays multi-dimensional approach of conflict resolution is most famous and preferable by international system players. Main features of this approach is a diversity of mediators involved in the conflict resolution process. It recommended itself as inclusive settlement of conflict with the outcome of long term lasting effect.<sup>4</sup>

With the end of the Cold War Era “balance of power” approach in resolving

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<sup>4</sup> Bercovitch Jacob & Richard Jackson, Conflict Resolution in the Twenty First Century: principles, methods, and approaches, The University of Michigan Press, 2009, p.10

conflicts changed in line with the nature of conflicts.<sup>5</sup> “New wars” (Kaldor) as Jacob Bercovitch states require new approaches “focusing on resolving deep-seated and structural issues” involving wide range of actors as official so nonofficial ones.<sup>6</sup> Non official diplomacy, preventive diplomacy, post-conflict peace building and extermination of root causes are tools of new era conflict management approaches. After the end of Cold War conventional ways of resolving conflicts such as negotiation and mediation have been prioritized and modified as new types of inter- intrastate wars appearing mostly based on ethnicity, identity and less on territorial sovereignty factors need different approach. The goal of new conflict management approaches is not only secessions of violence but creation “of new forms of interactions that can reflect tenets of justice, human needs, legitimacy and equality”<sup>7</sup>. Tajikistan became one of the first recipients of new conflict resolution strategies where third parties had contributed to signing peace agreement by collective effort and periodic informal negotiations. In recent years, nonconventional approach to conflict resolution is in the form of third-party mediation is getting popularity.<sup>8</sup>

**Multi-dimensional approach-** recommended itself as an inclusive settlement of conflict with outcome of long term lasting effect.<sup>9</sup> Such an approach includes international and regional organizations, states and non-governmental organizations bound by the common

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<sup>5</sup> Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century*; Principles, Methods and Approaches, University of Michigan Press, p.9 2009

<sup>6</sup> Ibid

<sup>7</sup> Marieke Kleiboer, *Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation*, 360-61

<sup>8</sup> Kumar Rupsinghe, “Meditation in Internal Conflicts: Lessons from Sri-Lanka,” in *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation*, edited by Jacob Bercovitch, (Colorado: Boulder, 1996), 154.

<sup>9</sup> Bercovitch Jacob & Richard Jackson, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty First Century: principles, methods, and approaches*, The University of Michigan Press, 2009, p.10

goal of resolving the conflict. Third parties influence on parties in conflict on different levels, of “normative and practical dimensions”<sup>10</sup>.

**Negotiation**-is a dyadic structure of bargaining, where contending parties are in full control of the process come together to solve their problem in verbal or non-verbal communication.<sup>11</sup> It may include two or more parties, which have sequential relationship and a conflict of interests they are trying to solve.

**Mediation**-is another form of conflict management where the role of third parties to assist two or more conflicting parties to find peaceful solution to their problem.<sup>12</sup>

Richard Jackson defines it as bargaining between parties in conflict where intermediary uses different tools such as leverage, skills, financial or political power to influence on the relationships between the parties, to increase their commitment to the process and foster peace process.<sup>13</sup> One of the most used strategies by facilitators in mediation is a track two or non-official diplomacy.

**Track II Diplomacy**, in other terms *non-official, face-to-face diplomacy, back channel diplomacy*. Bercovitch defines it as an interactive initiatives, trained scholar-practitioners run special conflict analysis workshops to facilitate negotiations between leaders or conflicting parties.<sup>14</sup> It is relatively new approach in conflict resolution became popular after the end of the Cold War, to resolve new intrastate conflicts differing from

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<sup>10</sup> Jacob Bercovitch, “Conflict Resolution in the Twenty First Century”, 10.

<sup>11</sup> J.Bercovitch & Richard Jackson, Current Developments in International Conflict Management: assessing the relevance of negotiation and mediation. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2001. Accessed 25/04/2015

<sup>12</sup> Marieke Kleiboer, Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol 2, 360, (1996)

<sup>13</sup> Richard Jackson, “Internal War, International Mediation, and Non-Official Diplomacy: Lessons From Mozambique”, *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, (2005).

<sup>14</sup> Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, “Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-First Century”, 2009.

conventional interstate conflicts existing. The basis of non-official diplomacy is to arrange internal conflicts which differ from conventional interstate disputes happened before the 1990s.

Though conflict resolution process in Tajikistan is accepted as successful “Security Council welcomes the success achieved in the peace process in Tajikistan...”<sup>15</sup> some scholars are skeptical about effectiveness of it. Zartman states “agreements signed under the conditions of political exclusion, do not lead to increased political participation”. Negotiations in Tajik Civil War were very fragile which made mediators exclude the option of inclusivity in the process as it could be a threat for the next rounds of negotiations. As a result parties from Sogd were not included in peace process and were discriminated from power sharing system. After establishing the new government based on the 30/70 power sharing formula between the Tajik United Opposition and the government consisting of Kulobi people regime gradually became to circle around a strong president and his loyalties. Provisions of the General Agreement which ended the war did not include extermination of root cause of the conflict such as regionalism and ethno-nationalism. The hypothesis of this paper is that, security first approach of mediators in conflict resolution process created a fertile ground for the new government to develop into authoritarian regime with neo-patrimonialism prevailing in politics and economy.

