Section 1. Social Sciences

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Extremist Right-Wing Parties in Contemporary Germany

Introduction

After the end of the Second World War (WWII), few in West Germany foresaw that in less than a decade the specter of right-wing extremism would reemerge with renewed intensity. Particularly in the first decades after the end of WWII, the newly founded German democracy experienced the proliferation of right-wing extremist parties and movements across the country. More than 40 different right-wing political parties and movements were counted in West Germany during this period of time (28, p.95).

With varied intensity, the new forces demanded the reversal of the liberal democratic state in Germany, the subversion of capitalist markets, and the end of Allied occupational politics (before the reunification). The emerging right-wing extremist parties profited from deeply seated disappointment of many Germans at the division of the German state, the Allied occupation, the expulsion of many Germans from former East German territories (Prussia, Sudetenland), and the difficult socioeconomic conditions in the first decade after the end of WWII. In addition, the parties also exploited the deep rooted right-wing attitudes of many Germans. Indoctrinated by the Nazi propaganda machine during the 12 years of Nazi rule, it was not easy for many Germans to forgo deeply rooted attitudes and values.[1] Such feelings and sentiments conditioned and facilitated the emergence and proliferation of right-wing political parties and movements in the country.

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[1] E.g. Sidney Verba and Almond Verba in their study of political attitudes in five European nations found that the dominant feature of the political culture of West Germans in the 1950s was political detachment and indifference towards political participation. See The Civic Culture. *Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations,* Princeton 1963, p. 428ff.

During the late 1960s and in the 1970s, the claim of political extremists in Germany subsided slightly, either due to the absorption of their voters by the traditional right and center-right political parties, or due to the internal weakening of extremist parties. However, the virus of political extremism did not disappear. Social transformation, economic stagnation, unemployment, cutting of the social budget, and rising immigration rates were the breeding grounds for a new rise of right-wing extremism in West Germany in the 1980s. Later, the German reunification in 1990 provided new incentives for the radical right-wing extremist parties and movements in Germany to consolidate their ranks, particularly in the eastern part of the country. (25, p.2)

The *German National Democratic Party* (NPD), the *German People's Union Party* (DVU), and the *Republikaner* party, today represent three formidable enemies of German democracy and its liberal values. Founded during the 1960s and 1980s, these three parties have been persistent in their appeal to overt nationalism and xenophobia, and their rejection of individual and social equality and integration of marginalized groups. All three parties have been rather insignificant on the national level, but they have achieved some noticeable success in communal and regional elections. The recent victory of the NPD in communal elections in Sachsen-Anhalt shows that the reservoir of right-wing attitudes in Germany, particularly in East Germany, remains high (21, p.2). This also proves the recent study by the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, which found that one in four Germans wish to have a "strong party", that "would embody the whole people's community". Another alarming finding was that one in ten Germans wish to have a "Führer" who "would govern Germany for the benefit of all with an iron hand". (8, p.72ff) Against this background the present article seeks to explore the contemporary right-wing extremist parties in Germany, their organizational strength, political platforms, and their social basis.

Working definition of right-wing extremism

Before analyzing the right-wing extremist parties and their political platforms, we need to elaborate a working definition of right-wing extremism. The term 'right-wing extremism' lacks sharp analytical contours. It is often conflated and confused with the similar yet substantially differing terms of 'right-wing populism' and 'right-wing radicalism'. The reason for this is the Janus-headed nature of the right-wing extremist parties, which makes it difficult to give clear definitions of its varying forms and subforms. The right-wing extremist political parties, which will also be investigated in the present article, have by different authors at different times been called 'right-wing populist', 'radical right-wing populist', or 'radical right-wing'[1]. Though similar in name, the three terms denote different streams of political extremism. The question of where right-wing populism or right-wing radicalism ends, and where right-wing extremism begins, needs proper demarcation.

The term 'right-wing extremism' will be used herein to describe a form of political extremism (15, p.7-24) that derives its claim from the principal belief in ethnic and social inequality between people, puts the interests of the community ahead of the interests of

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[1]   E.g. Hans-Georg Betz calls them radical right-wing populist parties. See, Betz, Hans-Georg. (1994) *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*, New York: St. Martin's Press.

the individual, calls for an omnipresent role of the state, denies pluralism, and rejects a multiparty system. Thus, right-wing extremism is the antithesis of a liberal democratic state. (4, p.248ff) Whereas a liberal democratic state derives its legitimacy from the people's sovereignty and majority rule, right-wing extremists aspire to a state in which non-native parts of the population are excluded from enjoying essential basic rights. Where democracy bases its legitimacy on supremacy of individual liberties, the right-wing extremists conjure up a state in which personal freedoms are subordinated to the interest of protection of law and order. The right-wing extremist would ideally prefer to replace the modern democratic state with a sort of 'Führer-state' in which a strong authoritarian ruler would rule with an iron hand.