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<sup>15</sup> UN Security Council, Report by President,



## Chapter 1

In September 1991 Tajikistan declared itself an independent sovereign state. However, having been politically and economically dependent on Moscow for more than 70 years, it encountered many problems. This was due to the fact the country was ethnically fragmented, a result of the Soviets' demarcation project, which saw Central Asia divided along ethnic lines in the early 1920s. This left Tajikistan with four regions, Gorno-Badakhshan, Khorog, Sogd, and Khatlon delineated according to ethnicity, which the Soviets used as a tool<sup>16</sup> to keep control over the region during Soviet's rule. Following the decline of Moscow's power, growing regional ethno-nationalism and ideological difference between political parties led to a struggle for power. Northern Tajikistan was more developed economically than the South and had dominated in politics since the establishment of the Tajik republic in 1929. Gorno-Badkhshan, Khorog were less developed regions and always were inferior in the politics and economy. Comparatively to two underdeveloped regions Kulyabi people from Khatlon were in minor representation in Communist Party.

In the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a result of *perestroika* and *glasnost*, marginalized regions in Tajikistan inspired by reforms found free space to express own grievances. Tajikistan had its first multi-party elections in 1991 where nine candidates competed for power. Continuing the old structure of regional dominance, Rakhmon Nabiev from Khujand (Leninabad) won the presidential elections. Regions of Kurgan-Tyube, Gorno-Badakhshon, and Garm started active promotion of own interests

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<sup>16</sup> John Heathershaw, *Post Conflict Tajikistan: The Politics of Peace Building and the Emergence of Legitimate Order*, (Taylor & Francis Group, 2009), 21.

by which they challenged dominance of Northerners.<sup>17</sup> The time of Rakhmon Nabiev as a president was short, as the lack of a “cohesive sense of national identity”<sup>18</sup> meant that opposition parties could easily mobilize their supporters, who took to the streets of Dushanbe in response to Nabiev’s imprisonment of opposition party members.<sup>19</sup> After two months of demonstrations, armed conflict eventually broke out between the opposition groups and the National Guard, which had only recently been formed by volunteers and pro-government supporters. Lack of diplomatic skills and willing to compromise by the new government were the main reasons for the escalation of violence.<sup>20</sup> Foreign influence also helped exacerbate the conflict, providing support with militia and ideological nourishment.<sup>21</sup> Foreign governments at first stages of conflict, as Uzbekistan, Afghanistan or Russia had sympathized parties to the conflict, Leninabadi factions, Islamic party and the government respectively. Occupation of Kabul by Taliban changed the attitude and strategies of the countries, so they urged reconciliation in order to avoid threats to its own security.<sup>22</sup>

### **Main Parties in the Conflict**

The conflict in Tajikistan as a reflection of social, political, and religious aspirations of people occurred between the government and opposition. The opposition comprised the democratic and Islamic parties, while the governments of Nabiev and later Emomali

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<sup>17</sup> Heatershaw, *Post Conflict Tajikistan*, 21.

<sup>18</sup> Dov Lynch, *Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan*, (USA: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 150.

<sup>19</sup> Lynch, *Russian Peace Keeping Strategies*, 150.

<sup>20</sup> Shirin Akiner & Catherine Barnes, “The Tajik Civil War: Causes and Dynamics,” in *Accord: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, ed. Kammolludin Abdullaev and Catherine Barnes, (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001), 16-23.

<sup>21</sup> Akiner and Barnes, “Tajik Civil War,” 2001.

<sup>22</sup> Iji Testuro, “Multi-Party Mediation in Tajikistan: The 1997 Peace Agreement”, *International Negotiation* 6, (2001), 357-385

Rakhmonov were conservative.<sup>23</sup> Although the opposition parties were united in their fight against the government, their differing ideologies created conflict between themselves. At the start of the conflict, all the parties operated according to regional ties, ideological and religious aspirations. The strongest parties included the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, which sought to liberate Tajikistan from the communist legacy, and the Islamic Renaissance Party, later known as the United Tajik Opposition, which wanted to establish an Islamic government. United Opposition was the major-dangerous rival of the government because it had military capability to fight. Also it had The Lali Badakhshon Party exclusively fought for the rights of people from the Badakhshan region, where the majority of the population were Ismaili. They wanted independence from Dushanbe and in April 1992 Badakhshan updated its status of an autonomous region. The Rastokhez (Revival) movement founded by intelligentsia from Khujand had nationalistic agenda and wanted to build a strong Tajik identity through promoting local customs and language. The president Rakhmonov was a chair of Kulob Provincial Soviet of People's Deputy before his election to chair Supreme Council. After election of him as a chair of Supreme Soviet he came to communist dominated government and later in 1998 joined People's Democratic Party.

All of the parties received financial, ideological and organizational support from external forces. Islamic opposition leaders had contact with the Taliban in Afghanistan, which sent its members to fight on the side of opposition with government and the Russian troops.<sup>24</sup> Pro-governmental structures meanwhile were supported by Russia.

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<sup>23</sup> Dov Lynch, *Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan*, (USA, St. Martin's Press, 2000), 227

<sup>24</sup> Kamoluddin Abdullaev & Catherine Barnes, Profiles, *Accord: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001), 90.

Other Central Asian states in some instances supported many of the parties, except for Turkmenistan, which remained neutral until the middle of negotiations. Turkmenistan was concerned with the security of its own regime. It did not want Muslim insurgents in the neighboring country inspire radical movements on its own land and it hosted 4<sup>th</sup> round of negotiations (Appendix I). Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan backed the government as they prioritized regional security, which would have been at risk had conflict in Tajikistan resulted in separatist movements got into power. Despite the fact that Uzbekistan did not host any official negotiations and consultative meetings it played a big role as a peacemaker sending its troops to help Rakhmonov to be a president in (1992-1993) and set the motion of official negotiations.<sup>25</sup> Uzbekistan as third party to the conflict played a role of patron for Leninabadi faction and sought the outcome of the war strategically important for it; however with the shift of power to Kulyabi faction it was marginalized.<sup>26</sup>

With regards to conflict management, Russia played an important role in this process. After the resignation of Nabiev, Rakhmonov was elected as the head of state and was supported by Leninabadi and Kulyabi deputies to get to that point in exchange to the place in the government.<sup>27</sup> The new government requested intervention from the Commonwealth of Independent States forces to resettle the conflict. Russia acting through the CIS mandate sent so-called “*mirotvorcheskie*” (peacekeeping) forces to Tajikistan.

### **Regional Intervention**

Intervention in the conflict can be divided into two parts: regional and international.

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<sup>25</sup> Iji Testuro, “Multi-Party Mediation in Tajikistan: The 1997 Peace Agreement”, *International Negotiation* 6, (2001), 357-385

<sup>26</sup> Iji Testuro, “Multi-Party Mediation in Tajikistan”, 371

<sup>27</sup> Dov Lynch, *Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan*, (USA, St. Martin’s Press, 2000) 152.

On the regional level Russia, Iran were the most powerful external actors in the process of negotiations, since they facilitated, financed and hosted negotiations. Throughout the whole process Russia was pro-government and encouraged the opposition to negotiate. It was one of the main sponsors of peace talks and hosted five meetings among which the most important one took place, where a peace agreement was signed between the leader of the United Tajik Opposition Hoji Abdullo Nuri and Emomali Rakhmon.<sup>28</sup>

All of the regional actors: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan also hosted negotiations and were observers of the peace process. Out of these countries, Iran played the biggest role in promoting peace and sponsoring peace talks in Tehran. The motivation behind its actions was to weaken the Taliban's influence and also that of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Iran also wanted to prevent involvement of the United States and Turkey in the regional issues.<sup>29</sup>

Uzbekistan in line with Russia's and Iran's involvement played a big role in development of conflict and peace process. On the first stages of conflict it supported government to fight Islamists, and shifted from its position when Rakhmonov became closer to Russia. Russia sent its military troops to contain security mainly on the borders with Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. Karimov started doubting its relations to Rakhmonov's government and criticized it for reluctance to negotiate on peace process. Uzbekistan played a big role because Karimov appealed to the Security Council of United Nation in 1992 to intervene the process.<sup>30</sup>

At the point of intervening the conflict regional state were largely motivated by

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<sup>28</sup> Kamoluddin Abdullaev & Catherine Barnes, *Accord: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001), 93.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid

<sup>30</sup> Ibid

self-interest. State or regional intervention differ from international by its aim of intervention, which is self-interest. Intervention by international organizations is considered as non-biased and impartial. The nature of intervention either humanitarian intervention or self-interest action to influence on the outcome of civil war in different ways. Third parties are generally considered to be non-biased, impartial and non-coercive.<sup>31</sup> They intervene in situations when conflicting parties are unable to achieve common goal and are unwilling to cooperate. In the case of the Tajik civil war mediators had double motive, self-interest and humanitarian incentives. Intervention influenced not only on peace process but on post conflict state building also. It created politics of exclusion which did not become a precondition for democracy, but lead to authoritarianism.<sup>32</sup>

The worst of the war occurred between 1992 -1993, and regional powers' intervention did not do much to stop armed conflict. The request addressed to the UN Secretary General by regional states became an incentive for international actors to intervene. In September 1992, the UN mission was sent to Tajikistan to report on the situation and visit the places that had been most affected by the conflict and speak with political and military leaders.<sup>33</sup> In November the same year, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF and WHO closely cooperated with the CIS mediating team led by Felix Kulov (then vice president of Kyrgyzstan)<sup>34</sup>. They created a multi-party mediation group of regional and international actors. As the findings from the first two missions were not enough to create

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<sup>31</sup> Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse & Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2011) pages needed

<sup>32</sup> Jonathan Zartman, "Negotiation, Exclusion and Durable Peace: Dialogue and Peace Building in Tajikistan", *International Negotiation*, 13, (2008): 55-72

<sup>33</sup> Kamoluddin Abdullaev & Catherine Barnes, *Accord; Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, (London, Conciliation Resources, 2001) 33-35.

<sup>34</sup> *ibid.*

a suitable mediation strategy, the UN established a mission of observers (UNMOT), which was based in Dushanbe. It was responsible for monitoring the situation on the ground and keeping the Secretary General updated as well as encouraging regional peacemaking efforts, assessing the military situation and facilitating humanitarian assistance by the international community.<sup>35</sup> In April 1993 the UN Secretary General established a full-time envoy led by Ambassador Kittani and later by Ramiro Pirtiz Ballon. The envoy's aim was to mediate a ceasefire and establish a negotiation process.<sup>36</sup> Later in June, the OSCE joined the UN, as a result of responsibility sharing the UN was heading peacemaking process and OSCE peace building.

Before the official negotiations facilitated by the UN, there were organized non-official dialogue under the auspices of the Dartmouth Conference. Participants of the Dialogue were second, third level governmental officials and civil society representatives. The inter-Tajik Dialogue was a platform for the civil society to develop and discuss solutions to the conflict and foster an understanding of the rooted causes.<sup>37</sup> On meetings of the National Dialogue, participants issued memorandums consisting of formulas of regional and ethnic representation, empowering conflicting parties to participate in negotiations, or in advisory character to create a "consultative forum of the people of Tajikistan".<sup>38</sup> Gradually dialogue created a "culture of tolerance and cultural symbiosis".