Many of the elements mentioned in our definition of right-wing extremism can also be found within right-wing populism and right-wing radicalism. Nationalism, appeal to strong authoritarian rule, and rejection of multiculturalism are also part of a familiar repertoire of many right-wing populist and right-wing radical parties in Europe. Like right-wing extremists, both right-wing populists and right-wing radicals divide the world into 'us' and 'them', and frequently use stigmas to downgrade 'others', foremost the foreigners. Another principal similarity is the appeal to xenophobia, which often spills over into overt racism and anti-Semitism.

Where right-wing populists and right-wing radicals principally differ from right-wing extremists is their attitude towards the liberal democratic state. Right-wing extremists reject the democratic state, especially its principles of social equality and pluralism, and seek to subvert and replace it by an authoritarian state. Right-wing populists and right-wing radicals do not enshrine those position in their programmatic platforms. Despite their denial of multiculturalism and their appeal to xenophobia, the right-wing populists and right-wing radicals are not necessarily hostile to the democratic principles of people's sovereignty and equality.

In contrast to the right-wing extremists, the world of right-wing populists and right-wing radicals is much more flexible and open to adaptation. This feature can explain why in many European democratic states we find populist and radical right-wing parties in the government.[1] Thus, right-wing populist together with right-wing radical parties are much more compliant with democracy, and thus more tolerated by mainstream political parties as coalition partner. Even right-wing radical parties which call for radical change of social and economic problems by going into their roots (latin 'radix' = 'root') show moderation as regards their attitudes toward democracy. By contrast, the world of the right-wing extremists is much more coherent and static; As a rule, there is no place for variety and opposition. In addition, the right-wing extremists seek historical and ideological connections with subversive '-isms' of the interwar Europe like Fascism and Nazism, and see themselves as a continuation of the Nazi ideology. (4, p. 250)

Despite these conceptual differences, the boundaries between right-wing extremism, right-wing populism, and right-wing radicalism are very slippery. Often right-wing extremist

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[1] The very recent example is the Geert Wilders' Freedom Party victory in the June 2010 parliamentary elections in the Netherlands. See: False prophet. Why Geerts Wilders is a Problem, Not a Solution. *The Economist.* 7 October 2010.

parties bear features of right-wing populists, and right-wing populist parties adopt features of right-wing extremists. The same applies for the right-wing radical parties.

From this inconsistency in political platforms another important feature of these right-wing '-isms' springs in mind, which can be used as a semantic threshold between them. *Extremism* means going beyond the outer ends of permissible, or to use the definition of Seymour Martin Lipset, "means going beyond the limits of the normative procedures which define the democratic political process" (3, p.161). *Populism* can be seen as a political strategy of instrumentalization of public anxiety and disenchantment, and *radicalism* builds the threshold as well as the scale of 'over-boiling'. Wherever the right-wing parties begin to reject universal human rights and deny equality between men, they surpass the 'threshold' to *extremism*.

According to the definitions used above, three right-wing extremist political parties in Germany will be given particular attention in our analysis: the *German National Democratic Party* (NPD), the *German People's Union Party* (DVU), and the party of the *Republikaner*. Today in Germany, these parties represent three formidable enemies of the liberal democratic state and its values. With varied intensity these parties have been persistent in their criticism of democratic foundations of the German state. This includes their demand for ethnic homogeneity of the German people, their explicit proclamation of social inequality between the people based on their ethnic and racial differences, their denial of the multicultural characteristic of the German society, and their call for expulsion of all foreigners from the country.