<sup>39</sup> As it was not official meetings and its suggestions did not carry binding character,

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<sup>35</sup> Kamoluddin Abdullaev & Catherine Barnes, *Accord; Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, (London, Conciliation Resources, 2001) 33-35

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, 34-35.

<sup>37</sup> Rhanda M. Slims and Harold Saunders, "The Inter- Tajik Dialogue: From Civil War towards Civil Society", in *Accord: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, ed. Kammolludin Abdullaev and Catherine Barnes, (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001) 44.

<sup>38</sup> Rhanda M. Slims and Harold Saunders, "The Inter-Tajik Dialogue", 46

<sup>39</sup> Jonathan Zartman, "Negotiation, Exclusion and Durable Peace: Dialogue and Peace Building in Tajikistan", *International Negotiation*, 13, (2008): 57

they were ignored by decision making parties even when Nuri and Rakhmon promised to organize consultative forum.

The first official inter-Tajik negotiations led by the UN took place one year after the start of its mission. The leading office responsible for the process was the UN Department for Political Affairs (DPA). It was in charge of drafting the reports of the General Secretary to the Security Council, developing the peace process strategy, preparing draft agreements and handling organizational issues concerning negotiations.<sup>40</sup> The first round of negotiations took place in April 1994 in Moscow and took three years for parties to sign the peace agreement. An accord was reached on the distribution of power in the government and the military, on refugee issues and amnesty arrangements.<sup>41</sup> The most problematic part of the negotiation arrangements for mediators was getting together the conflicting parties, who were reluctant to negotiate. The diagnostic phase, which preceded the official negotiations, was aimed at finding official party representatives to take part in negotiations and planning the structure of mediation. Lack of diplomatic experience and inability of leading strategic politics without war was an alien thing for newly formed parties in Tajikistan was seen. In early periods of conflict they sought to gain power and authority by military action, accepting it as the only option. It did not work out as parties started having big personnel losses.

### **Multi-dimensional tactic**

To bring conflicting parties to the table of negotiations and make them listen to each other, mediators took a multi-dimensional approach and acted on a regional and

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<sup>40</sup> Jonathan Zartman, "Negotiation, Exclusion and Durable Peace: Dialogue and Peace Building in Tajikistan", *International Negotiation*, 13, (2008), 57-58

<sup>41</sup> Kamoludin Abdullaev, "Conflict Resolution in Tajikistan", last modified on June 1, 2009. <http://kamolkhon.com/conflict-resolution-in-tajikistan/#more-12>.



international level of leverage, persuasion and enforcement.<sup>42</sup>The civil war attracted the attention of a broad range of regional actors, which, as previously mentioned, had both internal and external interests in managing the conflict. International, intergovernmental organizations such as the OSCE, UN and regional states Russia, Iran headed the conflict resolution team and had played big part in conflict management process. Central Asian countries also showed high level of cooperation and cohesive action. Each state and organization had a specific influence at particular stages of negotiations, mediations. For example when Rakhmonov was elected as the president he immediately started to fight the opposition groups, imprisoning and executing them. This forced the opposition to flee out of the country and announce themselves opposition in exile. They established an office in Afghanistan and periodically launched attacks in Tajikistan, reducing the military capacity of the government but increasing its will to negotiate<sup>43</sup>. Having military superiority the government was reluctant to negotiate political accommodation, but Russia and the UN pressured government to cooperate with the opposition.<sup>44</sup> In multi-party approach mediators used “directive strategies”<sup>45</sup> to force parties to take some action towards reconciliation and peace agreement.

The UN was aware that Tajikistan’s neighbors had their own interest in the outcome of the civil war and in which way it may affect them. Having this in mind the United Nations group called upon regional countries to support and sponsor peace process. The UN

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<sup>42</sup> Conor McAuliffe, “Tajikistan Peace Negotiations”, *The Fletcher School Online Journal to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization*, (Fall 2006), 3-4.

<sup>43</sup> Vladimir Goryaev, “Architecture of International Involvement in the Tajik Peace Process, in *Accord: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, ed. Kammolludin Abdullaev and Catherine Barnes, (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001), 16-23.

<sup>44</sup> Anthony Richter, “Springtime in Tajikistan”, *World Policy Journal* 11, no. 2 (1994): 86, accessed October 15, 2014, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40468613>.

<sup>45</sup> Marieke Kleiboer, “Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation”, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 11, no. 2, (June 1996): 375

invited Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to join the group of observers in the Inter-Tajik Dialogue. Russia, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan were also present. These countries played a big role in persuading opposition leaders and government representatives to participate in the negotiations. Using such a multi-party approach the mediators' strategies provided parties the opportunity to reach a solution and in cases of high distrust pushed them to negotiate on certain issues.

### **Track Two Diplomacy**

Track two diplomacy or non-official diplomacy practiced by the mediators as a method to consolidate trust between opposition and the government as their behavior was unpredictable because of mutual mistrust. This was an essential part of the conflict resolution process in Tajikistan as there Tajikistan did not have a culture of diplomatic conflict resettlement. This meant parties were unable to sit at the same table and periodically broke any agreements that were reached. During eight rounds of official negotiations meetings were held with each party. UN mediators, OSCE members and regional stakeholders helped parties to define their aims, think about possible barriers and come up with a strategy to achieve concrete goals.

After the first round of negotiations in Moscow the parties were unable to find common ground when it came to restructuring the government and policy issues. The government rejected a plan initiated by opposition on establishing transitional governing body named Council of National Reconciliation where part of places would be allocated to the UTO members. Russia as patron of Rakhmonov's regime in early 1994 realized that conflict should have political resettlement and changed its course of unilateral military solution through military support of Tajik government to active participation in mediation process

as it served its changed interests better.<sup>46</sup> Increase of Taliban power in Afghanistan in 1996, at the same time decrease of its own military capabilities, and deterioration of Rakhmonov's regime forced Russia to reorient its attention towards peaceful resettlement of conflict in near abroad Tajikistan. The shift in Russian foreign policy was done to prevent spread of Islamic fundamentalism in the region, political accommodation of the conflict in Tajikistan would stop it.<sup>47</sup>

During the second round of official negotiations, parties did not reach a political solution as each insisted strongly on its own interests. The UN with an observer and a host country Iran facilitated consultative meetings in Tehran in 1994 where an agreement on ceasefire was signed by parties in conflict. The UN representatives were the only among mediators who met with both conflicting parties. Therefore, it used its authority productively to put pressure on factions, to increase their commitment to negotiations, and doubted its facilitation of third round of negotiations.<sup>48</sup> After multiple 'shuttle negotiations' in 1995, the Protocol on Fundamental Principles of Peace and National Accord was signed by conflicting parties, which became a framework for the development of the General Agreement\* signed two years later in 1997.<sup>49</sup>

All consultations with the opposition party were held in Iran or Pakistan as these countries backed the opposition and had good relations with them. UN group was the one

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<sup>46</sup> Iji Testuro, "Cooperation, Coordination and Complimentary in International Peacemaking: The Tajikistan Experience", *International Peacekeeping Journal*, 12, no.2, (Aug 2006): 192-93

\*General Agreement was composed of all agreements and protocols signed by countries in the period of 1993-1997, further in the research referring to the General Agreement means final agreement signed by parties in 1997, which was called The General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Elena Rigacci Hay, "Methodology of inter-Tajik negotiation process", in *Accord: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, ed. Kammolludin Abdullaev and Catherine Barnes, (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001), 38-43

<sup>49</sup> Elena Rigacci Hay, "Methodology of inter-Tajik negotiation process", in *Accord: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, ed. Kammolludin Abdullaev and Catherine Barnes, (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001), 38-43.

who chose the place for non-official meetings. It based its choice on the privileges and advantages available for conflicting factions in negotiations in a specific country. Important, first and the second rounds of negotiations were hosted by most prominent stakeholders, Russia and Iran. Each state was patronizing government and opposition respectively and assisted own clients through the process of negotiations, to protect their interests. Choosing hosting country was a sensitive deal, which could have influence on the outcome of negotiation based on the place where it was held. Official and important rounds of negotiations held in Russia were useful when it was aimed at promoting the interest of the government and the agenda drafted there prioritized the interests of Tajik government.

## Chapter II

### *Critiques of the Peace Process*

The reconciliation process involved in the Tajik civil war is generally considered to be a successful case of how a multi-party approach along with non-official diplomacy can help end civil war. The UN Security Council has defined conflict management in Tajikistan as a success and defined several factors that led to the positive outcome of the conflict management process in Tajikistan. These include involvement from the beginning of the war; recognition of the UN by regional states and parties as the legitimate and supreme coordinator of the mediation process; active involvement of regional actors, taking leading positions while hosting negotiations on their territory; the signing of the Fundamental Principles for Establishing Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, which became the basis for General Agreement; and the deployment of UN military observers to support peacekeeping envoys efforts.<sup>50</sup>

Iji Testuro has broken the conflict resolution process in Tajikistan into three stages: diagnostic, formula creating and detail setting.<sup>51</sup> Diagnostic period started in 1993 when the UN sent special observers to analyze the situation on the battle fields and to report on findings to the Security Council, based on which reports were set further actions. This period lasted up until the 1994, when first official negotiations took place in Moscow in April 19. The first and second rounds with following consultative meetings were

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<sup>50</sup> Vladimir Goryaev, “*Architecture of International Involvement in the Tajik Peace Process*”, in *Accord: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, ed. Kammolludin Abdullaev and Catherine Barnes, (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001), 37.

<sup>51</sup> United Nations’ Security Council, *The Situation in Tajikistan and along the Afghan Border: Statement by the President of Security Council*, S/PRST/2000/17, (12 May 2000), available at <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/statements/2000.shtml>

dedicated to formula setting and defining general points concerning the conflicting parties. The outcome of that stage was the Protocol on the Fundamental Principles of Establishing Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan signed in August 1995. The Protocol became the basis for the General Agreement and constituted a framework of it. After signing the Protocol on Fundamental Principles negotiation shifted to official meetings and closed conferences of the leaders of parties Emomali Rakhmonov and Abdullo Nuri on setting the details of agreement. External mediators under the control of the UN outlined the negotiations' agenda, composed draft agreements, invited participants and controlled the process with observers. United Nations' members worked on drafting texts, 95% of which were accepted by the parties to conflict.<sup>52</sup> Regional stakeholders contributed to the process by hosting meetings, supporting financially, providing logistics and putting pressure on actors to move forward from stalled negotiations. At every stage there were specific problems. The main problem was mutual antagonisms existed between parties, both wanted to gain ultimate power without sharing it with the other, and excessive hostility which hindered negotiations. The second was an inability to find a political solution and share power and finally the difficulty of setting details. For example, parties could not come to common point on the place of next negotiations, opposition was inclined to have it in Iran or other Muslim countries where they would have ideological supporters, government preferred to use its supporters' territory, Russia or Central Asian countries. Each party tried to advocate its own interests on the meetings, debates aroused around the topics for discussion on next stages, on the power sharing formula, and on the

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<sup>52</sup> Elena Rigacci Hay, "Methodology of inter-Tajik negotiation process", in *Accord: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, ed. Kammolludin Abdullaev and Catherine Barnes, (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001), 42.

numbers of prisoners to be freed.<sup>53</sup>

This coercive and multi-dimensional approach by mediators also helped to influence the development of Tajikistan as a nation.