Origin and history

In contrast to other democratic states in Europe the right-wing extremist scene in Germany might appear relatively weakly represented. Since the creation of the West German state in 1949, the right-wing extremist parties have not been able to achieve any remarkable success in the national elections. In contrast to the mainstream political parties the right-wing extremist parties have had permanent problems with building core membership. Their political growth and significance has been very much contingent on political and economic conditions in the country. This notwithstanding, we should not write the right-wing extremist parties off the political stage in Germany as a feeble political force. Particularly on the level of the German States (*Länder*) and Communes, the right-wing extremist parties have had more political success, and at times have achieved remarkable electoral breakthroughs. (See the chart in the appendix)

The oldest among our three parties is the *German National Democratic Party* (NPD). Founded in 1965, the party was built as result of consolidation efforts by several right-wing extremist groupings in the country, and was thought to be the common roof for them during the next elections. The leader of the party became Adolf von Thadden, a representative of the German nobility and former member of the Presidium of the *German Socialist Reich Party*, which was the earliest version of a night-wing extremist party in post-war West Germany. It was banned by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1952 based upon the party's hostility to the German democratic constitution, and its self-identification as the successor to the *German National Socialist Workers' Party* (NSDAP) of Adolf Hitler. (13, p.127)

One particular factor that facilitated the building of the NDP as a new right-wing extremist party was the economic crisis in 1966-1967. This was the first economic crisis after WWII. The inability of the ruling Great Coalition, consisting, of the *Christian Democratic Union* (CDU) and the *Social Democratic Party* (SPD), to deal with the rising public debt and unemployment played into the hands of the NPD. During the next regional elections, the party won several seats in the state parliaments in Lower Saxony (7.0%), Schleswig-Holstein (5.8%), Rhineland-Palatinate (6.9%), Hesse (7.9%), Bavaria (7.4%), and Baden-Wuertemberg (9.8%). In total, the party won 61 seats in regional parliaments and filled more than 600 posts in regional and municipal public institutions. (26, p.51) It was remarkable that the NDP strongholds were the same as where Hitler's NSDAP Party had success in the period of 1930-1932.

Despite this initial success on the regional level, the NDP could not achieve any remarkable breakthrough in national elections. In 1969, the party scored only 4.3% in the next national vote, and could not enter the Bundestag because it failed to surpass the electoral threshold of 5%. The same trend was seen during the 1970s and 1980s. The NDP party leadership could not profit from the economic crisis following the 1974-1975 oil shock. In 1986, the party did win one regional parlament mandate in Bremen when it canbined forces with the *German People's Union Party* (DVU), another right-wing extremist party analyzed below. Except for this single victory, the NDP remained insignificant until the 1990s.

Not only did the NDP find little support among West German voters, but also internal fragmentation weakened its internal organization. This can be observed in the declining number of party members. At its peak of popularity in 1969, the NDP had almost 28,000 active members, but by the beginning of the 1980's, the number of active members decreased to 7,000. (2, p.64)

With the German reunification in 1990 and turning of the new century, the NDP experienced a reanimation of its popularity. In 1992, the party achieved 10.9% or 15 mandates in the regional elections in Baden-Wuertemberg, and another 9.1% or 14 mandates in the elections of 1996. Rolf Schlierer, its new leader since 1994, was apparently successful in consolidating the rank and file of the party. In the first decade of the new century the party moved the center of gravity of its activities to the East, where the potential of right-wing attitudes was apparently higher. The party won 8 mandates in the 2009 regional elections in 2009 in Sachsen-Anhalt. Currently, 29 members of the NDP sit in regional, communal, and municipal institutions in Sachsen-Anhalt. (21, p.1), and the party enrolls almost 6,000 members.

Another right-wing extremist party which fits our definition is the *German People's Union Party* (DVU). It is currently the largest right-wing extremist party in Germany with 13,000 active members. The DVU party was founded in 1971 as a protest movement against the signing of the 'East Treaty' by the government of Willy Brandt (1969-1974), which many DVU members viewed as unconstitutional. The 'East Treaty' initiated the reconciliation policy of West Germany with countries in Eastern Europe, primarily East Germany and the USSR. Under the authoritarian leadership of Dr. Gerhard Frey (one of the richest men in Germany, and the owner of a printing house where right-wing emblems, flags, maps, audio and video materials, and several right-wing newspapers like "Deutsche National- Zeitung", "Deutscher Anzeiger" and "Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung" were printed) the party did not at first seek parliamentary representation. (2, p.64) This tactic was, however, changed after

German reunification. The DVU achieved its first significant breakthrough in 1992 in Schleswig-Holstein (6.3%), followed in 1998 in Sachsen-Anhalt (12.9%), and two subsequent victories in Brandenburg in 1999 (5.3%) and 2004 (6.1%). (25, p.3) These achievements notwithstanding, the party's work in the state parliaments can be retroactively considered as infamous and incompetent. (14)

The third right-wing extremist party in Germany is the party of the *Republikaner*. Founded in 1983, the main catalysts for building the new party came surprisingly from two prominent members of the conservative *Christian Social Union* party (the sister party of the Christian Democratic Party from Bavaria) and from Franz Schönhuber (the TV-Moderator of a monthly talk show on Bavarian television). The Republikaner party was built in direct response to the failure of the government of Helmut Kohl (1982-1994) to bring about a promised radical turnaround (*Wende*) in West German politics.

Republikaner party leadership saw its mission as reviving what can be described as a genuine German conservatism. (7, p.49) The party was at first built, and has in fact seen itself, as a regional party with relatively strong representation in Bavaria where in 1989 the party achieved its most spectacular victory (14%). However, the one spectacular breakthrough the party could achieve nationwide came in the European elections of 1989 when the party won 7.1% of votes or 6 mandates in the EU parliament. (7, p.50)

Like the two other right-wing extremist parties the Republikaner party followed the same path, with ups in the beginning and downs in the end. Following German reunification, the party shifted its focus to the East where it hoped to win new voters. Republikaner membership declined from 18,000 members at the peak of its political career to the current number of 9,000 active members. (2, p.66ff)

In contemporary Germany, the NDP, DVU, and Republikaner parties represent three formidable enemies of German democracy and its liberal values. Although the three parties are hardly represented on the national level, they are not and should not be treated as marginal forces within the German politics. (19) Even though the number of active members of the three parties has been declining over the last decades, the cumulative number of voters of the NPD, DVU, and Republikaner parties has doubled since German reunification, from 875,000 to 1.6 million. (26, p.7) Particularly between elections, the parties have successfully increased their popularity among German voters. Their efforts at network building among youth, particularly in East Germany, are likely to increase the number of real and potential members in near future.

Programmatic pillars of right-wing extremist parties

Before we turn our focus toward the political platforms of the three right-wing extremist parties, two preliminary observations are important to mention. First, all right-wing extremist parties no longer appear to be single-issue parties. (29, p. 103) In order to counter their decline and attract new voters almost all right-wing extremist parties (except the DVU) adopted exhaustive party programs covering almost every political, economic, and social issue as illuminated through their ideological prism. The DVU is an exception; Its current 12-point program stands out in its essential as well as vocabulary scarcity. (9) Second, all right-wing extremist parties use very unobtrusive terms to express their position in their programs. This

key attribute can be considered as the direct response by the right-wing extremist parties to the defensive character of the contemporary German constitution.

After the bitter experience with failure of the Weimar democracy (1919-1933), the founding fathers of the new German constitution enshrined the concept of 'militant democracy' in the Article 21 of the Basic Law. This allows the Federal Constitutional Court to declare political parties unconstitutional it they are found to represent a danger to the democratic constitutional order.[1] Based on this provision, two political parties were been banned in Germany by the Federal Constitutional Court: in 1952 the already mentioned Socialist Reich Party (SRP), and four years later the *Communist Party of Germany* (KPD). The Court Found that these two parties represented a threat to democratic stability and constitutional order. Association bans have also been implemented in several cases. Since 1990, some twenty extremist right-wing groupings have been banned in Germany. Besides the Federal Constitutional Court, the German *Länder* can also initiate process and ban right-wing extremist political parties and movements. In total, since 1949 the German states at the level of interior ministry banned 49 right-wing extremist parties and movements. (18, p.38)

Against this background of resolute treatment of enemies of democracy in Germany, all contemporary right-wing extremist parties display unbelievable moderation in their political programs. (28, p.102) The DVU party even tries to profess its 'wholehearted and unquestioning' commitment to democracy, and its liberal values in the preamble to its program. Despite this, overt nationalism and the antidemocratic substance of all three parties have remained permanent features, and are manifest in many places.[2] This applies especially to the theme of nationalism, which penetrates through almost all chapters as the common thread in the programs of all three parties. In fact, nationalism and right-wing extremism can be considered as twinned phenomen, not only in Germany but also elsewhere in Europe. (26, p.43) All three parties demand the return to the nationalist idealism of the 19th century, according to which the state was the gift for one particular nation.

For this reason, the parties vehemently reject the multicultural society, which in their opinion destroys the bonds between the people and creates 'parallel societies'. On the same ground they seek to expel all foreigners from the country, as they destroy the German sense of national identity and unnecessarily burden the German social system. This is especially true of the DVU and the NPD, which are very radical in their treatment of foreigners, and do not spare negative words to stigmatize foreigners as evils of all German problems including crime. The Republikaner party appears more moderate on this issue. Whereas the NPD and DVU appeal to overt xenophobia, the Republikaner party speaks about 'estrangement' (*Übefremdung*) of the German society, and calls for the stop to future immigration. (32, p.15)

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[1] See: Roger Eatwell and Cas Mudde. 2009 *Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge*, London and NY: Routledge.