Recent approaches to conflict resolution have not just been aimed at ending violence, but at establishing new collaborations that reflect the basic principles of justice, legitimacy, equality and human needs.<sup>54</sup> The security first approach influenced the negotiation process in the sense that it shortened it and brought to success, but mediators put pressure on parties to quickly sign the peace agreement because their main concern was the threat to regional security caused by Civil War in Tajikistan and Taliban fight in Afghanistan. The outcome of such an approach, which will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, resulted in only parties with military power being included in the negotiation process. In addition, the strategy of putting pressure on parties to achieve a goal created a culture of dominance in the new political regime of Tajikistan. Today Tajikistan is a neo-patrimonial regime that has its roots in the conflict resolution process of the civil war during which mediators applied forceful strategy using authority and leverage over parties.

### ***Exclusive Mediation***

The international actors' well organized, goal-oriented mediation strategy together with the desire of the opposition parties which were exhausted of exile to resolve the conflict before it took on a regional dimension helped end violence, but had many shortcomings that did not change the overall situation in the country. Inter-regional struggle for power was resolved by introducing a power-sharing system, however, it did

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<sup>54</sup> Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, "Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: Principles, Methods and Approaches", (US, University of Michigan Press, 2009) 9.

not help resolve the root cause of the conflict as regionalism still prevails to this day across the country's political, economic and social arenas.<sup>55</sup> The outcome of this approach as previously mentioned resulted in parties without any military power being excluded from the political arena. As a result parties from the once politically and economically strong region of Khujand (Leninabad) were excluded from negotiations altogether and had no place in the new system of power sharing.

During the most severe period of the conflict in 1992, Leninabad provided financial and military support to the Kulob parties and supported Rakhmonov's candidacy in the 1992 Supreme Soviet meeting in Khujand, where he was chosen as head of government. Relations between Leninabad and Kulob deteriorated, however, when Rakhmonov Abdumalik Abdullajonov from Khujand lost the 1994 presidential elections by only a few votes to Rakhmonov.

### **Response to Single Governance**

In 1992 during the worst of the conflict, Leninabadi people at first provided financial and military support to Kulobi parties and supported Rakhmonov's candidacy. In late 1992 a Supreme Soviet meeting was held in Khujand, where Rakhmonov was elected, winning the majority of the votes.<sup>56</sup> However, relations between Leninabad and Kulobi factions gradually deteriorated when Abdumalik Abdullajonov from Leninabad, a strong contender in the 1994 presidential elections lost with only a slight difference. Abdullajonov had much experience in politics, but was accused of embezzlement in 1994, and as a result he was dismissed from holding public office and running for the 1995

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<sup>55</sup> Iji Testuro, "Negotiating an End to the Conflict in Tajikistan", (Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University) 16

<sup>56</sup> Iskandar Asadullaev, "The Tajikistan Government," in *Accord: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, ed. Kammolludin Abdullaev and Catherine Barnes, (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001)24-25.



parliamentary elections. Intentional marginalization by other regional forced Abdullajonov to move to Moscow, where he founded the National Revival Movement (NRM) with Abdujalil Samadov and Jamshed Karimov, two other Leninabadis who had been in office. Their intent was to challenge Rakhmonov's government and lobby for the inclusion of the NRM in official negotiations.<sup>57</sup> The Leninabadi party posed the biggest challenge to the Kulobi faction and after lobbying for inclusion in peace talks, Rakhmonov refused.<sup>58</sup> He thought that by including Abdullajonov would weaken his influence and, decrease his political dominance over the United Opposition, leaving his government in a minority.<sup>59</sup>

### **International Response**

Mediators were silent about NRM's proposal. When they proposed that 40 seats would be given to Rakhmonov's party, 20 seats to the National Assembly and 20 quotas and some ministerial positions for Leninabadi faction, the UN, Russia and Iran let president to block their proposal.<sup>60</sup> The president did not accept because in addition to the abovementioned reasons he wanted to reserve the powerful ministerial seats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Security, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Defense for those he trusted and those loyal to him from Kulob.<sup>61</sup> Despite rejecting their plan, the mediators supported the government because its main goal was to achieve a ceasefire and reach an agreement between the two major parties with military power.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Abdullajonov and the Third Force," 30.

<sup>58</sup> Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Abdullajonov and the Third Force," 30.

<sup>59</sup> Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Abdullajonov and the Third Force," 31.

<sup>60</sup> Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Abdullajonov and the Third Force," in *Accord: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, ed. Kammolludin Abdullaev and Catherine Barnes, (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001)30-31.

<sup>61</sup> Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Abdullajonov and the Third Party," 30.

<sup>62</sup> Iskandar Asadullaev, "The Tajikistan Government," in *Accord: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, ed. Kammolludin Abdullaev and Catherine Barnes, (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001)

Throughout the conflict resolution process mediators acted as legitimizers and moderators of peace. Despite having power of influence on conflicting parties they did not address root causes of the conflict, instead choosing to concentrate efforts on the short-term goal of a ceasefire. This impacted the new political elite of Tajikistan in a way that they became capable to easily exterminate their opponents. By taking this approach, a great opportunity for a real representative government was lost. The mediators' tactic worked to legitimize the government's system of marginalization and political patronage.

### ***Security First Approach***

In the 1990s Russia had its own internal problems in its southern territories, which are largely Muslim, so it shifted its foreign policy towards Tajikistan.<sup>63</sup> It sent 25000 peacekeeping troops to support the government and help secure Tajikistan's borders. Russia's main aim was to restore peace without any Islamic influence, which would reduce the possibility of dissent in its territories. The UN and other mediators acted on the basis of security first approach, as they limited mediation process to addressing only problems caused by the war, and not those which led to conflict

All of the mediators however, ignored the importance of addressing regional factionalism, which was the main cause of the conflict.<sup>64</sup> They concentrated their attention on problems which emerged on a period of conflict from 1992-1997. Those problems were the outcome of the conflict, but not causes of the conflict. Four major issues: military, refugee, political and prisoner amnesty were discussed from a political perspective, but the socio-ethnic situation was not taken into account. The security first

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<sup>63</sup> Dov Lynch, *Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan*, (USA, St. Martin's Press, 2000) 149-53.

<sup>64</sup> Rashid G. Abdullo, "Implementation of the 1997 General Agreement", in *Accord: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, ed. Kammolludin Abdullaev and Catherine Barnes, (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001), 53.

approach in the case of Tajikistan led to a one-sided peace agreement, which excluded other regions. Under the 1994 UN resolution that saw the establishment of UNMOT in Dushanbe, observers were only allowed to “maintain close contact with the parties in conflict”<sup>65</sup>. The mediators were thus limited to consider warring and did not take into account other factions.

In the same document it was assigned that the UN “urges all states and others concerned to facilitate the process of national reconciliation and to refrain from any actions that could complicate the peace process”.<sup>66</sup> This can perhaps be used to explain why the mediators did not challenge Rakhmonov’s refusal to include Abdullajonov and his party. As a result of this policy, two parties with military capacity were left to build a new Tajikistan on the principles of “democracy”, which turned later into neo-patrimonialism.

### ***Vague Agreement***

The opposition were not willing to negotiate until they realized that a military solution was not easy to achieve. However, pressure put by the mediators on the government and opposition increased overall commitment to the process as before success and failure was dependent on the battlefield. Using their leverage over parties they made them realize the costs and benefits of cooperation that eventually persuaded the government and the United Tajik Opposition to sign the Protocol on Fundamental Principles of Establishing Peace in 1995 and the General Agreement on National Reconciliation in 1997, which stopped armed conflict but neglected other regions and parties in the country. The agreement was vague, because the process of implementation

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<sup>65</sup> “Resolution 968,” *United Nations Security Council*, accessed April 30, 2015  
[http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/968\(1994\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/968(1994))

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

were not described, the process of distributing quotas and sharing power. As a consequence when it came to implementation of agreements on political provisions it caused debates. In the political protocol parties agreed on:

- a) Creation of the National Reconciliation Commission, which would monitor the implementation of the General Agreement provisions and would be responsible for the following actions:
- b) Establishment of the Central Electoral Commission, with 25 percent of places allocated to members of the UTO, which would be responsible for conducting a referendum and elections before the work of joint government.
- c) Incorporating UTO members and local governments, judicial and law enforcement branches into the executive body.
- d) Lifting previous ban on media activities and UTO members in accordance with the constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan.
- e) Power-sharing system of 70 to 30 percent of governmental places to Rakhmonov's party and UTO respectively.<sup>67</sup>

Even though Commission on National Reconciliation (CNR) was designed as an independent body containing 26 members from both factions with power to draft constitutional amendments, change legislation and organize referendums, it lacked “procedural safeguard”<sup>68</sup>, because there was not balance of power system.

A lack of tools to implement provisions of The General Agreement hindered the

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<sup>67</sup> General Agreement, “Protocol on Political Issues”, 18 May 1997.

<sup>68</sup> Rahmatillo Zoir and Scott Newton, “Constitutional and Legislative Reform”, in *Accord: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, ed. Kammolludin Abdullaev and Catherine Barnes, (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001) 56.

effectiveness the agreement. For example in the power sharing system, where 30 percent of positions in the government were allocated to UTO members, but the way of distribution of quotas and selection of candidates to given positions was not assigned. Lack of instructions on implementation and formulas of distribution of quotas reflected the absence of real institutional reforms constituted in the agreement, because the main accent in the agreement was done on intricate term ‘national reconciliation’.<sup>69</sup>

### ***Development of a Neo-Patrimonial Regime***

The turning point in the history of Tajikistan was the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord (1994-1997)<sup>70</sup> between the government and the United Opposition. It was intended to be the basis for democratic development of the country and creation of balance in the power system. However, it did not address the root causes of the conflict and failed to address deep-seated issues in the political and legal system.<sup>71</sup> Instead it laid the foundation for the government to build a regime based on the principles of patronage and regionalism. Despite Rakhmonov’s rule being based on a constitution that states governance should be based on “sovereign, democratic, rule of law, secular and democratic state”<sup>72</sup>, in reality the state is seen as “weak, illegitimate and maintained largely by the ‘war weariness’ of the population”<sup>73</sup>. Tajikistan is a neo-patrimonial country where informal politics defines and sets the foundation of formal

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<sup>69</sup> Rahmatillo Zoir and Scott Newton, “Constitutional and Legislative Reform”, in *Accord: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, ed. Kammolludin Abdullaev and Catherine Barnes, (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001) 55-59

<sup>70</sup> The General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord, (Moscow, 1997)

<sup>71</sup> Rahmatullo Zoir and Scott Newton, “Constitutional and Legislative Reform”, in *Accord: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, ed. Kammolludin Abdullaev and Catherine Barnes, (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001)

<sup>72</sup> Article 1, “*Constitution of Tajikistan*”, (Dushanbe, 1994) 55.