[2] The party program of the NPD was updated and adopted at the party congress in Bamberg in June 2010. The party program of the Republikaner was updated and adopted at the party congress in 2002. The party program of the DVU party has no data about year and place. See: Arbeit, Familie, Vaterland. Das Parteiprogramm der Nationaldemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (NPD), September, 2010 http://www.npd.de; Die Republikaner. Sozial – Patriotisch – Цkologisch. Bundesparteiprogramm, 2002 http://www.rep.de; Deutsche Volksunion Partei. Das Bundesprogramm http://www.die-rechte.info

In addition, nationalism also penetrates into areas where parties express their attitude toward recent German history. In general, all three parties belittle the German role in WWII, and agree that the German contribution to the war should be revised. On the same ground, they demand a stop to German remuneration payments to victims of WWII, and demand due respect by the state for German war veterans.

As to the question of German contribution to the war, and German history after the war, the position of the DVU and the NPD appears again more resolute and radical. The DVU openly demands the return of German lands east of the Oder-Neisse line, which was drawn in the aftermath of WWII as the border between Poland and Germany. The NPD in turn speaks about the need to restore the historical unity between the German people and the state, giving a hint to the Germans living in Austria, Poland and the Czech Republic. In its party program of 1998 the NPD was much clearer when it proclaimed that "Germany is bigger than the current Federal Republic of Germany" reminding everybody in Germany of the territory of the German Reich before WWII. (31, p.13)

In foreign policy, all three parties seem to have no sound alternative to the foreign policy of the German government. No long-term strategy is apparent. Their statements are rather populist, and neglecting in content and programmatic aims. All three parties admit that the 21st century will be decisive for all Germans as they face many global challenges such as increased foreignization, internationalization, and globalization.

Foreignization refers not only to the growth of Moslem cultures in Germany, but also to increased American influence. Anti-Americanism has been a persistent feature within the right-wing extremist propaganda. The right-wing extremists criticize not only the current U.S. military and foreign policy, but also the whole concept of the 'American way of life', which they consider as "decadent, soulless, aggressive, and imperialistic". (16, p.3)

With regard to the European Union (EU) and the European integration, all parties could represent the 'hard-liners' within the Eurosceptics as they not only reject the membership of Germany in the EU, but also deny the EU in its current form.[1] The justification for their Euroscepticism is the notion that the EU weakens the national identity of Germans. In particular, the parties demand the return of the national currency, reject the Lisbon Treaty and the enlargement of the EU towards Eastern Europe, and oppose free movement of people in the EU, particularly those from the new member-states. They also reject Turkey as a potential member-state of the EU, based open their view of Europe as a community of Christian nations. By contrast, their opposition to the membership of Eastern European countries in the EU is guided by a deeply seated 'welfare chauvinism' or unwillingness to share German economic welfare with poor member-states of Eastern Europe.

Strong etatism or devotion to creating a strong state is omnipresent in the programs of all parties. What sounds reasonable is the statement that the state is the real safeguard of individual safety and freedoms. However, the parties violate this established truth by their position that individual freedoms should be subordinated to the liberty of the whole community. Thus, the state is allowed to intervene in the freedoms of the person where it sees that the freedom of the whole community is endangered. Statements like this display

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[1]   On difference between hard and soft-liners see Sten Berglund et al., *The Making of the European Union. Foundations, Institutions, and Future Trends*, Cheltenham 2006, pp. 150-151.

a strong desire on the part of right-wing extremist parties to constrain individual freedoms for the sake of the whole community. At the same time, they implicitly express their wish to replace the liberal democratic state by powerful authoritarian state.

This feature becomes particularly evident where the parties speak about the necessity to restore law and order in the state. Thereby, the rule of law is not interpreted as equality before the law and the supremacy of the law, but in terms of 'total monopoly of the state'. This entails an increased role in the society for the police and state persecution agencies, with punishment of any assault, even a minor one, and no mercy for the criminals.

In addition, all right-wing extremist parties are united in their criticism of representative institutions in Germany. The German Basis Law, adopted by the German Parliament, is vehemently rejected by all parties. On the same ground they call for a constitutional referendum. In addition, all parties are united in their demand for direct election of the President, and transferring more powers to him. Finally, all parties repudiate the defensive clause of the German Constitution (Art. 21), including the electoral threshold.

Social basis

The social basis of all three right-wing extremist parties can be said to currently represent a homogenous group. The earlier claims that the right-wing parties represent political parties of 'petit bourgeoisie' (22, p.86) appears still relevant today. Studies prove that all three right-wing extremist parties currently represent small entrepreneurs, farmers, and low or semi-skilled workers. All of these social groups have little job security, low education, low income, and are seen as highly at risk during an economic crisis.

Available data allows us to show the social composition of the right-wing extremist parties in greater detail. The NPD party enrolls its real and potential supporters from farmers, small entrepreneurs, retailers, self-employed, and also a small percentage from the working class. The party is particularly popular among unskilled or semi-skilled workers with lower or secondary school education, and appeals mostly to young voters between 18 and 29 years of age. The recent elections in Sachsen-Anhalt showed that from the 5.6% of total votes received, 13.5% came from the 18 to 25 age group. (24). The party also enjoys additional support in the Protestant North, among older voters between 40 and 49 (2, p.72) where the party's strongholds were concentrated, and recently also in the Catholic South. Another important feature is that the NPD is voted predominantly by men. This can be explained by the hostility of the NPD party to the issue of abortion, and the general aversion of women to the notion of extremism.

The same applies for the remaining two right-wing extremist parties: DVU and Republikaner. These two parties are also seen as 'men-parties' in Germany.(12) Likewise the both parties primarily recruit their voters among low and unskilled workers with low or secondary education, with fewer numbers from lower and middle-level employees and civil servants. Among voters with a higher university degree, all right-wing extremist parties have little or no support. (6, p.163) Kai Arzheimer found that the overwhelming majority of the right-wing parties' voters are also not affiliated with any established political parties, churches, or trade unions. (2, p.73) Geographically, the two parties have moved beyond their traditional strongholds in Bavaria (the Republikaner) and Schleswig-Holstein (DVU). (2, p.73)

Conclusion

A little more than a half a century after the end of the WWII the specter of political extremism again appears across Germany. Though its strength is still miniscule in comparison with the mainstream political parties, its appearance should not be treated as marginal or inconsequential. In fact, the appearance of right-wing political parties and the growth of their popularity among German voters can be perceived as the reaction of the German voters to what they perceive as shortcomings of democratic systems. That particularly marginalized groups within German society vote for the right-wing extremist parties shows the lack of political mechanisms in the hands of ruling political parties to offer them alternative solutions. As result, a gap is widening between citizens and the ruling political parties that the right-wing extremist parties increasingly seek to fill.[1]

Indeed, opinion polls show that a third of Germans believe that Germany's main political parties are turning more and more "elitist", both in terms of their composition and the political issues they deal with. Accordingly, they also believe that their proposals (e.g. tax-cut proposals) bring little relief to ordinary Germans. As result, the number of Germans who accuse the ruling political parties of "pandering to the rich" has dramatically increased over the last decade.(27) Such sentiments may build a breeding ground for right-wing attitudes in the future, and increase the number of potential supporters of right-wing extremist parties during the next elections.

Table 1.

***Results of the NPD, the Republikaner, and the DVU in National
and European elections***

National elections												
	1965	1969	1972	1976	1980	1983	1987	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006
NPD	2.0	4.3	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.3	-	1.8
Rep.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.1	1.9	1.8	0.6	0.1
DVU	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.6	-	-	1.2	-	-

European elections						
	1984	1989	1994	1999	2004	2009
NPD	0.8	0.9	0.2	-	-	-
Rep.	-	7.1	3.9	-	-	-
DVU	-	1.6	-	-	-	-

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[1] For more details, See, Jens Rydgren, Is the Right-Wing Populism Contagious? Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family. *European Journal of Political Research*, No. 44: 413-437. 2005.

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Ways to Study Meaning
(R.O. Jakobson vs. V.V. Nabokov)

The problem addressed in this paper is to compare different models of expressing meaning in texts. The matter is that the theory allows supplementing verbal expression of meaning with, in the words of James Joyce, "ineluctable modality of the visible". In ancient Greece, the "theorists" were "carefully peering" spectators at sports events, and "the theory" helped these spectators anticipate results more accurately than participating athletes could do. Thus, the roots of both commonly used scientific terms are also associated with the "modality of the visible".