<sup>73</sup> John Heathershaw, “Post-Conflict Tajikistan”: *The Politics of Peace building and the Emergence of Legitimate Order*, (New York, 2009), 173.

politics through patronage, clientalism, and network politics.<sup>74</sup> The roots of neo-patrimonialism go back to the end of the war when Rakhmon gave ministerial power over 4 government institutions to close confidants from Kulyab<sup>75</sup>. His intention was to surround himself with loyal people and counteract those who might cause any political or economic threats. Gradually the system would reach a point where it was entirely concentrated around a single person and his loyalties.<sup>76</sup> After signing the General Agreement on National Reconciliation, political culture in Tajikistan moved in such direction that political parties, groups and opposition would not be able to operate freely, the electoral system would become corrupted and the regime would have authoritarian rule over a population who were increasingly passive towards politics.

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<sup>74</sup> Rico Isaac, "Neopatrimonialism and Beyond: *Reassessing Formal and Informal in the Study of Central Asian Politics*", Contemporary Politics, Vol. 20, No.2, 229-245, (Rutledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2014) 230, accessed 2/02/2015,

<sup>75</sup> Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Abdullajonov and the Third Force," in *Accord: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, ed. Kammolludin Abdullaev and Catherine Barnes, (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001) 30-31.

<sup>76</sup> Merlene Laurelle, "Discussing Neopatrimonialism and Patronal Presidentialism in the Central Asian Context", (Democratizaciya, 2012), Vol.20, Issue 4, 301-324.

## **Conclusion**

Tajikistan gained its independence being the poorest country in the Soviet Union. In the 1991 Tajikistan gained independence. As legacy Tajikistan inherited regionalism and ethno nationalism from Soviet Union, who used such system to keep control over its subordinated republics. The head of the government of Tajikistan became the former communist party member Rakhmon Nabiev, who promoted communism in the country. As many regions under the Soviet Control were in the shadow of Leninabadi politicians who dominated in economy and politics in the period of Soviet's rule. In 1992 any parties showed their unwillingness to have communist government and organized opposition groups based on regional affiliations. Opposition parties: Islamic Party of Renaissance, organized demonstrations in Dushanbe to for communists to leave, but peaceful demonstrations escalated into full range armed conflict because of the government's aggressive response. Armed conflict resulted in from 60 000 to 100 000 killed people in 1993.

Uzbekistan sent a request to the UN Secretary General to intervene the conflict and send peacemaking troops to resettle the conflict. In 1993 the UN established UNMOT office and delegated its special envoy to facilitate negotiation process. Together with regional states and other international organization UN nations used multi-party approach to bring conflicting parties to negotiations table.

Mediators used security-first approach in negotiations to achieve peace reconciliation. Third parties used leverage and put pressure on conflicting parties to force their commitment to the negotiation process. Mediators were successful in achieving their goal and stop the violence, through facilitating exclusive negotiation. Northern parties were

excluded from the power sharing system, which later resulted in the regime becoming neo-patrimonial and authoritarian.



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## Appendixes


### Appendix 1:

Meeting	Date	Venue
I Round	4-19 April, 1994	Moscow
II Round	18-28 June, 1994	Tehran
Consultative Meeting	12-17 Sep., 1994	Tehran
III Round	20 Oct., - 1 Nov., 1994	Islamabad
Consultative Meeting	20-26 Apr., 1995	Moscow
Meeting between Rahmonov and Nuri	16-17 May, 1995	Kabul
IV Round	22 May-2 June, 1995	Almaty
Meeting between Rahmonov and Nuri	19 July, 1995	Tehran
V Round	30 Nov. -22 Dec. 1995 26 Jan. - 18 Feb. 1996 26 Jan. - 21 July 1996	Ashgabat Ashgabat Ashgabat
Meeting between Rahmonov and Nuri	10-11 Dec. 1996	Khos Deh
Meeting between Rahmonov and Nuri	10-23 Dec. 1996	Moscow
VI Round	5-19 Jan. 1997	Tehran
Meeting between Rahmonov and Nuri	20-21 Feb. 1997	Meshed
VII	26 Feb. - 8 Mar. 1997	Moscow
VIII Round Part I	9-16 Apr. 1997	Tehran
Meeting between Rahmonov and Nuri	16-18 May 1997	Bishkek
VII Round Part 2	21-28 May	Tehran
Meeting between Rahmonov and Nuri	26-27 June 1997	Moscow

### Intern\_Tajik Negotiations<sup>77</sup>

<sup>77</sup> Roy, Oliver. "Inter-regional dynamics of war" in *Accord: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, ed. Kammolludin Abdullaev and Catherine Barnes, (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001),43

**Appendix II:**



**Tajikistan Regions<sup>78</sup>**

<sup>78</sup> “Tajikistan Cities Map,” *Maps of the World*, accessed April 30, 2015  
<http://www.mapsofworld.com/tajikistan/cities/>